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ABSTRACT
THE TRANSFORMATIVE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION:
AN ALLIANCE'S OUT-OF-AREA POLICY AND JOURNEY TO AFGAHNISTAN
Laura Kash
University of New Hampshire, May, 2009
NATO was formed in 1949 to safeguard and promote stability for its members
throughout the North Atlantic. Since its formation its members have sought to uphold its
mission and objectives while expanding its agenda and engaging in a broad range of
activities. These activities have included engagements that lay outside the traditional
European boundaries of the Alliance. Historically, the member nations were unable to
carry out an out-of-area policy due to disagreements between interests, ideologies, and
viewpoints. The end of the Cold War signaled a shift in member nations' attitudes and
policy regarding out-of-area operations. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the
Alliance engaged in several missions and participated in its first out-of-area mission in
Afghanistan.

Through a dialogical analysis of NATO's policy building upon rule-

orientated constructivism, this thesis will explore NATO member nations' shift in out-ofarea policy and understand why NATO became involved in Afghanistan in 2001.

x

INTRODUCTION

After many years of misery and suffering through the Great Depression and
World War II, prosperity was no longer a glimmer in the horizon for the citizens of the
United States and Europe. The year of 1949 represented a time of hope, success, and
change. The year was marked by a growth in car sales and television sets. It was also a
year in which the People's Republic of China had established the first Asian Communist
state under Mao Zedong and the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear bomb. Amidst the
trends and the rising tensions between the East and the West, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) was established.
The Alliance was formed in order to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage
and civilization of their people" while trying to "promote stability and well-being in the
North Atlantic area."1 According to NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, the
formation of the Alliance was seen as a way to keep "the Russians out, the American in,
and the Germans down."2 For the next sixty years, NATO's objectives would be sought
after and achieved through both political and military means.

1

"The North Atlantic Treaty," available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm; Internet,
accessed 21 October 2008.
2

"NATO in the 21st Century, Speech by the Secretary General to the Millennium Year Lord Mayor's
Lecture," available from http://www.nato.int/docu/speech72000/s000720a.htm; Internet, accessed 16
February 2009.
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From 1949 with the formation of NATO, until 1989 with the fall of the Berlin
Wall, the member states of the Alliance3 have continuously sought to uphold its mission
and objectives. As the Cold War came to an end and the security threat against the
member countries diminished, NATO sought new measures to uphold its mission within
the global security environment.
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has moved beyond its European
boundaries and has carried out its missions and operations in a different way by
expanding its agenda and engaging in a broader range of activities. Despite the shift
occurring in the global security environment, NATO has remained a crucial element in
preserving the safety and security of its member countries and their citizens. As NATO
members continue to expand the role and agenda of the Alliance, their efforts are
designed with one basic premise in mind - "to address proactively the security challenges
which could, or already do, affect the safety or the interests of its members and their
populations."4 As a result, NATO has carried out its mission and objectives in the 21 st
f

century.

Entering into the 21 st century, NATO has continued to embark on its mission to>
preserve the safety and security of its members. In doing so, the member nations have
sought to build a different relationship with the East, expand the membership of the
Alliance, and increase the involvement and activities of the Organization beyond the
traditional European boundaries. After the end of the Cold War, the members of NATO
built a different relationship between the West and Russia. By building an organic,
3

NATO is an alliance made up of member states; thus NATO can be referred to as an Alliance.
Throughout this thesis NATO may also be referred to as an Organization.

4

NATO in the 21 st Century.

~

:

2
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permanent relationship between Russia and the Alliance, the member nations have
developed an effective and efficient way to solve security issues. These issues include
crisis management and proliferation problem-solving. Additionally, the enlargement of
its membership has allowed NATO to "preclude major conflicts in Europe, because the
very prospect of NATO membership serves as an incentive for aspirants to get their own
houses in order."5

However the most significant development within NATO is its

continued involvement in selective missions and operations, particularly those reside outof-area.6
From the time since the end of the Cold War, NATO and its members have
dedicated a large amount of time in developing relationships and becoming involved in
issues with the new democracies of central, eastern and southern Europe. These new
partnerships have influenced NATO's out-of-area policy and have influenced the
Alliance's involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo. These changes reflect a shift regarding
the Alliance's out-of-area policy. These adaptations have allowed the member nations to
maintain the mission of NATO while combating threats through a combination of
political, diplomatic, and military efforts.
Following the attacks of September 11th, the United States began its fight against
terrorism. In its war on terrorism, the United States called upon the help of several
NATO member nations to invade and topple the al-Qaeda regime that resided in

5

NATO in the 21st Century.

6

According to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6, the NATO area, the area which NATO would defend is
"the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on
the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north
of the Tropic of Cancer." NATO is defined by these areas, thus any mission or operation which takes place
outside of these regions is known as "out-of-area." Furthermore, "out-of-area" is military term used in
NATO's military structure and forces,'which means any mission or operations which takes place outside of
the traditional European theater.

3

Afghanistan.

NATO, upholding its mission and its resilient bonds of its member

countries, responded by stating:
It underscores the urgency of intensifying the battle against terrorism, a battle that
the NATO countries - indeed all civilized nations - must win. All Allies stand
united in their determination to combat this scourge.
At this critical moment, the United States can rely on its 18 Allies in North
America and Europe for assistance and support. NATO solidarity remains the
essence of our Alliance. Our message to the people of the United States is that we
are with you. Our message to those who perpetrated these unspeakable crimes is
equally clear: you willnot get away with it.7
NATO's involvement in Afghanistan proved to be a test of the Alliance's determination,
principles, and military abilities. Afghanistan would be known as to be NATO's first
out-of-area mission.
NATO's- efforts in Afghanistan represent the Alliance's first mission beyond the
traditional boundaries of Europe. Although NATO has historically participated in several
missions, the operations in Afghanistan were special.

NATO's involvement in

Afghanistan was a historical turning point because it was the first effort undertaken by
NATO which involved both military and political efforts outside of the European theater.
For over fifty years NATO and its members have sought to safeguard the
freedom, common heritage and civilizations of their people and promote stability and
well-being in the North Atlantic area.8 Throughout its existence, the member nations of
the Alliance have changed and expanded the mission.

As such, the Alliance has

expanded its involvement from the central European theater to selective out-of-area
operations. In 2001, NATO once again expanded its involvement by being a part of
operations in Afghanistan.

In its present day, NATO remains a cornerstone in the

7

"September 11th, 2001: Statement by the North Atlantic Council," available from
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-122e.htm; Internet, accessed 16 February 2009.
8

The North Atlantic Treaty.
-
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operations in Afghanistan. The member nations will continue to expand the role of the
Alliance and be involved in selective out-of-area missions in order to uphold its mission
of stability and safety.
Although NATO has been involved in various missions previously, why did it
specifically become involved in Afghanistan? This thesis questions: why NATO become
involved in Afghanistan.

Specifically, are NATO member nations holding fast to

collective security rules while gradually adhering to institutionalism or simply are the
actions of the Alliance ad hoc? This analysis will critically analyze NATO member
states attitudes and out-of-area policy. The analysis of NATO's out-of-area mission in
Afghanistan will help to shed light on NATO's policy development and attitudes
regarding out-of-area and explain what led to NATO involvement in Afghanistan in
2001.

5

Overview of Thesis
The thesis consists of five chapters: Background, Toward an Analytical
Framework, Methodology, Case-Study, and Conclusions. A brief overview of each of
these chapters is as follows.
Chapter One, Background, will discuss relevant background information of this
study. The chapter will briefly trace the development of the NATO and its mission since
its establishment in 1949 to 2009. This discussion will lead to the question of the thesis:
why did NATO become involved in Afghanistan, specifically was its due to the use of
collective security rules and gradual adherence to institutionalism or ad hoc tendencies?
The final section of the chapter will introduce the reader to the case study of NATO
policy development which culminated in the Alliance's involvement in Afghanistan. The
purpose of this information is to provide a clear understanding to the reader for it is
essential for the study at hand.
Chapter Two, Toward an Analytical Framework, is divided into two main
sections. The first section will provide an overview of the literature and discuss related
alternative theories. I will argue which theory is substantial and applicable to this thesis constructivism. The section will then elaborate on the theory of constructivism. The
second section, will discuss a critical piece of literature written on constructing post-Cold
War collective security: Brian Frederking's Constructing Post-Cold War Collective
Security. Frederking's theory of rule-oriented constructivism will be the basis of this
thesis. The section will conclude with an outline of the strengths and weakness of
Frederking's work and then build upon these lessons learned and apply them throughout
the thesis.

6

Chapter Three, Methodology, will provide the methodologieal framework for this
study. The chapter will first identify the research question of the thesis, distinguish the
hypotheses to be tested, define the unit and level of analysis and key variables. It will
also outline the data and measurements of the variables.

Finally, the chapter will

intimately discuss the methodology of the study - dialogical analysis.
Chapter Four, Case Study, will comprise of the actual case study and present its
finding. First the chapter will outline the purpose, mission, and structure of NATO. Next
the chapter will provide a brief overview of NATO's policy regarding out-of-area. This
will be dovetailed by a historical summary of Afghanistan and NATO's recent
involvement in the Afghanistan 2001 invasion. The chapter will then interpret NATO's
policy between 1996 and 2003. Using NATO's communiques and dialogical analysis,
the chapter will outline the necessary background needed in order to test the research at
hand. Then the speech acts, found in the communiques, will be identified and explained.
These speech acts will then be analyzed according to both pragmatic and argument
methodologies. This chapter will conclude with a presentation of the findings.
Finally, Chapter Five, Conclusion, summarizes the findings of the thesis, briefly
j

highlight NATO and its policy development regarding out-of-area. The chapter finalizes
with a few directions for future research.

7

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

For nearly sixty years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a
fundamental cornerstone in the global security environment.

The Alliance was

established based upon democratic values, individual freedoms, and the rule of law. As
outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, the Alliance's mission is to "safeguard the
freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples" and "seek to promote
stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area."9 Each of these objectives would be
achieved through political and military means.
This chapter will discuss relevant background information of this study. The
chapter will briefly trace the development of NATO from 1949 to 2009. The chapter will
then highlight the history of NATO's operation and missions.

Building upon the

historical developments of the Alliance, the chapter will briefly discuss NATO's new
mission of the 21 st century. The chapter will end with a brief discussion on NATO's
involvement in Afghanistan. The chapter will establish the question of this thesis: why
did NATO become involved in Afghanistan? Specifically, are NATO member countries
adhering to institutionalism or is it because of ad hoc tendencies?

9

The North Atlantic Treaty.

8

The End of the Cold War
In 1989, the long standing divide - the Berlin Wall - between the hostile camps of
\

.

-

'

the Eastern and Western Europe met its fate. This was a significant turn in the security of
the Euro-Atlantic and the mission and objectives of NATO. The collapse of the Berlin
Wall signaled the first of multiple dominoes to fall and finalized in the end of the Cold
War. The security policy which had dominated Western policy since post-World War II
had finally come to a closure. The fall of the Berlin Wall lead to a sudden shift in the
balance of power. The materialization of a new world order signaled the beginning of a
new chapter in the security of the transatlantic and the mission of NATO.
Since the end Cold War, the mission of NATO became refocused in manner that
could have never been classified during the U.S.-Soviet dual. In essence the end of the
Cold War removed the foremost threat to NATO and signaled the emergence new
transnational threats. These new threats have jeopardized and challenged the peace and
stability of NATO and its members.

In this new environment, war was no longer

considered the only threat which nations faced. Threats to the Alliance and its members
would emerge outside of NATO's traditional mission area in the forms of terrorism,
states who have access to weapons of mass destruction, civil wars, natural disasters,
clashes over natural resources, and the "the impact of new technologies and reductions to
national defense spending."10 As a result, NATO member nations have responded to the
global security environment by developing "new roles, new missions, and accepting new
members.""

10

Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, (1999) "NATO Burden Sharing: Past and Future," Journal of Peace
Research 36:6:665.
"Ibid.

;

9
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NATO in the Post-Cold War Environment
The post-Gold War environment has inspired the emergence of a new integrated
European^Atlantic global security environment. Within this new environment, NATO
continued its central role of upholding its mission by establishing new methods for
cooperation and promoting a- shared understanding across the transatlantic region. As
NATO continues to engage the global security environment, it will continuously be
confronted with multiple challenges and threats.

Albeit the challenges and threats,

NATO will continue to strive to survive while transforming and adapting to reflect the
changes of the global security environment.
In the post-Cold War environment, NATO's existence has been challenged and its
objectives have altered. It was apparent from the end of the Cold War that the existing
security structure of the Alliance could not be used effectively in a crisis management.
Additionally, the security structures would not be capable of dealing with either "intrastate or regional conflicts, ethnic tensions, or aggressive separatism in the areas, which
are most frequently outside of NATO's direct geographic reach."12 The fundamental
question arose whether the Alliance would be able to exist in this new global security
environment and whether it could handle the nature of the security challenges while
being able to effectively adapt and maintain to confront the threats and challenges.
In 1991, NATO Heads of State agreed on the need to transform13 the Atlantic
Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in the global security environment. The
1991 Strategic Concept helped to reaffirm the original principles of the Alliance as well
:
:
' (
;
Manuka Metreveli, (2003) "Legal Aspects of NATO's Involvement in Out-of-Area Peace Support
Operations," NATO-EAPSC Research Fellowship (Brussels, BE: North Atlantic Treaty Organization).
12

13

Transform in this thesis will mean a marked change, as in Composition, appearance, character, and
condition.

10

as clarify NATO's role in the post-Cold War environment. The member nations agreed
that in order to achieve its central purpose, the Strategy would center around four
fundamental tasks:
•1. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment
in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the
peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate
or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of
force.
2. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a
transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital
interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security,
1

and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

3. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any
NATO member state; and
4. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.14
By fulfilling these fundamental security objectives, the member states were able to
continue upholding security and seeking peaceful resolutions to disputes.

However,

within a decade this policy was in desperate need of transformation, renovation, and
repairs.
From 1991 to 1999, NATO and its member states have been able to successfully
maintain its objectives as outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 and the Strategic
Concept of 1991 while adapting to the post-Cold War security environment. Over this
14

"The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the
meeting of the North Atlantic Council," available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm;
Internet, accessed 20 October 2008.
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period of time NATO member nations made internal alterations and played an expansive
role in supporting and maintaining objectives and missions. With the NATO members
engaging new roles and activities it became necessary to refine the Alliance's vision and
strategies for the future.

In 1999, at the Washington Summit, the members of the

Alliance adopted the Strategic Concept for the 21 st Century.
In April 1999, NATO Heads of State approved the Alliance's new Strategic
Concept. The new concept "emphasized that while collective security remains the core
purpose of NATO, Alliance security interests could be affected by other risks of a wider
nature and therefore must also take account of the global context."15 These included
"uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of
regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance" which could take the form of a "ethnic
and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the
abuse of human rights and the dissolution of states" that could lead to "crises affecting
Euro-Atlantic stability."16 More importantly the Strategic Concept formally adopted to
support (on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures) "operations
under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including by making available Alliance
resources and expertise."17

For the first time in NATO's history, the Alliance

documented and endorsed missions and operations. Even though the member nations did
not clearly define specification for area missions, the adoption of the Strategic Concept

13

"The Alliance's Strategic Concept," available from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm;
Internet, accessed 20 October 2008.
16

Ibid.

17

Ibid.

12
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solidified NATO's engagement in missions and opened the door for missions outside of
the European scope.
NATO's Missions and Operations
The Cold War
When NATO was first established in 1949, one of its fundamental roles was to
deter any military aggressions. In this role, NATO's success was a reflection of the
Alliance's lack of involvement in any military engagement. For much of the latter half of
the 20th century, NATO remained vigilant and prepared. Thus, throughout the Cold War
NATO relied upon a non-policy on missions who resided outside the boundaries of the
European continent.
The fundamental reason NATO did not endorse or implement an out-of-area
policy was based upon different interests perceived by each member nation beyond the
North Atlantic area. For example, "the United States had global interests; some NATO
members, including major ones as France and the United Kingdom, had regional
interests; and other NATO members only had local interests."

Another reason was the

different viewpoints regarding threat. "While NATO members recognized the constant,
albeit varying, Soviet threat to the North Atlantic area; there was no such consensus on
the Soviet threat to other parts of the world."19 A third and final reason was the variation
in ideologies. During the first half of the Cold War, various NATO members were in
•

•

•

possession of colonies while other countries held a position of anti-colonialism.

18

\

9ft

In the

Frode Liland, (1999) Keeping NATO Out of Trouble: NATO's Non-Policy on Out-of-Area Issues During
the Cold War in A History ofNA TO - The First Fifty Years, Volume I, (New York, NY: Palgrave), 173.
19

ibid;

20

ibid.
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later years of the Cold War, many of the NATO member countries found themselves
engulfed by "American projection of power all oyer the world, in the name of
containment of communism" and this was morally difficult for each country to grasp.21
Despite the difference in interests, ideologies, and perceptions toward threat, the end of
the Cold War led to a shift in area policy. This shift led member countries to reconsider
the security borders of the Alliance and NATO's role beyond Europe. The possibility of
geographic widening of the Alliance, lead to alarm amongst members for it could
jeopardize the cooperation of the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty. Despite fears and
anxieties, NATO member nations shifted attitudes and the Alliance's out-of-area policy.
This shift set the stage for NATO's involvement in new missions and operations
including several selective 6ut-of-area operations.
Post-Cold War
At the conclusion of the Cold War, the attitudes of the member states, NATO's
policies and procedures changed and began to reflect the current global security
environment.

In the post-Cold War environment, the member states committed the

Alliance to missions and operations which resided beyond the traditional realm of
Europe.
The development of NATO's missions and operations after the Cold War can be
classified into three stages. In the first stage, from 1990 to 1992, NATO's "traditional
reluctance to engage in out^of-area conflicts came under pressure, but remained largely
unchanged."22 In 1991, the member nations realized that its forty year old threat and
objectives had dissolved along with the Soviet Union. NATO and its members were
21

Frode (2009), 173.

22

Metreveli (2003), 34.

14

faced with the choice to make dramatic changes. These changes resulted in the adoption
of the Strategic Concept of 1991 and for the first time the member nations could envision
playing in out-of-area roles. However, this Strategic Concept was soon outdated with the
outbreak of war in Yugoslavia.
The second stage, from 1992 to 1995, was marked by NATO's involvement in the
war in Bosnia. In July 1992, NATO ships belonging to the Alliance's Standing Naval
Force, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), began monitoring operations
in the Adriatic. These operations, were undertaken in support of the UN arms embargo
against all republics of the former Yugoslavia, UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 713 and sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia outlined in
UNSCR 757.23

In October 1992, NATO's Airborne Warning and Control System

(AWACS) aircraft began to observe the no-fly zone over Bosnia and were to report any
movements under UNSCR 781. 24 Although these small actions by NATO were not
cataclysmic, the success of the narrow mission led to further calls on NATO aircraft at
later stages. In December 1992, NATO foreign ministers first stated that NATO was
prepared to support operations acting under the authority of the UN Security Council.
Initially, NATO's role was to help to support the UN's operations. However,
throughout the operations NATO's role in the joint operations changed from launching a
naval mission in the Adriatic Sea in 1992 to a large-scale air campaign against the Bosnia
Serbs in 1995. These actions proved significant both in encouraging NATO authorities

23

"Chapter 5: The Alliance's Operation Role in Peacekeeping - The Process of Bringing Peace to the
Former Yugoslavia," available from http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb050102.htm; Internet,
accessed 25 October 2008.
24

Ibid.

25

Ibid.
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and in making it clear that NATO had vast superiority in air power and was fully
committed to missions who threatened the peace and security of the member nations.
NATO's involvement in the war of Bosnia-Herzegovina marked a significant
change in the relationship between NATO and the UN, as the Alliance transformed from
peacekeepers to peace enforcers. From 1992 to 1995, NATO began to act independently
and its operations changed from those of peacekeeping26 to peace enforcement27 as it
intervened in the Bosnian war.
In the third stage, from 1995 to present day, NATO has fully embraced its new
objectives to be involved in selective out-of-area missions. Over this period of time,
NATO has been involved in three different types of missions. The first type of mission
involves operations who reside within the Euro-Atlantic area, such as those in Albania in
1997. A second type of mission are composed of "able and willing," such as in the
Kosovo military campaign. The third and final type of mission the Alliance is involved
in is missions based upon assistance from the Partnership for Peace. Operations of this
nature include those in Bosnia and Darfur. As NATO continues to expand and test its
operational boundaries, its core mission has consistently been upheld since its founding
in 1949.
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Entering in the 21 st century NATO's mission has remained consistent maintaining peace and security - and operations have changed. However, the attacks of
September 11th were a wakeup call for the member states of NATO. The attacks called
for drastic steps to be taken by the member states in order to ensure the safety and
stability of the Alliance. In response to the attacks, the member nations invoked Article 5
of the North Atlantic Treaty. The adoption of Article 5 effectively signaled a new
chapter in the history of NATO.
NATO's New Mission
On September 11 2001, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New
York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C., ended in the deaths of hundreds and the
injury of thousands. The impact of September 11th was felt immediately and directly.
The attacks of September 11th were a call for sweeping transformations to be made in the
global security environment. The NATO member states took historical steps and made
the extraordinary decision by unanimously agreeing to invoke Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty which stated "an attack on one or more of them in Europe or North
America as an attack against them all."28
Within mere hours of the attacks of September 11th, the Bush Administration
announced a war on terrorism. The goals of the war were to bring Osama bin Laden and
al-Qaeda to justice and prevent the rise of other terrorist organizations. These goals
would be accomplished by two means. First, the United States would place economic
and military; sanctions on any state perceived as harboring terrorists while increasing
intelligence distribution and worldwide surveillance. Second, US-led military operations
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would be launched in Afghanistan to overthrow the oppressive Taliban rule and oust alQaeda forces.
Within twenty-four hours after the attacks on New York and Washington D.C, the
fight against terrorism was identified as a central tenet for NATO and its member nations
in the 21 st century. On 12 September 2001, the NATO member nations immediately
pledged their loyalty and support of the war on terrorism. The first steps the member
nations took were to invoke Article 5 in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 and adopted
measures, if needed, to fight against terrorism.

In parallel with these dealings, the

Alliance also agreed to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern
Mediterranean in order to provide NATO presence and demonstrate resolve; and to
deploy elements of its AWACS force to support operations against terrorism.

These

actions enabled the Alliance to better assist its member nations and their national
authorities in the protection of their populations.

These collective actions,

operationalized in Article 5, clearly "demonstrated the member nations' resolve and
commitment to support and contribute to the U.S. led fight against terrorism."30
NATO involvement in the fight against terrorism is a commitment of a wideranging, long-standing effort by the Alliance and its members. The mission would
require a combination of political, economic, and diplomatic action and law enforcement
measures, as well as military tactics. Consequently, the NATO member countries agreed
on the need for a long-term, versatile approach which would includexthe "members of the

Chapter 1: What is NATO? - Terrorism and the Emergence of New Threats.
Metreveli (2003), 56.
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Alliance and as members of other international organizations."31 The first test of this
long-term approach would be NATO's mission in Afghanistan.
NATO's Mission in Afghanistan
In 2001, following the September 11th attacks, the military of the United States
with the help of several NATO member nations invaded and toppled the al-Qaeda
regime. The invasion of Afghanistan would prove to be a test of will, ideologies, and
military capabilities for NATO and its member nations. Indeed, Afghanistan created a
venue for which NATO members would have to go beyond their European theater and
combat the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The mission
in Afghanistan can truly be called NATO's first out-of-area mission.
The efforts undertaken by NATO in Afghanistan are the Alliance's first mission
beyond the boundaries of the European continent.

The purpose of the Afghanistan

mission was to stabilize and reconstruct the country.

Even though NATO has

participated in several stabilization and reconstruction missions, such as in Kosovo, the
operations in Afghanistan were different. Different because there has never been a long
standing centralized Afghanistan government, the presence of Taliban, the out-of-area
scope and abrasive terrain, its historical context, and standing amongst the international
community. The mission in Afghanistan has played an important role for NATO, its
leadership, and will play a role in the Alliance's future.
For approximately sixty years the mission of NATO has never deterred or
wavered from its course as established in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 - to
safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples and seek to

31
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promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

Over this period of time,

NATO has expanded its security umbrella far beyond the tradition European theater. In
2001, NATO became involved in its largest challenge to date ; - operations in
Afghanistan. Today, NATO continues to be involved in Afghanistan operations and will
continue to expand its role and be involved in various selective out-of-area missions. But
taking a step back and looking at the larger picture, one questions why now and why
Afghanistan? Indeed why did NATO become involved in Afghanistan?

r

The North Atlantic Treaty.
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CHAPTER II

TOWARD AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Albert Einstein observed, "It is theory that decides what can be observed."

This

sentence explains that there are many theories that can explain a circumstance or a
phenomenon. Thus a theory is what is observed by explaining what was responsible for
the situation and conveys an understanding of what is seen. Based upon this explanation,
there are multiple theories on security at different levels of analysis - the individual
decision maker, the domestic determinant, the bureaucracy, and the international
environment - which may explain the developments and occurrences in the global
security environment, specifically NATO's involvement in Afghanistan.

Recognizing

that there are multiple scholars whose research explores security and its environment, this
particular research will use the international level of analysis and analyze NATO policy
regarding out-of-area to understand why the Alliance became involved in Afghanistan in
2001. Specifically, this thesis will apply Brian Frederkirig's rule-oriented constructivist
theory and dialogical analysis to analyze NATO's out-of-area policy from 1996 to 2003.
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section will provide a
summary of the related literature and related explanations. This section will establish that
the school of constructivism provides the strongest foundation for this thesis and its
analysis. The section will end with a discussion on constructivism, explicitly expanding
33
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on the theory of this thesis - rule-orientated constructivism. The second section of the
chapter will discuss Brian Frederking's Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security.
The section will examine Frederking's argument, summarize its main points, and point
out its major flaws. In particular, the section will critique Frederick's argument distilling
the inconsistency in methodology, his lack of ability to clearly define global security, and
use of secondary resources. The lessons learned from Frederking's research will be
applied throughout the thesis.
Literature Review
Discussion of Security
The idea of security is a complex and highly contested concept which is
profoundly weighed down with emotion and deeply held values. Security is defined as
"state of being free from the threat of harm."34 As such, there are both objective and
subjective aspects in security. Most people would agree that security is a problem which
occurs when someone - a person, group, organization, or state - threatens another's life
or livelihood. For example think about a gunman in a dark alley way demanding your
valuables or your life. Or more realistically, imagine the terror of a citizen in New York
City on September 11 2001, witnessing firsthand the attack and destruction of the World
Trade Center.

(

While few people would likely dispute that each of these examples are security
threats, many would also seek to extend the meaning of security to other beliefs and
interests. For example, they may apply the term to infectious diseases, the exponential
growth of the human population, global warming, or to human rights. Thus where do we
draw the line when studying security? What should be included or excluded? The study
34
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of security is a broad and contentious field, but for the purposes of this thesis, the study
of security will be studied at the international level and narrowly defined as the survival
of NATO and its member nations from threats and attacks.
The study of security is a complex and ever-growing and changing field. The
field of security studies has a long and varied history. For the purposes of this thesis, the
development of security will be discussed from the 1980s to present day.35
Security Studies
The study of security has a long and varied history which can be predated to the
Greeks and Romans. Based upon the expansive depth of the field, security studies in this
thesis will primary focus on the period between the 1980s to present day.
The field of security studies has been attractive for many researchers and analysts
i

over the decades. At the end of the 1970s and beginning of 1980s, the field began to see
a dramatic resurgence. In addition to the dramatic increase of professional interest and a
rise in publications regarding security related topics, "security studies became more
rigorous, methodology sophisticated, and theoretically inclined."36 These patterns would
result in a renaissance of security studies, which would last for the next three decades.
In the early 1980s, the focus of scholars and research in the studies of global
security revolved around explaining why the Soviets and Americans thought differently
about nuclear strategy.

Scholars argued that differences in a nation's security and

defense policies stemmed from variations in macro-environmental variables. A pioneer,
Jack Snyder (1977) argued that specific domestic elements develop aggressive strategic

35

The study of security predates the 1980s.

36

Stephan M. Walt, (1991) "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly
35:2:211-239.

23

perspectives that serve particular political interests in order to achieve security. These
interests are then manipulated by elites and used as a means of propaganda.

This

propaganda only served to obscure the true realities of the security found in the
international community. Snyder points out that "statesmen and societies actively shape
the lessons of the past in way they find convenient that it is to say that they are shaped by
them."37 Thus, developments involving security are a result of historical experience
linked with political culture. Similarly, Colin Gray (1981) and David R. Jones (1990)
point out that "cultures comprise the persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes,
traditions, habits of mind and preferred methods of operation that are more or less
specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a unique
historical experience."38 Thus security is not static. It changes gradually as society
responds to challenges from within and without being based upon historical experience,
culture and geography.
While Snyder, Gray, and Jones are considered some of the leading scholars in
security studies, there are multiple shortcomings in each of their research. Since the
analysis of security was relatively new during the 1980s, there were definitional problems
which lead to unwieldy characteristics. By introducing problems dealing with patterns of
behavior implied security led consistently to one type of behavior. When in reality it did
anything but this. By not addressing these key elements created gaping holes in the field
which in turn led researchers to take a different approach when regarding security studies.
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In the mid-1980s a new wave within security studies emerged. Scholars at this
time began to question the differences between what political leaders thought or said, as
opposed to their deeper motivations.

Scholars argued that security was used as a

governmental tool in security decision-making models.

Despite the new outlooks

presented by the scholars of the late 1980s, each still had a problem with symbolic
discourse; there was ho analysis of what factors may be influencing the development of
global security. Additionally, many scholars of the age relied upon secondary resources
and these sources where uncertain if there were differences in policy-making. Once
again, the field of security studies had many new ideas but all of whom were filled with
gaps and uncertainties. The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s signaled
new hope in the field with the rise of new outlooks and perspectives in security studies.
As the Cold War came to an end, the 1990s signaled a renewed interest in
discerning motivations and related sources of behavior in the field of security. At this
period of time, scholars and researchers were more rigorous in their studies and
discriminating in their conceptualization and operationalization of variables.

In this

context, a majority of theorists and researchers took a realist approach and cases focused
on structuralist-materialist notions. This approach proved that interests cannot explain a
particular strategic choice, especially in making security policy. Noteworthy, Alastair
Iain Johnston (1995) reasoned that the literature on security is both under and overdetermined. Additionally, scholars have so far been unable to offer a convincing research
design for isolating effects of security.39 Johnston writes that security theory today does
not reject rationality. Instead, a historically imposed inertia on choice makes strategy less
responsive to specific contingencies. Johnston, like many scholars of this "new age"
39
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security, avoids determinism that was used by security scholars in the 1980s. In this
sense, researchers and scholars no longer used behavior as their independent variable
when establishing causal relationships. Rather, competitive theory testing was used,
which pins alternative explanations against one another illustrating a new outlook for the
field of security.

,

This new wave of studies within the field of security marked the 1990s and
attributed to the ever-growing knowledge in the field of international relations. However,
holes still remained. Three main shortcomings still continued to plague scholars - a lack
of a definition of security; the flawed use of realism; and the use of organizational culture
as the cause for the influence on security policy.
To date, the interpretation of security has become one of the largest challenges in
the fields of security studies and international relations. Presently, the field of security
studies rest on an ill defined and often debated netherworld. Despite the tensions within
the field there are three alternative theories - realism, liberalism, and constructivism used throughout security studies to help explain the global security environment and its
developments.
Alternative Theories
/

The alternative theories - realism, liberalism, and constructivism - each have
strived to explain global security and its environment. Each of these theories differs
significantly in their compositions and demeanors. The following section will briefly
highlight each theory and will identify the theory which the thesis will be based upon.
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Realism
Realism, a traditional approach to security, is comprised of a variety of concepts
and methods. It has remained a dominant theory within the field of security studies.
Realism, associated with Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Morgenthau, as well as many\
others,40 emphasizes that "the state is the principal actor in international affairs and there
is no authority superior to these sovereign political units."41 This position asserts that
analysis should focus on the behavior of individual states. Accordingly, states will act
upon their own personal goals to maintain safety and achieve security. Thus, a state
disregards the interdependence between states in order to achieve their personal interests.
Accordingly, realism presents itself in several tenets within security studies:
1. Nation-states are unitary and geographically based actors in an anarchic
international environment who have no authority to regulate interactions between
each state in the system;42
2. Sovereign states are the primary actors in the international environment;43
3. States, being the highest actor within the, international system, are always in a
constant state of competition with one another; and
4. States each act in rational manner that pursue their own self interest in order to
"
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maintain and secure their own security.
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In summary, realists believe that all mankind and states are self-centered, aggressive, and
competitive. Furthermore, realists believe that states are inherently aggressive and are
consumed by the idea of security. Thus, aggression is present at all times and when this
aggression builds up a security dilemma is created.45 Within a security dilemma a state's
objective is to increase its power; however it can create instability for itself, while
another state is building up their security!
Difficulties with the Realist Analysis
There are several cleavages within realism.

These problems would call its

relevance into question when specifically regarding this thesis. First, in the post-World
War II period, realism emerged as the central structure for understanding international
relations and security studies.

However the rise of the Cold War gave birth to a

"pessimistic view of human nature, and assumptions about the prevalence of the pursuit
of power, underpinned more classical approaches to realism."46 When the Cold War
came to an end, the bipolar world, which realists,argued was a triumphant and stable
configuration, also ceased to exist. Secondly, it has been cited that the end of the Cold
War was due to internal problems within the USSR not from a systemic failure, as realists
would have contended. These governments then began to shift their behaviors toward
"becoming Western-style political and economic systems and joined Western community

44

Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, (1999) "Realism: The State, Power, and the Balance of Power" in
International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, (Boston, MA: Allyn and
Bacon), 35.
45

Allan Collins, (2007) Contemporary Security Studies: Traditional Approaches, (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press), 18-19.

46

Karin M. Fierke, (2007) Critical Approaches to Global security, (Oxford, UK: Polity Publishing), 24.

28

institutions, turning to cooperation or at least band-wagoning for their security."47 Many
realists believed tMat the end of the Cold War would result in a multiplicity of power.
Rather the United States rose to become the hegemony in the international community.
Finally, these two patterns have risen to become larger than some realist may have
anticipated. Although realists assert that they have time and history on their sides to rely
upon, the post-Cold War global security environment displays characteristics hegemony and levels of interdependence and cooperation - which are particularly
difficult and at times tricky to explain from a realist point of view.
Liberalism
Liberalism, a counter to realism, arose during the 17th and 18th centuries during
the age of Enlightenment.48 The concept of liberalism did not begin to take root until
after World War I when it was necessary to explain a states' inability to find a
counterbalance to war within international relations.
Liberalism, associated with Locke, Smith, Kant, and other French and German
thinkers, argue for equality of opportunity and individual liberties.

In this sense,

liberalism holds that the individual is the main actor and as such there will be plurality in
actions. Preferences will vary and be largely dependent on culture, government type, and
economic organization. Thus there are various streams of thought concerning liberalism,
but liberalism holds several general beliefs concerning security studies:
1. The individual is the primary actor in the international environment;49
47

Collins (2007), 24.

48

Ibid., 25.

49

Carla A. Arena Ventura, Melissa Franchini Cavaleanti, and Veronica Angelica Freitas de Paula, (2006)
"The System Approach to the Pluralist Theory of International Relations: A Case Study of the European
Union," Systemic Practice andAction Research 19:5:475^87.

29

2. State behavior is primarily determined by state preferences rather than their
capabilities;50
3. State preferences will vary from state to state and are not limited;
4. State cooperation and interdependence exists allowing for absolute gains;51 and
5. States are generally united by their support for freedom of sought and speech,
governmental limitations, the rule of law, right to property, and transparency in
government.5^
Based upon these tenets, liberalism substantially discourages the use of force among
states due to the associated risk with gains.53 Liberals argue that the costs to use force are
high and consequently using force to achieve security is unattractive. A state would
rather cooperate and achieve a balance in security than use force. States rely upon a web
of interdependencies to achieve their interests regarding security. As long as a high level
of interdependence can be maintained there is a reason to hope for balance in security
amongst countries and a diminished use of force and a potential security dilemma.54
Difficulties with the Liberalist Analysis
Liberalism stresses equality of opportunity and individual liberties; nevertheless
there are serious problems with the liberal perspective when dealing with this particular

50

Collins (2007), 26.

51

Ibid., 27.

52

Ibid., 26.

53

Barry Buzan, (1984) "Economic Structure and Global Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case,"
International Organization 38:4:597-624.
54

Collins (2007), 27.

30

thesis. First, there are "recurring tensions in theory and practice over priorities."55 In
other words, in order to achieve security and peace, it is important to cooperate with other
governments and countries. However, where should a country's priorities lay; in trying
to build stable and successful relations with other countries or to protecting itself? This is
one of the largest tensions evident - whether a state should place emphasis in selfdetermination or building relations and viable states. As Bush Jr. discovered, invading a
state embedded with terrorist activities and then trying to create a stabilized state of
fractioned minorities, raises alarm with those whom reside within the countries as we'll as
states which are located within the region and around the world. The liberalist standpoint
offers no remedy to resolve these internal and external conflicts in theory and does not
provide any sound basis for governments to make pertinent resolutions.
A second problem with the liberalist theory can be found in the justification of
using force. Specifically in two scenarios, (1) when governments disagree "about when
force is justified or how to determine the will of the international community" and (2)
when there is large strife and unhappiness in a certain scenario and the "willingness to
see force used to deal with it but widespread reluctance to bear the costs."56 In both of
these cases, liberalism is of little aid when trying to justify the use of force and those who
should bear the burdens when becoming involved. The characteristics outlined above
illustrate that it is easier said than done when trying to explain the global security
environment from a liberalist perspective.
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Preferred Alternative Theory: Constructivism
Since the Gold War, the perceptions surrounding the development of global
security and related policies became refocused in a new manner.

In this new

environment, war was no longer considered the only threat which nations faced. Rather
global security grew to include threats from transnational forces, failed states, spread of
infectious and deadly diseases, terrorism, and cyberspace. Today global security has
been redefined as the preservation of sovereignty and the protection against all physical
threats, domestic and foreign, through global response and multinational cooperation.57
Today, the global security environment has become complex in its nature as NATO and it
member nations strive to survive and maintain themselves.
Today, global security is focused on problems which fall outside the realm of
weapon defense systems. The global security environment and its associated threats and
challenges have become all encompassing and have continually challenged the traditional
assumptions - realism and liberalism - about the nature of international relations and
global security. Accordingly, the fields of security studies and international affairs have
employed several theories to explain the developments in global security. However after
the end of the Cold War, some researchers saw that the realist model which focuses on
state action, and the liberal model which advocates complex interdependence and
cooperation, as inadequate and each needed to be modified to reflect the modern global
security environment. One answer to the shortcomings of realism and liberalism was the
constructivist approach.
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Fashioned in the 1990s, constructivism emerged as an alternative to realism and
liberalism. Constructivism emerged as a new theory which could explain events like the
end of the Cold War and the development of the global security environment. The rise of
constructivism in the post-Cold War environment influenced the theoretical works of
international relations especially concerning the subfield of security.

Constructivism

inspired a new wave of research with the promise of new avenues for future
development.
Constructivism
Constructivism, associated with Alexander Wendt, Martha Finnemore, Peter
Katzenstein, Nicholas Onuf, as well as many others, asserts that the "existence of social
CO

structures - including norms, beliefs, and identities - constitute world politics."

The

, theory of constructivism seeks to demonstrate that the state system is socially
constructed. That is, the state is embedded in a larger society and in this society states
agree to particular rules and institutions. Within the society, social arrangements are
determined by "shared ideas rather than by material forces," and "the identities and
interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by
nature."59 The social arrangements are constitutive and regulative. These so called
"patterns of rules" tell us who we are and who others are, and what to do. Essentially,
they tell us how the world works, and states and actors come to live and abide by these
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arrangements.

In a larger sense, these arrangements make up the complex and

overlapping world of international relations.
Constructivism asserts that the state system is embedded in a larger more complex
society. As cited above, particular social arrangements constitute the society. Many
leading constructivists cite different factors that influence the social arrangements. For
example, Wendt (1999) cites Mead's symbolic interactionism and Bhaskkar's scientific
realism.60 While Onuf (1989) identifies Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, Gidden's
structuralism, Habermas' theory of communicative action, and Searle's speech act
theory.61 Despite these differences, each scholar references the use of language. Many
constructivists reference language in their studies because language is seen as a
representative of the world which creates and makes action possible. In short, language
is action itself and signals a "post-positivist turn in the social sciences."62
The use of language in constructivism is seen as a representative of the world.
Language is a key factor which creates and makes actions possible, and essentially
influences social arrangements. Accordingly, constructivists emphasize three common
positions. Each of these positions is ontological in nature:
1. Social factors are the main influence of interaction between humans;
2. Social structures and identities of goal-oriented actors; and
.
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3. Agents and structures construct each other; where rules make the agent and agents
make the rules.63
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Based upon these tenets, constructivism can be called a social theory. The theory of
constructivism "offers a synthesis between material, subjective, and inter-subjective
dimensions of the world."

In short, constructivism and its use of language can help

explain social arrangements of the world and its developments.
In order to analyze and interpret the social world and its arrangements,
constructivists have developed a variety of methods to analyze language. These methods
include Crawford's (2002) use of linguistic methods,65 Hopf s (2002) phenomenological
approach,66 Mattern's (2001) analysis of narrative strategies,67 the discursive practices of
Doty (1993), conversation analysis,68 event data,69 anddialogical analysis. Each of these
methodologies are unique in their understanding and execution, however each in some
fashion or another to help emphasis that norms, rules, and institutions can help in
understanding an environment where "people make society, and society makes people."70
The diverse constructivisms and their methodologies each use ontology in order
to depict the world.

Constructivists describe a world which is made up various

arrangements. These arrangements are constituted by types of rules. These types of rules
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include beliefs, norms, and identities. "Beliefs are shared understandings of the world."71
Beliefs are social rules which make claims of truth about the world. "Norms are shared
understanding of appropriate actions."

Norm rules are social rules which make

appropriateness claims about relationships. Finally, "identities tell agents who they are
and who others are; they enable agents to make the actions of themselves another
intelligible."73 The social rules of identity make sincerity claims about agents. Each type
of constructivist argument emphasis one of these rules for they each help to guide and
conduct while at the same time creating objects and agents.
The use of language has allowed constructivists to account for aspects within,
international relations which realists and liberalists have ignored completely. The use of
ontology has allowed constructivists to tackle obstacles which other theorists have
encountered and not been able to overcome m international relations and security studies.
First, constructivists have "put in the center of attention the constitution of international
agents."74 It is no longer assumed that "sovereign states and other international agents
considered as given" and it appears that "national interests, state identities, social
movements, and transnational networks appear in need of explanation."75 Second, since
there is a central focus on the construction of norm, identities, and institutions.
Constructivists are able to explain alterations that may occur in strategies. For example,
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war and collective security are not tools "toward an end but constitute the enactment of
diverse games and rules on which reasoning actors draw" when dealing with a particular
security threat.

Finally, constructivists have developed a rich and diverse understanding

in social arrangement and changes in the international realm.

This has made the

constructivist approach attractive to those who seek to explain the end of the Cold War
and the transformation of the global security environment. It will prove to be a concrete
and sound methodological approach when analyzing NATO's out-of-area policy.
Rule-Orientated Constructivism
The theory of rule-oriented constructivism is a theory which holds practices and
social arrangements in terms of social rules.

As discussed above and according to

Frederking, social rules that are driven by beliefs, norms, and identities help to define
77

social arrangements of a society.

Essentially, rules and norms are the linchpin in

constructivist studies.
Constructivists believe rules are the reasons for actions. Rules are able to provide
reason for action because they provide significance, establish criteria, and create
conditions. Rule-orientated constructivists have two key tenets regarding rules. First,
"rules give meaning to human action by communicating 'shared understandings' that
no

shape and orient behavior."

In this sense, social arrangements, which are constituted by

a stable pattern of rules, make up the structure of world politics. Additionally, "rules also
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guide and regulate behavior."

Thus, rules convey standards of how we should act.

Rules make it possible for actors, such as states, to act: "They tell us how the world
works; they tell us who we are and who others are; they tell us what we should do."
Rules constitute the world at large.
The second rule establishes that rational actors use speech acts to construct social
rules.81 This rule-oriented constructivist claim is based upon the pre-existing speech act
theory

and the notion of communicative rationality of Habermas.

According to the

speech act theory, the effect of a speech is analyzed in relation to the speaker and
listener's behavior. Austin (1962) explains that acts of speech contain particular sentence
types which have conventional relationship to certain types of speech acts. In this sense,
a verbal statement defines an action. For example, saying "I swear to tell the whole truth
•

(

•

•

•

'

and nothing but the truth" in a court of law is a meaningful social act because it invokes
v .

.

.

•

•

•

•

'

•

social rules in the institution of the court. The "speech act theory argues that language is
action; speech acts (promising, declaring, apologizing, etc.) are both plentiful and central
to social life."

In brief, the speech act theory is the backbone of the rule-orientated

constructivist theory.
Language is the primary catalyst to drive an action according to the speech act
theory. In order to determine what kind of action will take place, I will use Onuf s three
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types of speech acts - assertions, directives, and commitments. These different types of
speech acts help to determine the social rules that have fashioned the particular speech
act.

When analyzing a speech act art assertion will "convey knowledge about the

world."85 Examples of speech acts involving assertion rules are trade agreements and
arms shipments. A directive conveys "what we must or should do and often include
consequences for disregarding them."86 Examples of directive rules are use of force and
1

. trade sanctions.

•

0*7

Finally, commitments are "promises to act in a particular way."

Examples of speech acts invoking commitment rules are international trade and treaties.
The second rule-oriented claim also uses Habermas's notion of communicative
rationality which builds upon the speech act theory. Communicative rationality is a
theory which tries to explain human rationality based upon outcomes of successful acts of
speech.

Habermas argues communication is "oriented to achieving, sustaining and

reviewing consensus - and indeed a consensus that rests on the intersubjective recognition
of criticisable validity claims."88 Habermas asserts that a "rational agent performs a
speech act, convey validity claims, interpret and evaluate the claims of others, and act on
the basis of mutually recognized validity claims."

In this process, agents express and

evaluate one another's validity claims of speech acts which help to construct and
reconstruct social rules and perhaps social arrangements. Frederking emphasizes that
rule-oriented constructivists "rely on Habermas because only communicatively rational
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actors can achieve the interpretive accomplishments ascribed to them by constructivist
argument."90

<

Rule-orientated constructivism is a theoretical framework that takes into account
the structure in social analysis and provides the means to analyze the complex
interrelationship between agents, speech acts, and social structures.

Rule-orientated

constructivists are able to explore what makes social action possible and meaningful.91
Essentially, rule-orientated constructivism asserts that people use information from their
own experience to create constructs in order to problem solve; this can help
constructivists anticipate future events and to make sense of the world.
Rule-Orientated Constructivist Theory and the Global Security Environment
The theory of constructivism seeks to demonstrate that the state system is socially
constructed. That is, the state is embedded in a larger society where states agree to
particular rules and institutions. This position can only assert the existence of the social
arrangement and their so called "societal rules," however it cannot tell us the content of
these rules. Thus, constructivists need to demonstrate that their theoretical assertions
about social rules correlate to the speech acts and are produced by real-world agents. As
such the rule-oriented constructivist theory is a solution which demonstrates a
relationship between theoretical applications and speech acts that can explain the global
security environment.
As outlined above, a state system is constructed based upon a variety of social
arrangements.

These arrangements thus constitute the makeup of the world.

For

example, the global security environment is constituted by war, rivalries, collective
90
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security, and security communities. These social arrangements allow the global security
environment to "go on;" although some arrangements may be more institutionalized or
fluid than others.

Concisely, what comprises a system depends on what logics are

guiding particular social arrangement.
The 'ideal typical rules' in these societal arrangements can be found in Figure 1.
Each social arrangement has six rules which make up and rule action(s) - (1) Identity; (2)
Autonomy; (3) Security; (4) Deterrence; (5) Enforcement; and (6) The Use of Force. The
following are the scope of each of these rules:
1. The identity rule establishes agent identities as enemies, rivals, citizens, or
friends.92
2. The autonomy rule establishes the extent to which the autonomy of both state
and non-state agents are either threatened by others or limited by mutual
obligations.93
3. The security rule establishes the belief that security is acquired by either
relative military capability or friendly political relationships.94

!

4. The deterrence rule establishes a dominant normative expectation either to
recognize the autonomy of others or to follow the rules of the community.95
5. The enforcement rule establishes the ultimate method of resolving conflict.96
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6. The use of force rule establishes the extent to which force is required to
resolve conflict.97
There are variations of these rules which makeup the 'ideal' social arrangements of war,
go

rivalry, collective security, and security communities.
and helps to explain the global security environment.
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Each of these rules constitutes

War

Rivalry

RulelIdentity
Rule 2 Autonomy

We are enemies

We are rivals

We do not
recognize the
autonomy of
others

We recognize
the autonomy of
others

Rule 3 Security

Survival is
based on
relative
(Alliance)
military
capability
You must
surrender

Security is
based on
relative
(Alliance)
military
capability
Do attack me

Rule 5 Enforcement

We will attack
until you
surrender

Rule 6 Use of Force

The use of force
is always
necessary to
resolve conflicts

We will
retaliate if you
violate our
sovereignty
The use of force
is sometimes
necessary

Rule 4 Deterrence

Collective
Security
We are fellow
citizens
Autonomy is
limited by
obligations to
follow and
enforce the
community's
rules
Security is based
on a multilateral
commitment to
use military
capability

Security
Community
We are friends

Do no break the
rules of our
community
We will retaliate
if you break the
rules of our
community
The use of force
is sometimes
necessary

Do not break
the rules of our
community
We will
resolve
conflicts
peacefully
The use of
force is not
acceptable

Autonomy is
limited by
obligation to
follow the
community's
rules
Security is
based on
political
relationships

Figure 1: The Global Security Environment Social Arrangements
It is important to point out that each of these rules is not intended to be exact
replicas of reality of the global security environment. Rather they are a reflection of the
rule-oriented constructivist theory. Each is applicable to the task at hand and each is able
to provide a concrete application in order to conduct research. It is recognized that these
rules may not cohere with future research and may need to be refined or even abandoned
when regarding the global security environment.
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Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security: Brian Frederking
Frederking (2003) argues that "September 11th did not fundamentally change
world politics" rather "it exacerbated already existing tensions about the appropriate
implementation of fledging collective security rules."100 For one terrorist event cannot
mechanically change the development or rules of global security. Instead, Frederking
uses dialogical analysis building upon rule-oriented constructivism and the collective
security rules of the global security environment to explain that there exists a set of
overlapping social arrangements. This helps to explain that "the dominant trend in the
post-Cold War world is the gradual institutionalization of collective security rules."101
This interpretive method is capable to yielding both theoretical and practical insights to
"posit four social arrangements constituting the security structure of world politics: war,
rivalry, collective security, and security communities."102 Frederick uses the analysis of
the debates over Kosovo and Iraq to show that each of these events is very similar in
nature. However the involvement in each of these circumstances is due to gradual
institutionalism in the development of the global security environment.
Frederking's research reveals three conclusions.

First, "it contributes to the

constructivist research program by offering a tentative rule-orientated constructivist
theory by asserting the existence of war, rivalry, collective security, and security
community social arrangements."

Frederking asserts that the rule-orientated

constructivist theory moves beyond the traditional methodology of social theory in
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international politics.

Unlike Alexander Wendt who argues that the structure and

tendencies of social systems will depend on which of these three roles - enemy, rival, and
friend - will dominate world politics and global security;104 Frederking argues that the
global security environment is dominated by four sets of social arrangements which
interact and overlap. Moving away from the original three roles, Frederking explains
four sets are needed in order to understand the dominant security trends in the post-Cold
War environment - "movement away from the Cold War rivalry" and the gradual
institutionalization of collective security rules."105 Frederking builds upon the traditional
assumptions of constructivism to explain development in the global security
environment.

u

-

The second conclusion is in regard to dialogical analysis. Frederking's research
holds that dialogical analysis, a means for modeling language in a serious manner,106
"models a linguistic conception of social interaction capable of illustrating constructivist
arguments."107 This particular methodology allows for pragmatic analysis, dialogical
disputation analysis, and formal theorem proving.

Pragmatic analysis "reveals

proposition actors implicitly convey to and infer from one another."108

Dialogical

disputation analysis "identifies additional tacit proposition that actors discursively convey
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and summarize the flow of interaction."109

Finally, formal theorem-proving tests

"hypotheses concerning the importance of particular propositions for interaction
outcomes.110

In other words, dialogical analysis has the ability to help develop

theoretical approaches into practical applications. It is a practical methodology which
offers an approach to analyze social interaction of the global security environment.
The third and final conclusion of Frederking's work involves its contribution to
the "policy debates about U.S. foreign policy after September n t h " i n

Frederking's

research suggests that "preemption policies are premised on a flawed assumption that the
events of September 11th fundamentally changed the world politics."112 The research
refutes that the war on terrorism represents a "more aggressive, unilateral, and even
preemptive U.S. policies."113

Rather Frederking argues that the events of Kosovo and

Iraq, and the war on terrorism are an embedded part of a larger, more complex world of
global security. Each is a result of gradual institutionalism of collective security rules
and the arrangements in the global security environment. In short, the three conclusions
of Frederking's work are consistent with the tasks of rule-oriented constructivism - "(1)
assert the existence of social arrangements, (2) show how these rules make action
intelligible, and (3) helps agents'go on'in the world."114
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In sum, Frederking argues that terrorist events cannot change the overall rules of
global security and its environment. "Even U.S. foreign policy, although tremendously
important, cannot unilaterally construct a war socially arrangement through declarations
of a 'war on terrorism' or even by invading Iraq."115 In the modern global security
environment there is an existence of constitutive social rules and "communicatively
rational actors constructing these rules through the performance of speech acts."116 As
such these rules are constantly in a state of flux as they are negotiated, mediated, and
facilitated through varies agents and facilities. The analysis presented by Frederking
suggests that the post-Cold War rules and global security environment will remain
relatively stable while gradual institutionalism takes place. As in Kosovo, the global
security environment remains strikingly similar even after intervention by the United
States. In the case of Kosovo, the United States sought the approval and authorization of
the United Nation Security Council prior to the intervention.

It is clear that the

international community is reliant upon historical examples and constancy rather than ad
hoc methods, and collective security rules are preferred over unilateral measures.
Weaknesses
Building upon the scholars of constructivism, Frederking's work is insightful and
strives to move beyond the current epistemological debates; nevertheless it has four
critical faults.

First, there are definitional problems which lead to unwieldy

characteristics within Frederking's research and analysis.

Although Frederking

introduces patterns of behavior inherent to the social arrangements - war, rivalry,
collective security, and security communities - which constitute the security structures of
115
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global security, he never provides a tangible definition of global security. Does global
security involve "material circumstances and the psychological state produced by those
circumstances?"117 Is global security the "physical survival of nations and its people by
protecting from attacks by states and non-states?"

Or is global security the "protection

from transnational forces, such as the environment, weather, disease, and criminal
activity - the physical survival and safety of the United States and its people by
protecting from all physical threats?"119 Or is global security "the preservation of
sovereignty against external and internal threats" by an international defense organization
and its member states?120

i

Presently in the field of security studies, the interpretation and definition of
security has become one of the largest challenges in the field of international relations.
Security concepts have continued to maintain their limitations and what does remain is
largely oversimplified.

Despite this, scholars, like Frederking, continue to drive on

regardless of what critics argue. To some, the field of security studies exists in a
comprehensible state. However, to others it is necessary to broaden the field of security
studies in order (1) to narrow the definition of security and (2) to comprehend and study
contemporary political debates.121 By not addressing this key element in methodology,
there is a lack of conceptualization and operationalization of the variables presented. In
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short, Frederking's work at best, acts as introductory survey to the development within
global security environment and security studies.
Secondly, Frederking research is based upon NATO operations in Kosovo and
Iraq; however the researcher fails to incorporate any resources dealing directly or
affiliated with NATO. Although there are a wealth of statistical and research data
available today pertaining to Kosovo and Iraq, data dealing directly with NATO and its
involvement in Kosovo and Iraq may not be readily available or available only in limited
allotments. Although finding resources no small task, all material must be relative to the
research at hand.
Third, Frederking uses secondary resources as a primary basis for conducting his
research. Although the use of secondary data has time and cost saving advantages, there
are a number of disadvantages to using secondary data. First, the secondary information
related to the research topic may either not be available or is only available in limited
quantities. Second, the secondary information may be of a questionable nature pertaining
to its authenticity, quality, and credibility. This can then lead to misleading interpretation
of the facts or analysis. Third, the information may be in a different format or unit than
what be desired by the researcher. Finally, secondary data may not be concurrent with
what is sought after by the researcher. In short, Frederking's use of secondary sources
leads to a lack of methodological consistency within his research.
Lastly, Frederking's three faults, as cited above, lead to inconsistencies in the
theoretical framework of the analysis. This then compels this research to (1) define
global security; (2) use primary resources to explain what has affected the shift in policy
which lead NATO's involvement in Afghanistan; and (3) create a consistent theoretical
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framework. This thesis and its research will examine and build upon these faults in order
to develop a consistent analytical framework. This framework will act as a foundation
when trying to develop an understanding of NATO's policy concerning out-of-area
missions and path to Afghanistan.
A Way Forward
Constructivism asserts that the "existence of social structures - including norms,
beliefs, and identities - constitute world politics." The theory of constructivism helps
paint the backdrop of the global security environments and developments within it.
Bearing this concept in mind, this research recalls the original research question: why did
NATO become involved in Afghanistan? Specifically, was it due to ad hoc tendencies or
was it based upon adherence to collective security rules while gradually adapting
institutional methods? It also recalls Brian Frederking's analysis of the global security
environments of Kosovo and Iraq, which illuminates the global security environment is
gradually institutionalizing towards collective security rules. According to Frederking,
the post-Cold War rules and global security environment will remain relatively stable
while gradual institutionalism takes place. However, how clear or certain is it that NATO
is reliant upon historical examples and constancy rather than ad hoc methods? Or that
collective security rules are preferred over unilateral measures? Thus, this research will
apply Frederking's rule-oriented constructivist theory and dialogical methodology to
determine what is affecting the development of NATO's out-of-area policy which may
have contributed to NATO's involvement in Afghanistan.
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CHAPTER III

METHODOLOLGY

Research Question
Nearly three decades ago, the United States and the former Soviet Union were at
the end of a long ideological, political, and military battle which defined international
relations, politics, and the global security environment for more than a generation.
International relations and security studies, mirroring this struggle, primarily focused on
the threat of nuclear war and defense which influenced the global security environment
and related policies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, established to "safeguard
the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples" and "seek to promote
stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area,"122 sought to protect its member
nations against nuclear warfare and stabilize the global security environment.
Today, the ideological battle between the United States and the Soviets has come
to an end and new factors have arisen affecting the global security environment. In
today's global security environment, NATO member nations have continued to carry out
the Alliance's mission by way of an expanded agenda and selective participation in outof-area missions. Taking NATO's mission and history of operations into account, one
has to ask: why did NATO become involved in Afghanistan! In today's global security
environment and the activities taking place in Afghanistan, it is important to ask if NATO
122
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member nations are holding fast to collective security rules while gradually adhering to
institutionalism or simply is the Alliance's involvement in Afghanistan based upon ad
hoc methods in the post-Cold War global security environment?
Hypotheses
To address the questions this thesis proposes, this thesis will test the following
hypotheses:
HO: If NATO member nations adopt a neutral attitude toward out-of-area
missions then NATO will not become involved in Afghanistan.
HI: If NATO member nations adopt an institutional attitude toward out-of-area
missions then NATO would become involved in Afghanistan.
H2: If NATO member nations adopt an ad hoc attitude toward out-of-area
missions then NATO would become involved in Afghanistan.
This study's hypotheses will test NATO member nations' attitude toward out-of-area
missions. The thesis will determine if there is a particular attitude adopted by member
nations regarding out-of-area missions. In this sense, attitude is defined as a manner,
feeling, or disposition with regard to a person, circumstance, or thing which affects how
particular actions are carried out. For example, if a state has a neutral attitude then they
are "not aligned with or support any side or position in a particular circumstance."123 As
compared to a state who has an institutional attitude which is a "well-established and
structured pattern of behavior or of relationships that is accepted as a fundamental
part"124 of a culture, institutional, or government when regarding a situation. On the
other hand, if a state has an ad hoc attitude then they are impromptu in their manners and
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usually rely upon a "temporary, provisional, or improvised" attitude to deal with a
particular problem.125 If a particular aforementioned attitude is adopted by the member
state regarding out-of-area missions, the analysis will determine how this attitude affected
NATO's out-of-area policy and the Alliance's involvement in Afghanistan.

The

hypotheses which will be tested will seek to answer the proposed research question of the
thesis.
Unit/Level of Analysis
This thesis will use the international level as the level of analysis and the
international security organization, NATO, as the unit of analysis.

This level of

analysis and unit were chosen in order to properly measure the impact of the hypotheses
which have been generated. Additionally, the international level of analysis is best suited
for this research design because much of the literature concerning post-Cold War global
security is conducted at this level, including Brian Frederking's research. Thus, there are
considerable grounds for this thesis.
For the purposes of this thesis, the analysis of an international defense
organization is conducted at the international level because other techniques have proved
to be spurious and cannot accurately measure a system of states. The international level
of analysis helps to examine the behavior of states in the international environment. It
can be argued that the international environment "determines a state's behavior (for) it

"Ad hoc," available from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ad%20hoc?o=100074; Internet,
accessed 05 May 2009.
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asserts that all state react similarly to the same objective external situation."

Then

changes in a "state's domestic regime, its bureaucratic structure, and the personalities and
178

the opinions of its leaders do not lead to changes of policies."
external conditions can alter a state's behavior.

Rather, changes in

In other words, the global security

environment can cause changes in a state's behavior. Finally, the international level will
best serve this thesis because it allows for the identification of the characteristics of the
complex process of the global security environment and will build an understanding of
the shift in NATO's out-of-policy and help explain why NATO became involved in
Afghanistan.

( ••
i
j

Methodology
Having analyzed the selected literature on which this thesis draws, briefly
describing rule-orientated constructivism, drawing on NATO's history and out-of-area
policy, and keeping in mind the activities and circumstances in Afghanistan, a framework
has been developed. Building upon the established framework, this thesis will conduct a
crucial case study of NATO member nations' out-of-area policy between 1996 and 2003.
I will apply Brian Frederking's rule-orientated constructivist theory to determine: (1) if
there is evidence to support this research; (2) if rule-orientated constructivist theory is
viable for this research; (3) if rule-orientated constructivist theory to explain the
developments within NATO's out-of-area policy; (4) if there was indeed was a shift in
member nations' attitude and out-of-area policy; and (5) what led NATO to become
involved in Afghanistan in 2001.
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For this research, a case study will be used because it is the most effective method
of analysis. Rather than using large samples, which are difficult to define, quantify and
follow protocol, a case study is in an in-depth analysis of a unit. In short, a crucial case
study is a systemic way of conducting research. Thus, the unit of study in this thesis is
NATO. It is important to note that NATO will not be used as a proxy but is recognized
as an organization composed of member states that agree to and implement policy.
Within this crucial case study, it is important to ask: how does one quantify an
international security organization, such as NATO and its member nations, or the
development of out-of-area policy?

In order to answer these particular and crucial

questions, this research will use a qualitative analysis to account for policy developments
towards out-of-area and engagement in mission and operations.

By employing a

qualitative analysis, I will use this quality of data to explain the shift in policy and
explain what led NATO to become involved in Afghanistan in 2001.
For the purposes of this particular thesis, the qualitative method of dialogical
analysis will be the primary methodology used. Dialogical analysis is a methodology
which models "a linguistic conception of social interaction capable of illustrating
constructivist arguments."129

This particular method uses speech acts to study "the

category of things that exist or may exist in some domain."130 The end result is a catalog
of the types of things that are presumed to be in a domain of interest from the perspective
of a person who uses particular language for the purpose of talking about a particular
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social arrangement.131 For this thesis, the focus on ontology emphasizes a particular type
of social rules - beliefs, norms, or identities132 - which make up and influence social
arrangements of the global security environment.
Beliefs, norms, and identities are the types of rules that constitute the social
arrangements within in the global security environment. Each of these rules is in line
with Habermas' notion of communicative reality and the fundamental validity claims truth, appropriateness, and sincerity.133 Beliefs are social rules which make claims of
truth about the world.134 Norm rules are social rules which make appropriateness claims
* •

• - .

•

•

•

about relationships.135 Finally, the social rules of identity make sincerity claims about
agents.136 Each type of constructivist argument emphasis one of these rules. Dialogical
analysis is then able to "illustrate constructivist arguments about the role of norms,
beliefs, and identity."137

For it "posits the existence of social rules, communicatively

with rational agents, and the arguments of validity claims."
The method of dialogical analysis is comprised of three components. These three
components are pragmatic analysis, formal argument analysis, and formal theoremproving. Pragmatic analysis is a method which "reveals propositions actors implicitly
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convey to and infer from one another."139 Formal argument analysis is an additional tacit
proposition which identifies which "actors discursively convey and summarizes the flow
of interaction."140

Finally, formal theorem-proving "test hypothesis concerning the

importance of particular propositions for interactions."141 Each of these components
helps to identify and defines the international level of analysis and support the unit of
study.
The dialogical method is comprised of four steps. The four steps are identified as
the following:
1. One specifies . the background knowledge necessary to understand the
•

'

•

142

interaction;

,

2. One accumulates explicit speech acts that conveyed meaning during the
143

interaction;
3. One conducts a pragmatic analysis of the speech acts, deriving the implicitly
conveyed propositions during the interaction;144 and
4. One constructs a formal argument analysis from the inventory of pragmatic
propositions to isolate consensual and disputed claims during the interaction.145
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The method of dialogical analysis first begins with the researcher specifying the
background knowledge that will be necessary to understand the dialogue which will be
analyzed.

Most importantly a set of rules which governs the interactions will be

established. These set of rules should either he "politically noncontroversial facts or
beliefs of the relevant party support by the archival evidence."146 The set of rules are the
"theory which will be asserted by the analyst; dialogical analysis is the mythological tool
to provide empirical evidence for the existence of these rules."147

The social

arrangements - war, rivalry, collective security, and social arrangements - asserted in the
previous chapter, will act as the set of rules and serve as the background knowledge
needed in the dialogic analysis.
Next the researcher gathers speech acts which occurred during the time of
interaction by cataloging the specific moves which deal directly and indirectly with the
interaction. This may include any nonverbal actions which illustrate significance, such as
force deployments and diplomatic acts.148 In this step the speech acts are not selected on
a random basis. Rather this step will be made up of a reconstruction of the speech acts
from public sources. It is important to note that "no algorithmic coding rules exist to
transform textual data into analyzable speech acts."149 It is possible that these kinds of
rules are impossible to develop. In this sense the researcher gathers the speech acts
which are most relevant with the same interpretive ability as other researchers have.
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The analyst then conducts a pragmatic analysis of the dialogue. Pragmatics is the
field of linguistics where the meaning of the language relates "contents to context."150
Pragmatic analysis is concentrated on the aspects of meaning that "context-free, truthconditional semantics" cannot summarize.151 In this sense, speakers express more than
nonsense; they make pragmatic statements which allow them to understand one another
and correlate actions accordingly.

A researcher is then able to construct a list of

assertions, directives, and commitments conveyed by each person or party within a
particular speech act.
Drawing upon this list of assertions, directives, and commitments, an analyst is
able to carry out the final step by constructing a "formal argument analysis composed of
moves conveyed explicitly or implicitly."

This "isolates and formalizes the disputed

propositions and thus disputed social rules generated in the pragmatic analysis."
Within this context, speech acts are tested by illustrating if particular speech act logically
follows the belief inventories.154 This will help determine is a speech act is able to
express an outcome for a particular party.155 If the speech act follows the established
beliefs then it is considered adequate and if the speech act does not follow its contents
then it is inadequate. If this happens the researcher must return to its original information
and reconsider if the speech act(s) are applicable to the particular research. The "analysis
150
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thereby yields a parsimonious account of practical inferences" consistent with the speech
act.'56

The qualitative method of dialogical analysis is a viable technique that can

account for the "changing construction of social rules both within and across social
arrangements."157 Dialogical analysis will be used in this thesis in order to explain if
there was a change in member nations' attitudes and a shift in out-of-area policy which
may have contribute to NATO's participation in Afghanistan in 2001.
Data
In this research, in order to examine NATO's out-of-area policy, speech acts
published by NATO's North Atlantic Council will be collected from the online NATO
database. They will be accessed through the NATO official Press site; the online, fulltext archived database of Committee Reports and Committee Meeting summaries. This
research will analyze communiques found in NATO Committee Reports between 1996
and 2003. However, the key tenet for this study will be Brian Frederking's "Constructing
Post-Cold War Collective Security," a constructivist study published in The American
Political Science Review in 2003. These sources of data will enrich the quality of the
research, as well as cover a large continuum which reduces spuriousness and allows for
triangulation to occur.
Key Variables
Dependent Variable: NATO's involvement in Afghanistan
Independent Variables: Attitude of member nations regarding out-of-area
missions

Duffy (1998), 273.
Frederking (2003), 370.

60

Operationalization: Key Variables
The first step in measuring a hypothesis is to define the variables used - the
dependent and independent variables. For the purposes of this thesis, the dependent
variable is identified as "NATO's involvement in Afghanistan" and the independent
variable is identified as the "attitude of members nations regarding out-of-area missions."
These two variables throughout the thesis will be operationalized as the following.
"NATO's involvement in Afghanistan" shall mean an international defense
Alliance (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) engagement in the regional territory of
Afghanistan.
"Attitude of member nations regarding out-of-area missions" shall mean a
negative or positive point(s) of view and/or feeling(s) of members of an internal defense
organization (NATO) toward 1.) internal and external threats and threats without borders
(which include but are not limited to invasion, weapons of mass destruction, and
terrorism) at the international level and 2.) bodies of personnel sent to foreign territories
that reside outside of the traditional boundaries of the European theater.
Measurement
For this study, "NATO's involvement in Afghanistan" will be measured, as best
as possible, in terms of (1) missions and operations, including out-of-area, between 1996
through 2003 and (2) areas in which missions and operations were conducted in.
Measuring the "attitude of member nations regarding out-of-area missions" will
be done by analyzing communiques published by the North Atlantic Council between
1996 through 2003. Each of the communiques, hereby known as speech acts, will be
analyzed using dialogical analysis.

Specifically, the "attitude of member nations
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regarding out-of-area missions" in the speech acts will measured by using pragmatic
analysis, dialogical disputation analysis, and formal theorem-proving. This research will
look for evidence in changes or shifts in NATO's policy or treaty concerns, emotions or
feelings regarding particular situations in the global security environment, or
participation in treaties, missions, and operations. Thus, knowledge of NATO's policies
and treaties, partnerships with member countries and other nations, Alliance processes
and procedures, and missions are vital in measuring this data.
In summary, after the end of the Cold War, ideologies and policies regarding the
global security environment became refocused. The emergence of a new global security
environment challenged the traditional assumptions of NATO. As such, NATO's has
continuously transformed and changed to meet the threats and challenges of the new
security environment. NATO member countries have continuously broadened its agenda,
began a process of enlargement, and time after time committed the Alliance to engage in
missions outside the realm of the traditional European theater. In 2001, NATO became
involved in Afghanistan in the fight against terrorism.

This involvement raised the

question of why did NATO become involved in Afghanistan1? Exclusively, one has to ask:
are the member states gradually adhering to collective security rules and institutionalism
or simply was it an ad hoc reaction?
Security studies are a vast field and usually understood on the basis of theory or in
limited application. Security studies are usually justified on the basis of political or
academic benefit and each are usually challenged on the impracticality, out datedness, or
irrelevancy. This thesis can provide a window of opportunity to learn and understand the
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transformation of NATO member nations' attitudes; shift in the Alliance's policy
regarding out-of-area missions; and the path which led to its involvement in Afghanistan.
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CHAPTER IV

CASE STUDY

The past and the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have become
linked to its mission in Afghanistan. NATO, an Alliance that was created to safeguard
and promote stability within the North Atlantic area,158 was a player in the Afghanistan
invasion and is an active participant in helping Afghanistan's new government against a
resurgent Taliban. Afghanistan represents NATO's first mission which is outside of its
traditional European theater, and the "largest operational deployment" in the history of
the Alliance.159 NATO's mission in Afghanistan has become the test of the member
nations and the Alliance's ability to transform and survive.

However, in order to

ascertain the Alliance's future it is important to comprehend why did NATO become in
Afghanistan?
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section will summarize
the purpose, mission and structure of NATO; outline NATO's policy toward out-of-area
missions; briefly summarize the history of Afghanistan; and highlight NATO's
involvement in Afghanistan. This section will provide the background information which
is necessary to grasp the member nation's policy of out-of-area and understand the
historical developments which led the Alliance to become involved in Afghanistan
158
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operations. The second section in the chapter will analyze the communiques agreed upon
by the members of NATO. This section will conclude with a summary of the findings.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a transatlantic link which unites both
North America and Europe in a distinctive and timeless collective defense coalition.
NATO's mission is to protect and defend the liberty and security of each of its member
nations and their people by political and military measures. Since its birth, NATO has
continued to provide a collective defense to its members and serve as an "essential pillar
of peace and stability" in the transatlantic theater.160
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO and its members have continued to pursue
the Alliance's original mission while taking on new fundamental tasks. In response to
the global security environment, the member nations have continued to broaden the scope
and agenda of the Alliance, and continuously committed the Alliance to additional
responsibilities.

These new responsibilities include addressing instability within the

Balkans, and confronting threats beyond the traditional European theater such as in the
Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Middle East. In its present day, NATO continues to
engage in a large array of activities and missions which have been designed to promote
cooperation within the international community, build partnerships, and find proactive
solutions to the security threats and challenges of the 21 st century.
The Dynamics of the Alliance: Its Structure and How It Works
The Alliance of NATO is a dynamic inter-governmental organization.
backbone of the Alliance is its membership.

NATO in the 21 st Century.
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The

NATO is comprised of twenty-eight

countries.

Each member country has its own policies, objectives, and procedures.

Each nation works with one another along side of the United Nations (UN), the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU),
and the Council of Europe. NATO works in accordance with each of its member nations
and other entities to help create a peaceful and secure environment in which countries
preserve their sovereignty and independence, economies can flourish, and individuals
will prosper. In order to function in a cooperative and productive manner, the member
states rely upon the consensus decision-making process.
Consensus Decision-Making
One of the key elements of NATO is its decision-making process. The decisionmaking process is based upon a foundation of consensus.

Consensus is usually sought

when member nations must formulate policy on an important issue. In order to formulate
policy and implement particular policy, "all member governments must being fully
informed of each other's overall policies and intentions and the underlying considerations
which give rise to them."

Consequently, extended consultations and discussions are

1

required before an important decision can be made.164 Reaching a consensus in the
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The main objective of this process is the formation and publication of policy. These policy statements
are published in the form of a communique.
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decision-making process is a progression in which member states have multiple
opportunities to provide and revise language in NATO's documents which reflect a
nation's individual perspectives and objectives. Additionally, consensus amongst the
member nations "represents the common determination of all the countries involved to
implement them in full."165 The end result of the decision-making process is the formal
publication of NATO's policy in the form of a communique.166 In short, the consensus
decision-making process is a fundamental building block within the Alliance and results
in the formulation and publication of policy statements.
Within the member nations and in other allied governments, there is varied
support for decision-making by consensus. However there are critics who believe that
)

the process needs to be altered or abandoned. Although the consensus decision-making
process may be criticized as lengthy and cumbersome, it has two major distinctions and
advantages. First, "the members of the Alliance safeguard the role of each country's
individual experience and outlook while at the same time availing themselves of the
machinery and procedures which allow them jointly to act rapidly and decisively if
circumstances require them to do so."167 Secondly, once a decision has been made the
i

.

•

.

.

decision represents the determination of all the member nations and their commitment to

countries to arrive at mutually acceptable agreements on collective decisions or on action by the Alliance as
a whole." For more information refer to Chapter 7: Policy and Decision-Making - Consensus Politics and
Joint-Decision Making in the NATO Handbook.
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the decision.168 The consensus decision-making process is a fundamental cornerstone in
the Alliance.
Principal Players in the Decision-Making Process
NATO is an alliance composed of multiple countries. Each pf these countries is
the foundation upon which the Alliance rests and functions.

Essentially, "the most

important players in NATO are the member cpuntries who form the organization."169
Each of these countries is represented at every committee level by a representative, as
illustrated in Figure 2, at the political level. The Alliance is comprised of three principal
committees - the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, and the
Nuclear Planning Group - and their various subcommittees.

The three political

committees are each unique in their nature and each plays a vital rple within NATO. The
North Atlantic Council is the principal decision-making body. The Defense Planning
Committee is the ultimate authority regarding the Alliance's integrated military structure.
The Nuclear Planning Group is involved in nuclear policy issues.

Each group is

discussed at greater length in the subsequent sections.
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NATO's Civil and Military Structure
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The North Atlantic Council (NAC)
The North Atlantic Council (NAC) was established by Article 9 of the North
171

Atlantic Treaty.

The NAC is considered the highest authority and is considered the

fundamental decision-making body in NATO allowing it to have "effective political
authority and powers of decision."172
Normally, the Council consists of Permanent Representatives of all member
countries. The NAC meets at least once a week under the chairmanship of the Secretary
General. In order to assist in its work, the Council maintains numerous committees, each
of whom are responsible for carrying out the tasks the Council orders or.execute its
decisions. Each committee, regardless if it is civil or military, is under the discretion of
the Council. The type of decision and work the Council and the committees carry out
allow the Council to maintain its public profile, while issuing "declarations and
communiques explaining the Alliance's policies and decisions to the general public and
to governments of countries which are not members of NATO."173
The Defense Planning Committee (DPQ
The Defense Planning Committee (DPC) is the highest authority within NATO in
regards to the Alliance's integrated military structure. The DPC offers assistance and
guidance to NATO's military authorities, and within its scope, has the same functions
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and authority as the NAC on issues within its aptitude.

Essentially the DPC engages in

matters pertaining to defense matters and subjects who are associated with collective
security planning.
The DPC is composed of representatives of all member countries, with the
-

.

-

•

<

.

•

exception of France. The DPC meets when necessary at the level of Ambassadors and
twice a year at the level of the Ministers of Defense. It is chaired by the Secretary
General of NATO.
The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)
The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) discusses specific policy issues which are
related to or associated with nuclear forces. The NPG holds discussions which "cover a
broad range of nuclear policy matters, including the safety, security and survivability of
nuclear weapons, communications and information systems, deployment issues and wider
questions of common concern such as nuclear arms control and nuclear proliferation."175
The Planning Group is comprised of the defense ministers of member countries
who participate in NATO's Defense Planning Committee. The defense ministers meet at
regular intervals throughout the year. The NPG frequently reviews NATO's nuclear
policy and any decisions are taken jointly in order to modify or adapt new measures in

"Chapter 7: Policy and Decision-Making - The Principal Policy and Decision Making Institutions of the
Alliance, The Defense Planning Committee," available from
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070102.htm; Internet, accessed 05 March 2009.
175

"Chapter 7: Policy and Decision-Making - The Principal Policy and Decision Making Institutions of the
Alliance, the Nuclear Planning Group," available from r
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070103.htm; Internet, accessed 05 March 2009.

71

light of new developments and to update planning and consultation procedures relating to
^nuclear policy matters and subjects.
In short, NATO is an environment which brings together countries that are willing
to come together for a common cause and prepared to integrate their forces and engage in
multinational activities during a particular period of time. The military and political
structures of NATO provide for the advance planning which is required to enable
member countries to secure themselves in the global security environment. It is indeed
these structures and its process, that each member countries participates in, which
contribute to NATO's policy shift concerning out-of-area, and contributed to the
Alliance's involvement in Afghanistan in 2001.
NATO's Missions and Operations
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, NATO has continued to change while
maintaining cohesion and unity of purpose within the Alliance. In reality, NATO and its
member nations have not always been cohesive and unified, especially when dealing with
missions and operations who reside outside the traditional European borders.

The

Alliance's inability to cope with out-of-area missions can be traced back to the
foundation of NATO in 1949.
The Cold War
The tensions revolving around out-of-area policy of NATO can be traced back to
the establishment of the Alliance. When NATO was first established in 1949, one of its
fundamental roles was to deter any military aggressions. However, the member nations
of the Alliance were presented with the "difficulty of balancing their collective interest in
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North Atlantic security with their variously shared and perceived commitments in other
parts of the world."177 In this context, the member nations were unable to find common
v

•

•

•

grounds tb participate in anything beyond the boundaries of Europe.178 Throughout the
Cold War, the member nations relied upon a non-policy on out-of-area missions.
Since the foundation of NATO, conflicts regarding out-of-area was based upon
differences in perceived interests, ideologies, and viewpoints of the member nations.
From 1945 until the mid-1960s, the decolonization worldwide shifted European desires
and willingness to control economic boundaries.179 The decolonization created a vacuum
within the global security environment where NATO member countries found themselves
overcome by "Americanism" and this was hard for many to swallow. Additionally, the
realities of the Korean War affected member countries' interests and perceptions of
threat.180 Since, that period of time, many member nations have felt that by having
NATO forces involved in mission which resided outside the European boundaries would
leave the Alliance vulnerable. While the United States felt that it was in the Alliance's
JO]

bpst interest to engage in efforts outside of the European scope.

The conflicting

ideologies, perceptions, and interests remained a major stumbling block within the
NATO when responding to out-of-area missions.

The member states lacked a
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comprehensive consensus on how to deal with issues outside the geographical scope of
the North Atlantic that threaten allied interests and defense. Thus throughout the Cold
War, the Alliance continued to be hindered by its member states' ability to effectively
deal with out-of-area issues. In short, throughout the Cold War the member nations
'practiced' a non-policy on missions who resided outside the realm of the European
theater.
Post Cold-War
Throughout the Cold War, NATO member nations met resistance on collective
defense on out-of-area operations due to a lack of comprehensive consensus based upon
disagreeing beliefs, viewpoints, and objectives. The end of the Cold War heralded a
major shift in member nations' policy specifically regarding out-of-area. Many member
nations began to pursue more global policies due to the realization that in the modern
global security environment it is simply not possible to remain ambivalent about armed
aggression and threats beyond the European borders.182

But more importantly the

member nations were able to build upon differences in ideologies, perceptions, and
interests to engage in several selective missions throughout the 1990s and its first out-ofarea mission in Afghanistan.
The Afghanistan 2001 Invasion Case-Study at a Glance
Initially, NATO was a creation of the Cold War era. Since the end of the Cold
War, the global security environment has continued to become more complex. Therefore
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the Alliance has taken on new and fundamental tasks in order to remain effective in the
21 st century. The member nations have continued to refocus its efforts to "adapt to the
reality of asymmetrical threats"

Furthermore, the member nations continue to adopt "a

broader and more ambitious approach to security by further deepening and extending its
partnerships, modernizing its forces and providing assistance in crisis areas that are new
to the organization."185 In sum, NATO and it members continue to shift attitudes, update
and adopt policy, and accelerate the Alliance's transformation to deal with the global
security environment. The following is a brief historical description of Afghanistan and
summarizes with NATO's involvement in the region.
A Brief History of Afghanistan
Throughout its history, Afghanistan has confronted centuries of strife and turmoil.
Only until recently has the country been able to rebuild from the seemingly endless
warfare that has plague the land since it conception. The history of Afghanistan is
convoluted in conflict and social unrest but offers an intriguing and diverse tale. Because
of Afghanistan's location, between the historical trade routes of Asia and the Middle
East, the country has consistently been invaded and conquered by foreign invaders and
governments.

However, none of these foreign invaders successfully established and

maintained a long withstanding rule of law. As history has illustrated, invasion and
victory in Afghanistan will only be temporary at best, for success can be taken as easily
as it was given.
—:
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The history of Afghanistan has been a test to the global security environment and

the international community at large. Approximately 50,000 years, Afghanistan's earliest
settlers lived as hunters in caves until their numbers grew and moved to warmer plains
and formed villages and began to domestic animals.

The 6 to 15 century ushered in

the age of invasion and conquest. The foreign rulers bequeathed to the region a rich and
varied culture, and religious traditions which allowed Afghanistan to become a center of
great cultural and economic heritage.188 This was only to decline in the 16th century due
to constant foreign invasion and the discovery of other trade routes. The country was
finally unified in 1747 under Pashtun tribal leader Ahmad shad Durrani.189 The country
continued to be influenced by the presence of foreigners and was shaped largely by
competition between the United Kingdom and Russia during the 1.8th and. 19th centuries.
The region of Afghanistan relied upon an absolute monarchy, influenced by the
British Empire, until 1922. Under the guidance of the elected president, Amanullah
Khan, a state assembly and legislature were organized, and ministers were appointed to
the cabinet.190 From the turn of the 20th century to the end of the 1960s, the western
ideals of Khan and his successor Zahir Shah continued to challenge the powerful
religious leaders.
In the early 1970s the country was beset by serious economic problems. In 1973
the monarchy was overthrown by former Prime Minister Mohammad Sardar Daoud
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Kahan.191 Soon thereafter Daoud declared Afghanistan a republic and appointed himself
the first president and prime minister.192 By the middle of the 1970s, President Daoud
had decided to form closer ties with the West and the oil-rich nations of the Middle East
while distancing the country from the Soviet Union. Gradually, the Soviet's presence
was transitioned out of Afghan government and military positions. However, in 1978, a
Soviet-backed coup by the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) ended in the overthrow and murder of President Daoud. In December 1979, the
Soviet army invaded Afghanistan.
The presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan continued for the next decade.
During which time the Soviet army conducted military operations against Afghan
Mujahideen rebels who were backed by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and CIA operatives.
While the UN Security Council met to consider the Soviet Union intervention, which
resulted in the adoption of the first series of "Situation of Afghanistan" resolutions
(resolution ES-6/2).194 The resolutions "deplored the armed intervention in Afghanistan,
called for the withdrawal of foreign forces, asked states to contribute humanitarian
assistance, and asked the Security-General to keep it informed of developments."195
Throughout the 1980s, the UN General Assembly and the international
community continued to focus on Afghanistan by passing an additional series of
191
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resolutions. The resolutions "called for an end to the conflict, withdrawal of foreign
troops, UN assistance to find a political statement and international help for refugees and
others affected by the conflict."1

As international opposition from the United Nations

vocally increased daily, various approaches were made with the intentions of trying to
end the conflict.

However, "action by the United Nations Security Council was

impossible because the Soviets were armed with veto, but the UN General Assembly
regularly passed resolutions opposing the Soviet Occupation."197 Assistance from the
'

'

'

•

'

•

'

'

'

.

-

.
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international community - Germany, Great Britain, China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia was offered in order to help Pakistan deal with more than three million refugees fleeing
from Afghanistan.
In June 1982, a breakthrough in the Afghan War occurred when "proximity" talks
began between Pakistan and Afghanistan through the mediation of UN Secretary
General's special representative, Diego Cordovez.

The negotiations were aimed at

reversing a policy, which had enormous political, material, and human capital
ramifications, while achieving withdraw of the,Soviet forces.198

"The format had

essentially been agreed upon by 1985. Meanwhile the United States and the Soviet
Union had committed themselves to guaranteeing the implementation of an agreement
leading to a withdrawal."199 An agreement was reached which affirmed the sovereignty
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of Afghanistan and its right to self-determination, freedom from foreign invasion, and the
right of refugees to return in a safe return.20 The core of the agreement was reached in
"May 1988 that authorized the withdrawal of foreign troops according to a timetable that
would remove all Soviet forces."201 The occupation of Russian forces ended in February
1989 under the conditions of the Geneva Accords implemented by the UN. Nevertheless
the Soviets continued to back the Communist PDPA under Mohammed Najibullah until
the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992.
After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, civil war between the various factions
arose. The number of citizens fleeing the country resulted in the worst refugee crisis the
international community had ever encountered. In 1992, the fighting intensified, making
aid more difficult and shattering hopes of the country finding resolution. At the request
of the UN General Assembly, in December 1993 the Secretary-General established the
United Nations Special Mission Afghanistan (UNSMA).202 UNSMA was constituted to
"canvass a broad spectrum of Afghan leaders and solicit their views on how the UN
could best help with the national reconciliation and reconstruction."

Meanwhile, the

Taliban began to manifest their presence throughout the country.
In 1994, the Islamic Pahtun Taliban movement began in the southern providences
of Afghanistan.204 Over the next two years the movement began making rapid gains.
Soon thereafter the Taliban "controlled approximately 95 percent of the country,
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including the capital of Kabul, and all the largest urban areas, except Faizabad."

After

the seize of Kabul, the Taliban began to implement their own interpretation of the Islamic
law and conduct. In a presidential statement by the president of the UN Security Council
on 15 February 1996:
The Security Council expressed concern about intensified hostilities around the
capital city of Kabul, which prevented deliveries of humanitarian aid. It was also
deeply concerned that the continuing conflict provided fertile ground for
terrorism, arms transfers and drug trafficking, which destabilized the whole region
and beyond.206
As Taliban forces continued to establish their reign over the country, the UN Security
Council adopted Resolution 1076.207 The Resolution was a call for all Afghan parties to
cease all hostilities and to begin open dialogues aimed at achieving national unity and
reconciliation. It echoed earlier concerns "that the conflict provided fertile ground for
terrorism and drug trafficking and called on the parties to half such activities."208
Disregarding the resolutions passed by the UN and the condemnation by the international
community, the Taliban continued to expand its rule of law throughout the country and
conduct terrorist activities.
The rule of the Taliban and fighting between political and military fractions
continued between 1997 and 2000.209 The UN General Assembly, Security Council, and
international community continued to condemn the actions of the Taliban. Finally, on 15
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October 1999, "citing the failure of the Taliban authorities to response to demands, the
Council applied broad sanctions under the enforcement provisions of the UN Charter."210
The sanctions included the freezing of all assets and funds owned or controlled by the
Taliban.
NATO in Afghanistan
By the end of the 1990s, the nation of Afghanistan had become notorious for its
rule under the Taliban, production of opium, and terrorist training camps. The situation
in Afghanistan continued unresolved until the end of 2001. Throughout this period the
international community, including the UN and NATO, tried with varying levels of
success to provide aid to the citizens of Afghanistan.211

While condemnation by the

international continued without any direct actions taken.

This situation drastically

changed after the attacks of September 11 2001
•
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In 2001, immediately following the September 11th attacks, large scale
transformations were fashioned and implemented in the global security environment.
Within mere hours of the attacks in New York and Washington D.C., the Bush
Administration announced a war on terrorism. Initially the goals of the war were to bring
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda to justice and prevent the rise of terrorist organizations.
In order to accomplish each of these goals, the approach to be carried out by the United
States was twofold. First, economic and military sanctions were to be placed on any
country which was allegedly harboring terrorists while implementing global surveillance
and intelligence sharing. Secondly, US-led military operations would be launched in
Afghanistan to oust the oppressive Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. Soon thereafter, NATO
210
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and its member countries issued statements which were the first step in its path to
involvement in Afghanistan.
Immediately following the attacks of September 11th' and the announcement of
U.S.-led war on terrorism, NATO and its member states took historical steps by pledging
their loyalty and support in the war on terrorism. For the first time in the history of the
Alliance, NATO member nations made the extraordinary decision by unanimously
agreeing to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Additionally, the Alliance also
agreed to deploy its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean and elements of
its AWACS force.212

The steps undertaken enabled the Alliance to better assist its

member nations and their national authorities in the protection of their populations. The
actions of the member states regarding Afghanistan created a venue in which NATO
members would have to go beyond their European theater and combat the threats of
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The mission in Afghanistan was
NATO's first out-of-area mission.
After the initial activities in Afghanistan by NATO and as the situation continued
to unfold within the country, the international community met to discuss the situation at
hand and determine a decisive course of action before engaging in military operations.
On 12 November 2001, the "Six plus Two" group met in New York.213 Under the
chairmanship of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan, representatives from six countries
neighboring Afghanistan, as well as the United States and the Russian Federation, agreed
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on "the need for a board based and freely chosen Afghan government."214 In a Joint
Declaration, China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, the U.S. and
Russia each pledged their support in trying to help the Afghan people find a political
solution to the crisis within the country. Additional each country agreed that "there
should be the establishment in Afghanistan of a broad based multi-ethnic, politically
balanced, freely chosen Afghan administration representative of their aspirations and at
peace with its neighbors.215

At the end of the meeting it was concluded by many

participants, including some NATO member nations, that the crisis in Afghanistan was
critical and required immediate action.
Following the "Six plus Two" meeting, in December a further donor conference
was held in Berlin. The focus of the Bonn Conference was to address the immediate and
long-term needs of Afghanistan. Delegates from nations, international organizations, and
• )

the European Union attended the conference in hopes of addressing humanitarian and
reconstruction support for Afghanistan.216 The conference ended with the establishment
of a new, interim government in Afghanistan, known as the Afghan Interim Authority
(AIA).
After the UN Security Council unanimously endorsed the agreement, the Council
passed Resolution 1386.217
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International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help the Afghan Transitional Authority
918

maintain security in Kabul and its surrounding areas."

Initially led by the United

States, the ISAF was comprised of all NATO members as well as other partner states of
the Alliance. Additionally, the Afghan National Army was also key members of the
ISAF. The agreement of the^ ISAF paved the way for the creation of a three-way
partnership between the Afghan Transitional Authority, UNAMA, and ISAF.
As the mission of the ISAF continued, larger participation and assistance of
NATO forces were requested at the behest of the Afghan President Hamid Karzai. In
August 2003, NATO took over the command of ISAF.

In its new role, the UN. Security

Council Resolution 1776 called upon "NATO to disarm militias, reform the justice
system, train a national police force and army, provide security for elections, and combat
99A

the narcotics industry."

991

However, the Resolution failed to address how NATO

should carry out these tasks. It was left up to the member nations, in consultation with
the Afghan government, to take the provisions outlined in the Resolution and make them
tangible and quantifiable in order to carry out a realistic policy. However, political
leaders and local commanders have had to face considerable challenges - national
caveats, difficultly in persuading some member states to contribute forces,222 counter
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narcotics,

and failure of provincial reconstruction teams.

These challenges have

influenced the implementation of the ISAF by member nations. Despite these challenges,
over time NATO commanders implemented actions in Afghanistan to bring the country
under NATO's operational responsibilities.225 Today the ISAF is the primary operation
within Afghanistan.
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Figure 3: ISAF Troop Locations in Afghanistan226
Today, the two military efforts in Afghanistan continue with efforts to stabilize a
potentially hostile country. The first operation, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),227
was a U.S. led combat mission against the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorist groups,
primarily conducted along the Pakistan border. The OEF operation was not a NATO
mission, although it did involve nations whom are a part of the NATO. The second
operation involved in Afghanistan was the ISAF,228 who was established in order to
stabilize the country by the international community. The ISAF includes troops from all
twenty-eight states of NATO and has included troops from several non-NATO nations,
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such as Azerbaijan, Austria, Jordon, New Zealand, and Sweden.

"By July 2008, ISAF

had an estimated 52,700 troops from 40 countries, with NATO members providing the
core of the force. The United States has approximately 14,800 troops in ISAF."
The efforts undertaken by NATO in Afghanistan are indeed the Alliance's first
mission beyond the boundaries of the European continent.

The purpose of the

Afghanistan mission was to stabilize and reconstruct the country. Even though NATO
has participated in several stabilization and reconstruction missions, such as in Kosovo,
the operations in Afghanistan were different. Different because there has never been a
long standing centralized Afghanistan government, presence of Taliban, the mission's
out-of-area scope and abrasive terrain, and the country's historical context and standing
amongst the international community. Different because this was the first mission where
NATO was involved in a military operation outside of the European theater.
The mission in Afghanistan has played an important role in NATO, in the future
of the Organization, and for the leadership of its member nations. Most importantly, the
mission illustrates the progression of the political and operational involvement of the
Alliance since the beginning of the 19th century and a shift in NATO's out-of-area policy.
By why would NATO shift its policy and become involved in Afghanistan? Is it a result
of ad hoc tendencies?

Or, is something more typical of policy development and

adherence to institutional methods in the globalized, post-Cold War environment? The
following analysis will address these questions and analyze NATO's out-of-area policy to
understand what led NATO to become involved in Afghanistan.

NATO's Role in Afghanistan.
Gallis(1998),l.
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Interpreting NATO in Afghanistan: A Dialogical Analysis
Background Knowledge
The background knowledge which is required for this analysis includes the
knowledge of the four global security arrangements and the history of NATO, its policy
of out-of-area, and involvement in Afghanistan,231

but more importantly, an

understanding of the transition from the bilateral Cold War rivalry to the post-Cold War
security environment of collective security arrangements and Alliances.

The global

security environment is made up of many international organizations, bi-lateral and
multi-lateral treaties, policies and resolutions, non-governmental organizations, and
diffusion of norms and each of these components continue to grow and will continue to
govern the global security and its environment.

Within this context, NATO has

continued uphold its mission, shifted its views concerning out-of-area, and has become
involved in Afghanistan.
Speech Acts
The speech acts in this analysis were gathered from communiques published by
NATO's North Atlantic Council between 1996 and 2003. The communiques, policy
statements, are a result of the consensus decision-making process. During this process
representatives from the member states consult with one another. During the consultation
process, member nations exchange views and information and discuss the language of the
communique prior to reaching an agreement and taking any necessary action.232 This
process enables each country to voice their views and express any hesitations or worries,
231
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The result of the consultation and consensus decision-making process are policy
statements published in the form of a communique. This process ensures that each
communique is consistent in its format and reporting methods. In short, each speech act
k
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•

of this analysis represents an official position of NATO member states.

'

•

-

Each

communique focuses on the issues of how the member states of NATO will respond and
deal with the global security environment within the context of the appropriate security
rules.233
The following are the speech acts used in this analysis:
1. Speech Act 1: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1996)165 held at NATO HQ
Brussels 10 Dec 1996.234
2. Speech Act 2: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1997)155 held at NATO HQ
Brussels 16 Dec 1997.235
3. Speech Act 3: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1998)140 held at NATO HQ
Brussels 8 Dec 1998.236
4. Speech Act 4: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1999)166 held at NATO HQ
Brussels 15 Dec 1999.237
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To read each speech act in its entirety refer to the Appendices.
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.

5. Speech Act 5: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2000)124 held at NATO HQ
Brussels 15 Dec 2000.238
6. Speech Act 6: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2001)158 held at NATO HQ
Brussels 6 Dec 2001.239
7. Speech Act 7: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2002)59 held at NATO HQ
Brussels 14 May 2002.240
8. Speech Act 8: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2003)152 held at NATO HQ
Brussels 4 Dec 2003.241
Content of the Speech Acts
In speech act 1 the member states assert that the Alliance is in a state of reform.
The member states assert they will strive to define a new structure and dimension in a
different world and with a Europe in search of a new identity. The member states are
resolved to preserve its political and military strength which will ensure its ability to
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carry out a multiple missions. NATO member states will continue to build upon its
security by "maintaining its capability for collective security, admitting new members,
expanding and strengthening cooperative relationships with all Partners" and "realizing
the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance."242 The member states
reconfirmed their mission statements and will continue to support all efforts to combat
threats, like terrorism, which constitute serious challenges to harmony, security, and
steadiness of NATO.
NATO member states assert in speech act 2 that the Alliance is in a period of
transition.

The member states have expanded its membership to include the Czech

Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Additionally, the member nations have expressed a new
will and capacity to adapt to a new Europe through continual engagement in the
Partnership for Peace and the transatlantic coalition. As such, the member nations will
continue to consider options for a future of military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and will continue to condemn all acts of terrorism.243 In doing so the member states of
the Alliance will continue to pay particular attention to the Mediterranean since the
security of Europe is directly tied to security and stability within the region.

Thus

securing peace over the long term will then require cooperative efforts but also using
"arrangements in the Alliance for consultation on threats of a wider nature that affect
Alliance security interests."244
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In speech act 3 the member states continue to redefine the role of the Alliance in
order to adapt, renew, and meet the security challenges of the 21 st century. Internally, the
member nations continue to strive to "maintain the Alliance's military effectiveness for
the full range of its missions building on its essential collective defense capabilities and
its ability to react to a wide range of contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and
to develop the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)."245 Additionally, the
member nations continuously work to update the Strategic Concept. Externally, NATO
member states continue to enhance the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the
Partnership for Peace. These partnerships continue to be a focal point for the Alliance, in
order to build "new patterns of practical military and defense-related cooperation across a
wide range of issues."246 These efforts have proved useful in the crisis in Kosovo as
cooperation in the region progresses and the establishment of a NATO Military Liaison
Mission in Moscow. Finally, the members of the Alliance recognizes the proliferation of
nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons are a means of serious concern;
therefore member countries will work in conjunction with one another to urge all
countries to fully implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The member states of NATO assert in speech act 4 that the Alliance has embarked
on a new chapter. The member states note that the new chapter was marked by three
major milestones.

First, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland became official

members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in mid-March.

Secondly, the

member states committed the Alliance to its first air-strike campaign. The objectives of
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the campaign were twofold: (1) target Yugoslavian military targets to stop violence and
74*7

genocide and (2) force Belgrade to withdraw its troops from Kosovo.

Finally, NATO

celebrated its fiftieth anniversary since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.
Each of these events has propelled NATO and its member countries to reconsider their
ideas, concepts, and theories towards the Alliance at present arid in the future.

In

particular, the experience in Kosovo has confirmed that NATO member countries "must
continue to adapt and improve its defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of
future multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions."

The

member states recognize that this is an important step in the Alliance's transformation
especially in the 21 st century.

The member states will continue to enhance their

cooperation with other states, consider options for security building measures, and strive
to preserve its strategic stability.
In speech act 5 NATO members asserted they will continue to pursue its current
missions, including those endeavors in South-East Europe, while maintaining the
Alliance's partnerships and cooperative efforts to assure peace and stability. In order to
do so, NATO members will continue to "promote long-term stability based on regional
reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidence-building measures, regional cooperation,
(and) a lasting resolution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons."249
Additionally, the member states will continue to review their progress in implementing
the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI).
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capabilities the Alliance urgently requires to meet the security challenges of the 21 s
century by ensuring the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full
spectrum of Alliance missions."250 In doing so, the Alliance and its members will be able
to supply forces which are well, structured, interoperable, scalable, mobile, highly
capable and readily deployable. Each of these initiative require the member nations to
make "the most effective use of resources" and to find "innovative approaches to
overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of national contributions and
possible

cooperative

a n d r collective

arrangements

and

mechanisms,

including

multinational, joint and common funding."251 Additionally, the member nations have
made substantial progress on the development of the European Security and Defense
Identity, Mediterranean Dialogue, Partnership for Peace, OSCE, reaction and response to
NBC and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Alliance's Open Door Policy, but
important work remains to be done as the member countries continue to place high
priority on strengthening relationships with all participants in the Euro-Atlantic
community.
The member states of NATO stress in speech act 6 the effects of the terrorist
attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. This act resulted in the invocation of
-f

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Amidst this tragedy, NATO member states have
"taken stock of NATO's broad agenda, and given further guidance on its
implementation"252 and issued statements regarding NATO's response to terrorism and
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its contribution to the campaign against terrorism. The member states call into account
their commitment to forge a new relationship with Russia; their continued efforts in
enlarging the Alliance; and reiterated their commitment to peaceful, stable and
democratic countries, particularly those in South-East Europe. NATO member states
have demonstrated that the events of 11 September have challenged the Alliance and the
global security environment "in a variety of different, sometimes unpredictable, ways."
Thus the Alliance and its member states need to have the ability to ensure that each
country and its forces have the best capabilities to meet the challenges and are able to
work with one another in a seamless way. The members of NATO have demonstrated
they have the ability to interact with one another based upon their ability to adapt and
facilitate a "comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate
mix of political and defense efforts."254 In this context, NATO member countries will
continue to actively contribute to the development of agreements and measures in the
particular field while pursuing proactive policies and missions which are flexible and
enduring.
In speech act 7 the member states confirm that they have continuously engaged
and upheld their core commitments "to deter and defend against any threat of aggression
against any NATO member state, as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic
Treaty,"255

The Alliance has continuously engaged in upholding the security of its

member countries and in doing so it has changed by expanding its agenda and engaging
in selective out-of-area missions, such as in South-East Europe. In order to survive,
253
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NATO member nations have strived to transform the Organization. In doing so; the
member nations have pledged to fight against terrorism and become engaged in
operations in Afghanistan.

The member nations' commitment and involvement in

Afghanistan represents a new chapter in the Organization's history. In order to keep
abreast in the static global security environment, the members of NATO vow to carry out
the following:
•

Field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain
operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives;

•

Develop new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance, including strategic lift
and modern strike capabilities, so that NATO can more effectively respond
collectively to any threat of aggression against a member state;

•

Confirm the Alliance's commitment to remain open to new members, and
enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic area;

•

Commit ourselves to continuing to work with the aspirants to help them make
sufficient progress to be invited to begin accession negotiations, and undertaking
internal preparations to ensure its readiness to accept new members;

•

Upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue;
and

•

Reconfirm commitments to a peaceful, stable, and democratic South-East Europe
and operations in the Balkans.256

Each of these efforts confirm that NATO member nations will continue to work to
transform the Alliance, as "new, more substantive relationship with Partners" are formed
256
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and cooperation efforts are amplified when "responding to new security challenges,
including terrorism."257
Finally, NATO member nations in speech act 8 confirm the Alliance's ongoing
transformation in order to meet the needs of the '2.1st century global security environment,
its threats, and challenges which impose on the security of member countries, their
populations, territories, and forces. The member nations reaffirm the transformation of
the Organization within the global security environment by welcoming seven new
members to the Alliance; rejecting and condemning all acts of terrorism; confirming its
leadership of ISAF^ outlining the Alliance's mission in the Balkans and South-East
Europe; reconfirming its commitment to those partnerships made and continually
enhancing cooperative efforts across the Euro-Atlantic and Mediterranean area; and
supporting the aims of Proliferation Security Initiative and CFE Treaty.258 Finally, the
members of NATO demonstrate that their "commitment to multilateralism through
effective action and shared commitment to: the transatlantic link; NATO's fundamental
security tasks including collective security; shared democratic values; and the United
Nations Charter" has laid the path for the Alliance's transformation and survival in the
global security environment.259
Context of the Speech Acts
This thesis relies upon Frederking's

(2003) theory

of

rule-orientated

constructivism to contextualize NATO's communiques within the global security
environment.

According to Frederking's theory, actors perform speech acts that
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construct, invoke, or contest the collective security rules.

For this study, in order for

NATO member countries to interact within the global security environment and maintain
the Alliance, the member countries have identified and adopted several rules.

The

member nations of the Alliance abide by the following rules:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens;
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use;
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political relationships;
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully; and
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
• Each of these rules was designed to ensure stability and security for the Euro-Atlantic
area, help the member countries effectively conduct out-of-area missions, and allow the
existence and transformation of the Alliance within the context of the global security
environment.
Pragmatic Analysis
Pragmatic analysis refers to "a linguistic level that relates contents ,to context."261
In other words, pragmatic analysis is concerned with the way in which the meaning(s) or
significance of a word(s) and/or phrase(s) are constructed within a particular context
composed of interactions.

Central to pragmatics is the fact that we can mean much

more than we say. In order to assess the meanings of a particular word or phrase involves
the generation Of propositions. The important point is that propositions, as inferences, are
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based on a grammatical item or clausal structure phrase chosen, arid fall directly within
.

•

j

'

••

the realm of the speech act.
Pragmatic analysis helps to generate all propositions associated with a speech act.
Each proposition concerns those aspects which convey truth, appropriateness, and
sincerity claims. Therefore pragmatics reveals how each speech act illustrated claims of
validity and how each uses or builds upon the global security arrangements and the social
rules associated.

During an interaction, either a speech or activity, a rational actor

conveys multiple understood propositions, and each of these propositions is "consensual
and/or irrelevant to the specific issue of how to implement collective security rules."
Throughout the course of this thesis, in order to understand the context in which NATO
member states are functioning in, the collective security rules identified above should be
reference.
Assertions, Directives, and Commitments
The pragmatic analysis of the speech acts located within the communiques from
1996 through 2003 illustrates each invoked the use of several collective security rules.
Within the overall pattern, each speech act generated a distinctive set of assertions,
directives, and commitments. The paragraphs below briefly summarize the distinctive
and unique assertions, directives, and commitments from each speech act.
In speech act 1, NATO member states assert that the Alliance would uphold
security and stability while taking a new shape. The new shape of the Alliance would
reflect the fundamental changes in the security environment in Europe and the enduring
vitality of the transatlantic partnership which underpins our endeavors. In order to do so,
the member nations of the Alliance would have to commit to:
263
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• Agreeing on a new structure command;
• Making arrangements for the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI);
• Keeping the Alliance open for new membership;
•

Strengthening cooperative relations with all Partners, especially those with Russia
and the Ukraine;

• Enhancing Mediterranean dialogue; and
• Further enhancing political and defense efforts relating to conflict prevention,
crisis management, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).264
Additionally, the member nations directed all members to ratify, accede, and fully
implement NATO treaties and policies. The publication of this speech act confirmed that
each member nation has a clear understanding of NATO's mission and the necessary
steps needed to be taken in order to carry out the mission.
In speech act 2, the members of NATO asserted the Alliance has upheld its
mission through the reinforcement of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, based
upon on Allied solidarity and cohesion. Additionally, the member nations have asserted
they have been able to maintain a strong transatlantic link and form new cooperative
partnerships with other Euro-Atlantic nations; began to build an ESDI within NATO, and
remained effective and vigilant for a full range of missions. In order to do continue with
these assertions, the member nations of the Alliance would have to commit to:
• Maintaining a strong transatlantic link while remaining open through the
admission of new members;
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• Upholding the cooperative partnerships with Euro-Atlantic nations, especially
with Russia and the Ukraine;
•

Continuing the comprehensive process of NATO enlargement;

• Building a ESDI within NATO;
•

Strengthening the OSCE as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict
prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation as well as for
enhancing cooperative security and advancing democracy and human rights;

•

Continuing to support the Alliance in the effectiveness which enable it for a full
range of its missions;

•

Endorsing and continue with measures for the proliferation of WMD; and

•

Continuing to support all efforts to combat terrorism.

NATO also directed its member nations and other partners to ratify, accede, and fully
implement NATO treaties and policies. Each of these efforts illustrate NATO is in a
period of transformation as it continues to broaden its agenda and engage in mission
which are outside the traditional boundaries of Europe. Indeed, the Alliance and its
member nations comprehend the urgency to transform in order to meet the security
challenges of the global security environment.
In speech act 3, the member nations assert that the Alliance is able to adapt and
renew in order to meet the security challenges of the 21 st . In order to do so, NATO
members have committed the Alliance to carry out the following acts:

(
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'

•

Developing a comprehensive package that will continue the enlargement process,
operationalize our commitment to the open door policy and underscore our
willingness to assist aspiring countries in meeting NATO standards;

•

Continuing with internal adaption;

•

Improving the political, civil and military aspects of the Alliance;

•

Preparing to expand NATO's efforts to address the evolving proliferation threat;
and

•

Combating terrorism in accordance with our international commitments and
national legislation.266

To carry out each of these acts, NATO member states direct each of its members and
other nation to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and policies. In short,
the purpose of this speech act is twofold; first to acknowledge NATO's fifty year
establishment, and secondly, to illustrate that the Alliance members have to continuously
redefine their role in order to adapt, renew, and have the ability to meet the security
challenges of the 21 st century. This has allowed the Alliance and its member nations to
take on new roles and operations while maintain a clear and stable mission.
In speech act 4, the members of NATO point out that the Organization has been
able to secure and stabilize the global security environment while still being able to
transform to meet security challenges. The member countries asserts they have been able
to do so by maintaining stability and security; ensuring the effectiveness of bilateral and
multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions; maintaining civilmilitary relations; implementing robust practical and political support provided by
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Partner countries; having the ability to define, adopt, and transform policies; and
establishing a strong, stable and enduring partnerships within the framework of the
Alliance. In order to continue to engage in each of these measures, the Alliance and its
member nations will commit to:
•

Further adapting the Alliance to the new security environment while continuously
maintaining security and stability;

•

Continuing to consider means to ensure an effective and coherent Alliance
contribution to the efforts of the international community to prevent and defuse
conflicts, and to make recommendations where and if appropriate;

•

Monitoring closely the situation in South-East Europe;

•

Continuing efforts in Kosovo and other areas of involvement for the Alliance;

•

Helping to establish a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo;

•

Contributing to effective conflict prevention;

•

Reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar;

•

Remaining open to new members and encouraging applicants;

•

Continuing to attach importance to consultations and practical cooperation with
Russia and the Ukraine;

•

Maintaining efforts aimed at reducing nuclear weapons; and

•

Reaffirming the determination to combat it in accordance with our international
commitments and national legislation.267 ,

Each of these efforts are broad in their demeanors and efforts, thus the members direct
the help of its partners and other nations to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO
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treaties and policies;, encourage the leaders in Kosovo to work together and with the
international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a
democratic society; urge Belgrade and the government of Montegro to resolve their
differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any destabilizing measures;
push Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict; and support the
Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic reforms. NATO member
nations have changed the course of the Organization's history, as each countries
continues to improve its collaboration with other states, think about options for security
actions and procedures, and strive to protect its strategic strengthand security.
In speech act 5, NATO members demonstrate that the Alliance has been able to
uphold and maintain stability and security. The members of NATO assert they have had
the ability to do so by remaining strongly committed to the achievement of security,
stability, peace, democracy and respect for human rights for its member countries and in
Out-of-area missions, including South-East Europe and remain steadfast and adhere to
policies and treaties. Additionally, the member nations continue to condemn violence
and terrorism by vigorously pursuing out-of-area missions; continue to enable countries
to work together to ensure their own security; further strengthening their military
capabilities and to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar; and maintain cooperative
efforts to work with Russia and any situations which arise concerning the nation. To
build upon these efforts NATO and its member countries will carry out the following
commitments:
•

Promoting

long-term

stability

based

on

regional

reconciliation,

neighborliness, confidence-building measures, and regional cooperation;
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•

Continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic
for all member nations and in out-of-mission areas;

•

Providing sufficient resources to efficiently carry out policies, treaties, and out-ofarea missions;

•

Effectively using resources and finding innovative approaches to overcoming
shortfalls in capabilities by taking advantage of national contributions and
possible cooperative and collective arrangements and mechanisms, including
multinational, joint and common funding;

•

To work for permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency, consultation and
cooperation between member nations;

•

Intensifying consultation in times of crisis;

•

Continuing to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring countries on
their preparations for possible future membership; and

•

Considering ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of our
cooperative relations with all partners.268
.

'

_

.

(.

•

.

•

As such, the member states will continue to reach out and direct its members and other
countries of the global security environment to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO
treaties and policies and to subscribe to and adopt its principles, commitments,
confidence-building measures and incentives.

Additionally, NATO members will

continue to call upon the representatives and leaders in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina
to carry out their duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with the
international community and adhere to all treaties and policies; urge Russia and
268
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Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict; and encourage
Ukraine to move forward on its current path of political and economic reform. NATO
members will then be able to continue to pursue its current missions, including those
endeavors in South-East Europe, while maintaining its partnerships and cooperative
efforts in order to assure peace and stability.
In speech act 6, NATO member states assert that in order to maintain stability and
security in a post September 11th environment for the Alliance, its member nations and
their, citizens, it is essential that confident and cooperative partnerships, based on shared
democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided EuroAtlantics, are upheld. Furthermore, it is asserted that each member nation needs to
uphold current policies and treaties; continue to condemn all use of violence and
terrorism for either military or political means; engage in current and future out-of-area
missions; and reaffirm the necessity of having the capability to defend appropriately and
effectively against threats. The September 11th attacks will be forever remembered as a
'day of infamy' for all citizens around the world and in order to help prevent incidents of
this level, the member countries commit to:
•

Upholding its allegiance to its member states and its policies regarding the attacks
of 11 September 2001;

•

Exploring and developing new, effective

mechanisms

for

consultation,

cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action;
•

Continuing the enlargement process;

•

Developing a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans;
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•

Promoting regional reconciliation and cooperation, good neighborliness, stable
and secure borders, protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and
minorities, confidence-building measures, and lasting solution to the problem of
refugees and displaced persons;

•

Continuing to denounce terrorism and all acts of violence;

•

Further broadening and strengthening cooperation in the framework of the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP);

•

Ensuring that Alliance forces have the best possible capabilities to meet these
challenges and are able to work together seamlessly;

•

Continuing to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these
challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts; and

•

Finding a swift resolution of remaining issues between Russia and Georgia.269

To carry out each of these objectives, the member states direct the help of its members
and the defense community to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties and
policies and to continue to cooperate with the international community.

Moreover,

NATO member nations urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a
solution to the conflict; encourage the elected leaders of Kosovo to exercise their new
functions in strict compliance and carry out their duties responsibly and work together
and in close cooperation with the international community and adhere to all treaties and
policies; persuade the Ukraine to continue to take concrete steps to take its reform
process forward; and finally, encourage the Partners to seek a more active relationship
with the Alliance. Based upon the static global security environment and the attacks of
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September 11th, the members of the Alliance will continue to adhere to its goals and
rigorously pursue their commitments.
In speech act 7, NATO member states assert that the Alliance has continued to
transform in order maintain stability and security while striving to survive within the
global security environment.

Consequentially, the member nations assertively have

remained steadfast in order to promote peaceful, stable, and democratic nations, including
those countries in South-East Europe'while continuing to combat the threat of terrorism
and preventing the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense. Also, member
nations continue to maintain out-of-area missions and field forces that can move quickly
to wherever they are needed, sustain toperations over distance and time, and achieve their
objectives. The member states continue to work with Russia and the Ukraine to enhance
cooperation in addition to ensuring crisis are met with the most appropriate military
response, effective crisis management is implemented, and upholding current policies and
treaties. NATO member states have been able to do by directing its members and other
nations in the global security environment to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO
treaties and policies and to continue to cooperate with the international community;
encouraging Russia to enhance its cooperation with NATO to facilitate our efforts to
verify this claim as soon as possible; urging Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good
faith to find a solution to the conflict; supporting Croatia in their quest to continue to
contribute to stability in the Balkans; persuading the Ukraine to implement the reforms
required to achieve this objective and stand ready to continue to assist it in this regard;
and continuing to call on the local authorities in all out-of-area missions to take on
greater responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing policies and
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treatments. Each of these assertions and directives will be build upon as the member
states commit to:
•

Acting on its core commitments to deter and defend against any threat of
aggression against any NATO member state;

•

Adapting to be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks and to
strengthen security right across the Euro-Atlantic area;

•

Strengthening national and collective capacities to protect our populations,
territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed
from abroad;
\

•

.

Working with member nations and Partners to deal with the threat posed by
possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including their possible use
by terrorists, and the means of their delivery;

•

Developing new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance;

•

Launching the next round of NATO enlargement;

•

Remaining open to new members, and enhancing security in the Euro-Atlantic
area;

.

•

Building a new, more substantive relationship with Partners;

•

Upgrading the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue;

•

Promoting regional reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights of
members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures and a
lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons;
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•

Adapting the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet the threats posed by the
proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, adopting an appropriate mix of
political and defense efforts;

•

Developing a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans;
and

•

Continuing to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these
challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts.270

Each assertion, directive, and commitment provides evidence that the member nations
have shifted their out-of-area policy and transformed the Alliance within the context of
the global security environment in order to survive and deal with its challenges. Indeed,
the member countries of the Alliance have stayed true to their core commitments "to
deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state,"271
while adopting an ever-broadening agenda and missions who are beyond the realm of the
traditional European theater.
Finally, member nations in speech act 8 assert that NATO has continued to serve
as a keystone in the collective defense of the Euro-Atlantic area. Additionally, the
Alliance is an essential transatlantic forum for security in the current global security
environment. The Alliance's member countries and partners have patiently and tirelessly
worked towards the on-going transformation of the Organization to meet the 21 st century
threats and challenges. The members of NATO assert they have done so by continuing to
expand the Alliance and encouraging new members to join; continuing to combat
terrorism; ensuring peace, stability, and reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans;
270
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continuing to help to improve the security environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
continuing to prevent the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense; carrying out
the full range of its missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are
needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives; continue
developing relationships with Russia and the Ukraine; enhancing cooperation between
the member nations and the EU; ensuring crisis were met with the most appropriate
military response and effective crisis management is implemented; maintaining out-ofr
area missions; and upholding current policies and treaties. In order for the Alliance to
continue to transform in the global security environment, NATO member nations have
committed to:
•

Preserving peace through its operations;

•

Spreading stability through its partnerships;

•

Reinforcing the community of shared values through the most robust round of
enlargement in our history;

•

Using all means at its disposal and to cooperate fully with other international
Organizations and with its Partners to fight terrorism;

••• Assisting in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, integrated into the
international community;
•

Developing a comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, in
close consultation with other International Organizations and the Afghan
Transitional Authority;

•

Supporting territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in the Balkans
and help those countries to integrate fully into Euro-Atlantic structures;
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•

Enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU;

•

Considering ways to further enhance relationships by generating a more ambitious
and expanded framework;

•

Building on the progress between NATO and Russia, and NATO and the Ukraine;

. ?

Supporting arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play
a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives, including
preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their
means of delivery;

•

Encouraging multilateralism through effective action and our shared commitment
to the transatlantic link; and

•

Implementing measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the
Organization.272

Furthermore, NATO member nations have directed its members to ratify, accede, and
fully implement NATO treaties and policies and to continue to cooperate with the
international community. The member states have also directed the defense community
to encourage all parties in Kosovo to work constructively to meet the agreed standards;
encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan countries; encourage Albania, Croatia
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue pursuing the reforms
necessary to advance their candidacies for NATO membership; encourage Ukraine to
pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration; and urge swift
resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia and call upon the parties
to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level. The member nations' devotion to
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its mission and its on-going transformation are part of a process to "enhance the security
of Alliance member countries and the future stability and prosperity of the Euro-Atlantic
area as a whole."273
The analysis of each assertion, directive, and commitment derived from each
speech act reveals that NATO member states have adhered to its commitments as
outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty while transforming its out-of-area policy to
effectively deal with the global security environment.
Explicit Performatives and Implicit Contents
In the pragmatic analysis, each assertion, directive, and commitment are then
974

expressed as an "explicit performative,"

grouping the category and subcategory of each

srjeech act. Then each speech act is identified for implicit contents (reflexive intentions,
implicatures, and presuppositions)275 that can be inferred.
273
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The propositions add 'hereby' to each speech act to stress the fundamental point of speech act theory that
language is action.
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A reflexive intention is the proposition which specify implicitly conveyed intentions. Reflexive
intentions differ depending on the type of speech. Assertions follows P is the case and the intentions are S
believes that P and S wants H to believe that P. Directives follow Do X and the intentions are S believes
that his utterance, in virtue his authority over H, constitutes sufficient reason for H to do X and S wants H
to do X because of X's command. Commitments follow I will do Y and the intentions are S believes his
utterance obligates him to do U on the condition that H indicates he wants S to do U; S wants Y on the
condition that H indicate he wants S to do Y; and S wants H to believe (a) and (b).
A implicature is a proposition which comes from Grice's cooperative principles, which includes
the following maxim of conversation:
The maxim of these propositions come from Grice's cooperative principle, which includes the
following maxims of conversation:
•
The maxim of quality: Do not say what you believe to be false, and do not say anything for which
you lack adequate evidence,
•
The maxim of quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current
purposes of the exchange.
• The maxim of relevance: Make your contributions relevant.
• The maxim of manner: Avoid obscurity, avoid ambiguity, be brief and be orderly.
A presupposition is an inference that needs to be true for a statement to be meaningful or have a
truth value. Most suppositions have the characteristics of 'constancy under negation.' The classic example
is as follows:
' ••• The King of France is bald.
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implicit contents of any utterance may cancel or even alter any of the beliefs of the
member countries of the Alliance thereby affecting the collective security rules used.
Because space is insufficient here to present the entire pragmatic analysis, there will only
be brief list of implicit propositions of significance.276 A listing of the propositions I
analyzed and generated can be found in Table 1 and should be referenced throughout the
analysis.

• The King of France is not bald.
• The King of France exists.
The first two statements help to suppose the third, even through the first two negate one another. This is
consistent under negation. Most presuppositions in the pragmatic analysis have this property.
276

For the pragmatic analysis in its entirety refer to the Appendices.
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Pragmatic Analysis of NATO in Afghanistan
Speech Act
Speech Act 1 Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, and Enforcement
Explicit Performative:
a. The member nations hereby assert that the Alliance will uphold
the security and stability while taking a new shape, reflecting the
fundamental changes in the security environment in Europe and
the enduring vitality of the transatlantic partnership which
underpins our endeavors.
b. The member nations hereby encourage the member states and
other nations to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO
policies and treaties.
Reflective Intentions:
a. Assertion:
a. "The member nations believe that its must maintain
security and stability while being able to evolve and
survive in the current global security environment.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to uphold its
mission by carry out cooperative measures through
political and military means.
b. Directive
1. The member nations believe that its utterance, in virtue
of its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient
reason for to the member nations to ratify, accede and
fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
2. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede
and fully implement NATO treaties and policies because
of NATO's command.
Implicatures: The intentions of the member nations are sincere and
normative.
Presuppositions:
a. If the member nations preserve their political and military
strength, ensuring its ability to carry out the full range of its
mission, then the Alliance will be able to stabilize and secure the
whole Euro-Atlantic area and the global security environment.
b. If the member nations do not preserve their political and military
strength, ensuring its ability to carry out the full range of its
mission, then the Alliance will not be able to stabilize and secure
in the whole Euro-Atlantic area and the global security
environment.
Speech Act 2 Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, and Enforcement
Explicit Performative:
a. The member nations hereby commits the Alliance to do the
following:
a. Continue with the comprehensive process of enlarging
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Speech Act 3

NATO;
b. Continue to remain open through the admission of new
members into the Alliance;
c. Create a strong, stable, and enduring partnership with
Russia and the Ukraine;
,
d. Continue efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
e. Endorse and continue with measure for the proliferation
ofWMD;and
f. Continue to support all efforts to combat terrorism.
Reflective Intentions:
a. Commitment:
a. The member nations believe that its utterance obligates
the Alliance to promote peace and stability in the EuroAtlantic area and the global security environment on the
condition that the member countries continue with the
comprehensive process of enlarging NATO; continue to
remain open through the admission of new members into
the Alliance; create a strong, stable, and enduring
partnership with Russia and the Ukraine; continue efforts
in Bosnia and Herzegovina; endorse and continue with
measure for the proliferation of WMD; and continue to
support all efforts to combat terrorism.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the
directive on the condition that the member countries will
be able to promote peace and security amongst
themselves.
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and
(b).
Implicatures: The intentions of the member nations are sincere and
normative.
•
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, and Enforcement
Explicit Performative:
,
a. The member nations hereby assert the Alliance is able to adapt,
renew, and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21 st
century through security and stability throughout the global
security environment.
Reflective Intentions:
a. Assertion:
a. The member nations believe the Alliance must be able to
adapt, renew, and is ready to meet the security challenges
of the 21 st century through security and stability
throughout the global security environment.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to believe it has
the ability to adapt, renew, and has the ability to be ready
to meet the security challenges in the global security
environment while upholding security and stability.
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Speech Act 4

Implicatures: The intentions of the member nations are siricere and
normative.
Presuppositions:
a. If the member nations are able to adapt, renew, and is ready to
meet the security challenges of the 21 st century, the Alliance will
be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations
and throughout the global security environment.
b. If the member nations are not able to adapt, renew, and is ready
to meet the security challenges of the 21 st century, the Alliance
will not be able to maintain security and stability for its member
nations and throughout the global security environment.
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of
Force
'
Explicit Performative:
a. The member nations hereby assert the Alliance has been able to
adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security challenges of the
21 s ' century by maintaining stability and security; ensuring the
effectiveness of bilateral and multinational operations across the
full range of Alliance missions; maintaining civil-military
relations; implementing robust practical and political support
provided by Partner countries; having the ability to define,
adopt, and evolve policies; and establishing a strong, stable and
enduring partnerships within the framework of the Alliance.
b. The member nations hereby direct the following:
a. Leaders in Kosovo to work together and with the
international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo
and the establishment of a democratic society;
b. Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the
conflict; and
c. Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and
economic reforms.
c. The member nations hereby commit to the following:
a. Monitor closely the situation in South-East Europe;
b. Continue efforts in Kosovo and other areas of
involvement of the Alliance;
c. Help to establish a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic
Kosovo; and
d. Continue to attach importance to consultations and
practical cooperation with Russia and the Ukraine.
Reflective Intentions:
a. Assertion:
a. The member nations believe the Alliance has been able
to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security
challenges of the 21 s ' century.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to believe it has
adapted, renewed, and is ready in the global security
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environment based upon the Alliance's ability to
maintain stability and security; ensuring the effectiveness
of bilateral and multinational operations across the full
range of Alliance missions; maintaining civil-military
relations; implementing robust practical and political
support provided by Partner countries; having the ability
to define, adopt, and evolve policies; and establishing a
v
strong, stable and enduring partnerships within the
framework of the Alliance.
b. Directive:
a. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient
reason for leaders to work together and with the
international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo
and the establishment of a democratic society.
i. The member nations want the leaders of Kosovo
to work together and with the international
community in the reconstruction of Kosovo, and
the establishment of a democratic society because
of NATO's command.
b. The member nations believes in its utterance, in virtue of
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient
reason for Russia to open all avenues for a political
solution to the conflict.
i. The member nations want Russia to open all
avenues for a political solution to the conflict
because of NATO's command.
c. The member nation believes in its utterance, virtue of its
authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason
for the Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and
economic reforms.
i. The member nations want the Ukraine to move
L
forward with its democratic and economic
reforms because of NATO' s command.
c. Commitment:
a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the
Alliance to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security
challenges of the 21 st century on the condition that the
member countries want to maintain stability and security;
ensure the effectiveness of bilateral and multinational
operations across the full range of Alliance missions;
maintain civil-military relations; implement robust
practical and political support provided by Partner
countries; have the ability to define, adopt, and evolve
policies; and establish a strong, stable and enduring
partnerships within the framework of the Alliance.
(
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The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the
directives on the condition that the member nations
would be able to maintain the ability to adapt, renew, and
have the ability to be ready to meet the security
challenges in the global security environment while
upholding security and stability
The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and
(b).
Implicatures: The intentions of the member nations are sincere and
normative.
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of
Force
Explicit Performative:
a. The member nations hereby commit to the following:
a. Promote long-term stability based on regional
reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidence-building
measures, regional cooperation, a lasting resolution to the
problem of refugees and displaced persons, and
cooperation;
b. Continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic,
multi-cultural and democratic for all member nations
and in out-of-mission areas where all its people,
irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace
and security and enjoy universal human rights and
freedoms on an equal basis, including through
participation in democratic institutions;
c. Providing sufficient
resources
to ensure its
implementation to efficiently carry out policies, treaties,
and out-of-area mission;
d. Effectively use resources and find innovative approaches
to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage
of national contributions and possible cooperative and
collective arrangements and mechanisms, including
multinational, joint and common funding.
e. To work for permanent arrangements to ensure full
transparency, consultation and cooperation between
member nations, especially in regards to NATO and the
EU;
f. Intensify consultation in times of crisis;
g. Continue to provide advice, feedback and assistance to
the aspiring countries on their preparations for possible
future membership; and
h. Consider ways to strengthen the political and practical
dimensions of our cooperative relations with all partners.
Reflective Intentions:
a. Commitment:
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a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the
Alliance to be able to maintain and uphold its original
mission while being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to
meet the challenges of the global security environment
on the condition that its member countries want to
promote long-term stability based on regional
reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidence-building
measures, regional cooperation, a lasting resolution to the
problem of refugees and displaced persons, and
cooperation; continue working towards a peaceful, multiethnic, multi-cultural and democratic for all member
nations and in out-of-mission areas where all its people,
irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace
and security and enjoy universal human rights and
freedoms on an equal basis, including through
participation in democratic institutions; provide sufficient
resources to ensure its implementation to efficiently carry
out policies, treaties, and out-of-area mission; effectively
use resources and find innovative approaches to
overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of
national contributions and possible cooperative and
collective arrangements and mechanisms, including
multinational, joint and common funding; work for
permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency,
consultation and cooperation between member nations,
especially in regards to NATO and the EU; intensify
consultation in times of crisis; continue to provide
advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring countries
on their preparations for possible future membership; and
consider ways to strengthen the political and practical
dimensions of our cooperative relations with all partners.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the
directives on the condition that the member nations will
be able to maintain and uphold its original mission while
being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the
challenges of the global security environment.
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and
(b).
Implicatures: The intentions of the member countries are sincere and
normative.
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of
Force
Explicit Performative:
a. The member nation hereby assert in order to uphold and
maintain stability and security in a post 9-11 environment for the
Alliance, its members nations and their citizens it is essential
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that confident and cooperative partnerships, based on shared
democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable,
peaceful and undivided Euro-Atlantics are upheld; continuing to
uphold current policies and treaties; condemning all use of
violence and terrorism for either military or political means;
continue to engage in current and future out-of-area mission; and
reaffirming the necessity of having the capability to defend
appropriately and effectively against threats,
b. The member nations hereby commit to the following:
a. Upholding it's allegiance to its member states and its
policies regarding the attacks of 11 September 2001;
b. Explore and develop, in the coming months, new,
effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint
decision, and coordinated/joint action;
i c. To develop a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East
Europe and the Balkans;
d. Continue to denounce terrorism and all acts of violence;
e. Further broaden and strengthen cooperation in the
framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP);
f. Ensure that Alliance forces have the best possible
capabilities to meet these challenges and are able to work
together seamlessly; and
g. Continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy
to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of
political and defense efforts.
Reflective Intentions:
a. Assertion:
.
a. The member nations believe that the Alliance needs to be
able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the
post 9-11 in order to meet the challenges of the global
security environment.
b. The member nations wants the Alliance to be able to
uphold and maintain stability and security in the post 911 environment by being confident and cooperative
partnerships, based on shared democratic values and the
shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided
Euro-Atlantics are upheld; continuing to uphold current
policies and treaties; condemning all use of violence and
terrorism for either military or political means; continue
to engage in current and future out-of-area mission; and
reaffirming the necessity of having the capability to
defend appropriately and effectively against threats.
b. Commitment:
a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the
Alliance to be able to be able to uphold and maintain
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stability and security in the post 9-1.1 in order to meet the
challenges of the global security environment on
condition that the member nations indicate they would
uphold its allegiance to its member states and its policies
regarding the attacks of 11 September 2001; explore and
develop, in the coming months, new, effective
mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision,
and coordinated/joint action; continuing the enlargement
process; develop a peaceful, stable and democratic
South-East Europe and the Balkans; continue to
denounce terrorism and all acts of violence; further
broaden and strengthen cooperation in the framework of
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the
Partnership for Peace (PfP); ensure that Alliance forces
have the best possible capabilities to meet these
challenges and are able to work together seamlessly; and
continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy
to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of
political and defense efforts.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the
directives on the condition that the member nations will
be able to uphold and maintain stability and security in
the post 9-11 in order to meet the challenges of the global
security environment.
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and
(b).
Implicatures: The intentions of the member nations are sincere and
normative.
Presuppositions:
a. If the member nations are able to uphold and maintain stability
and security in the post 9-11 environment, then the Alliance will
be able to maintain security and stability for its member nations
and throughout the global security environment.
b. If the member nations are not able to uphold and maintain
stability and security in the post 9-11 environment, then the
Alliance will not be able to maintain security and stability for its
member nations and throughout the global security environment.
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of
Force
Explicit Performative:
a. The member nations hereby commit to the following:
a. Act on its core commitments to deter and defend against
any threat of aggression against any NATO member
state;
b. Adapt to be better able to perform its fundamental
security tasks and to strengthen security right across the
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Euro-Atlantic area;
c. Strengthen national and collective capacities to protect
our populations, territory and forces from any armed
attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad;
d. Work with member nations and Partners to deal with the
threat posed by possible use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), including their possible use by
terrorists, and the means of their delivery;
e. Develop new and balanced capabilities within the
Alliance;
f. Build a new, more substantive relationship with Partners;
g. Upgrade the political and practical dimensions of Our
Mediterranean Dialogue;
h. Promote regional reconciliation and cooperation,
protection of rights of members of all ethnic groups and
minorities, confidence-building measures and a lasting
solution to the problem of refugees and
i. Continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy
to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of
political and defense efforts.
Reflective Intentions:
a. Commitment:
a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the
Alliance to be able to maintain security and stability for
its member nations and in out-of area-mission in order to
meet the challenges of the global security environment
on the condition that the member nations to act on its
core commitments to deter and defend against any threat
of aggression against any NATO member state; adapt to
be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks
and to strengthen security right across the Euro-Atlantic
area; strengthen national and collective capacities to
protect our populations, territory and forces from any
armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from
abroad; work with member nations and Partners to deal
with the threat posed by possible use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), including their possible use by
terrorists, and the means of their delivery; develop new
and balanced capabilities within the Alliance; build a
new, more substantive relationship with Partners;
upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our
Mediterranean Dialogue; promote regional reconciliation
and cooperation, protection of rights of members of all
ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building
measures and a lasting solution to the problem of
refugees and continue to adapt the Alliance's
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comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges,
adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense
efforts.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the
directives on the condition that the member nations will
be able to maintain security and stability for its member
nations and in out-of area-mission in order to meet the
challenges of the global security environment
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and
(b).
Implicatures: The intentions of the member nations are sincere and
normative.
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of
Force
Explicit Performative:
a. The North Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of our collective
security and the essential transatlantic forum for security.
Today, we took stock of NATO's ongoing transformation to
meet 21st century threats and challenges to the security of our
populations, territory and forces, from wherever they may come,
and gave direction on work still to be done thus the member
nations need to continue expand the Alliance and encourage new
members to join; continue to combat terrorism; ensure peace,
stability and reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans;
continue to help to improve the security environment in Bosnia
and Herzegovina; continue to prevent the use of WMD, along
with deterrence and defense; to carry out the full range of its
missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they
are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and
achieve their objectives; continue to develop the relationships
with Russia and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation between the
member nations and the EU; ensuring crisis are met with the
most appropriate military response and effective crisis
management is implemented; continue to maintenance out-ofarea missions; and uphold current policies and treaties..
a. The member nations hereby commit to the following:
a. Preserve peace through its operations; spread stability
through its partnerships; and reinforce our community of
shared values through the most robust round of
enlargement in our history.
b. Use all means at its disposal and to cooperate fully with
other international Organizations and with its Partners to
fight terrorism;
c. Assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country,
integrated into the international community;
d. Develop a comprehensive strategy for NATO's
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engagement in Afghanistan, in close consultation with
other International Organizations and the Afghan
Transitional Authority;
e. Support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty 6f all
the countries in the Balkans and help those countries to
integrate fully into Euro-Atlantic structures;
f. Continue with the enlargement of NATO; , •
g. Enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU;
h. Consider ways to further enhance relationships by
generating a more ambitious and expanded framework;
i. Build on the progress between NATO and Russia, and
NATO and the Ukraine;
j . Closely follow the development of events in Georgia and
support the independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Georgia;
k. Support farms control, disarmament and nonproliferation will continue to play a major role in the
achievement of the Alliance's security objectives,
including preventing the spread and use of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery;
1. Multilateralism through effective action and our shared
commitment to: the transatlantic link; and
m. Implementation of measures to enhance the efficiency
and effectiveness of the Organization.
Reflective Intentions:
a. Assertion:
a. The member nations believe the Alliance is the basis of
collective security and the essential transatlantic forum
for security and as such it needs to maintain security and
stability for its member nations and Partners in order to
meet the challenges of the global security environment.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to maintain
security and stability for member nations and Partners by
taking stock of NATO's ongoing transformation to meet
21st century threats and challenges to the security of our
populations, territory and forces, from wherever they
may come, and gave direction on work still to be done
thus the member nations needs to continue expand the
Alliance and encourage new members to join; continue
to combat terrorism; ensure peace, stability and
reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans;
continue to help to improve the security environment in
Bosnia and Herzegovina; continue to prevent the use of
WMD, along with deterrence and defense; to carry out
the full range of its missions and field forces that can
move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain
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operations over distance and time, and achieve their
objectives; continue to develop the relationships with
Russia and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation between
the member nations and the EU; ensuring crisis are met
with the most appropriate military response and effective
crisis management is implemented; continue to
maintenance out-of-area missions; and uphold current
policies and treaties,
b. Directive:
\
a. The member nations believes in its utterance, in virtue of
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient
reason for the member nations to ratify, accede and fully
implement NATO treaties and policies.
i.
The member nations want its members to ratify,
accede and fully implement NATO treaties and
policies because of NATO's command.
b. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient
reason to encourage all parties in Kosovo to work
constructively to meet the agreed standards;
i. The member nations want the Alliance to
encourage all parties in Kosovo to work
constructively to meet the agreed standards
because of NATO's command.
c. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient
reason to encourage regional cooperation among the
Balkan countries;
ii. NATO wants its member nations to encourage
regional cooperation among the Balkan countries
because of NATO's command.
d. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient
reason to encourage Albania, Croatia and the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue pursuing
the reforms necessary to advance their candidacies for
NATO membership.
iii. The member nations wants the Alliance to
encourage Albania, Croatia and the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue
pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their
candidacies for NATO membership because of
NATO's command.
e. The member nation believe in its utterance, in virtue of
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient
reason to encourage the Ukraine to pursue all reforms
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necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration,
iv. The member nations want the Alliance to
encourage the Ukraine to pursue all reforms
necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic
integration,
f. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of
its authority over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient
reason to urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues
between Georgia and Russia and call upon the parties to
resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level.
i. The member nations want the Alliance to urge
swift resolution of the outstanding issues between
Georgia and Russia and call upon the parties to
resume negotiations at an appropriately senior
level,
c. Commitment:
a. The member nation believe its utterance obligates the
Alliance to be able to maintain security and stability for
its member nations and in put-of area-mission in order to
meet the challenges of the global security environment
on the condition that the member nations strive to
preserve peace through its operations; spread stability
through its partnerships; and reinforce our community of
shared values through the most robust round of
enlargement in our history; use all means at its disposal
and to cooperate fully with other international
Organizations and with its Partners to fight terrorism;
assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country,
integrated into the international community; develop a
comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in
Afghanistan, in close consultation with other
International Organizations and the Afghan Transitional
Authority; support for the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of all the countries in the Balkans and help
those countries to integrate fully into Euro-Atlantic
structures; continue with the enlargement of NATO;
enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU;
consider ways to further enhance relationships by
generating a more ambitious and expanded framework;
build on the progress between NATO and Russia, and
NATO and the Ukraine; closely follow the development
of events in Georgia and support the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia; support
farms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will
continue to play a major role in the achievement of the
Alliance's security objectives, including preventing the
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spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
and their means of delivery; multilateralism through
effective action and our shared commitment to: the
transatlantic link; and implementation of measures to
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the
Organization.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the
directives on the condition that the member nations will
be able to maintain security and stability for its member
nations and in out-of area-mission in order to meet the
challenges of the global security environment
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and
(b).
Implicatures: The intentions of the member nations are sincere and
normative.
Table 1: Pragmatic Analysis of NATO's Communiques
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The pragmatic analysis for this thesis, which generated explicit performatives and
implicit contents, revealed several patterns. The first pattern is connected to the use of
collective security rules. In speech act 1, the member nations justify their speech act with
the collective security rules of Identity (We are fellow citizens), Security (Security is
based on multilateral commitment to use military capability; Security is based on political
relationships), and Enforcement (We will resolve conflicts peacefully). In speech act 2,
the member nations justify their speech acts by building upon the rules of speech 1 and
adding the rule of Deterrence (Do not break the rules of our community). Finally, in the
remaining speech acts (3 through 8), the member nations justify their speech acts with the
collective security rules of Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force
(The use of force is sometimes necessary).
NATO member states recognition and utilization of collective security rules
allows the Alliance to engage and participate in the global security environment. The use
of the rules illustrates a relationship between theoretical application and actions. Thus
the member nations' adoption of the collective security rules constitutes the overlapping
nature of the social arrangements of the security environment and provides a means to
survive and interact. Each rule provides significance, established a basis for criteria, and
creates the conditions which member nations have continued the Alliance's role in the
global security environment while continuing to transform.
A further look into the pragmatics of the speech acts via the use of the explicit
performatives, reflective intentions, and presuppositions brings to light the member states
dedication to the original mission of the Alliance and highlights both the member nations
and the Alliance ability to transform and adapt. In speech acts 1 and 2, the member
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nations assert it is maintaining its original commitments and mission, but the Alliance is
in a state of reform and transformation. By providing the basis for the collective security
and preserving a balance in the Euro-Atlantic area throughout the 1990s, NATO member
countries have continued to preserve its liberty and sovereignty. NATO member states
are building upon the foundation it has created in order to fulfill its core functions, in
addition to assuming new tasks. These measures include the enlargement process of the
Alliance; creating a strong and stable partnership with Russia; continue engagement in
Bosnia and Herzegovina; and measures to effectively deal with violence and terrorism.
It is apparent in speech acts 3, 4, and 5, the NATO member nations have forged
ahead to equip the Alliance for both security challenges and opportunities of the 21 st
century. It is evident that the Alliance needs to adapt, renew, and must be ready to deal
with the modern global security environment as well as be able to guide its future
political and military developments. Reaffirming the importance of the transatlantic link
and of maintaining the military capabilities of the Alliance, the member nations commit
to its broad approach to security and stability, specifically ESDI; conflict prevention and
crisis management; partnership, cooperation and dialogue; enlargement; and arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The adoption of the new Strategic Concepts
is the principal formal statement of the Alliance's objectives and the wide range of
political and military means that constitutes the member nations' policy to achieve them.
Indeed the conceptual context lays the groundwork for the member nations and the
Alliance's gradual transformation internally and externally.

In short, it allows the

member nations to respond to the new challenges of the global security environment
while continuing the process of adaption, gradual transformation, and institutionalism of
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policies which enable the Organization to assume a large array of obligations and
responsibilities.
Speech act 6 illustrates that since the establishment of NATO, the member
countries have continually been effective in the deterrence and defense against the threat
of war. The primary objective of the Alliance remains guaranteeing the security and
territorial integrity of its member states and their citizens.

Although the task of

deterrence and collective security has remained unchanged, a different security situation
has arisen since 1996. The development of a new global security environment has
allowed the Alliance military forces to take on new roles in addition to fulfilling their
primary purposes. For example, the Alliance forces have been increasingly involved in
missions and operations, most notably in Kosovo and the Balkans. However, with the
surfacing of new threats and in particular the impact of the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001, NATO's military and political policies and activities have continued to
expand and transformed. Speech act 6 depicts the transformation of the member nations
in terms of developing the necessary capabilities to undertake its tasks and further
adaption alongside institutionalization of structures and procedures to reflect the needs of
the global security environment.
Since September 11th, NATO and its member nations have continued to change
by adapting and transforming the roles of its allied military forces and its defense posture
and policies to reflect the global security environment. Speech act 7 asserts that the
member states continue to act on their core commitment to deter and defend against any
threat of aggression against NATO member states. The analysis revealed the member
states' commitment to war on terrorism and their engagement in the out-of-area mission
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in Afghanistan. This new commitment signals a historical step in NATO's history by
becoming involved in a mission which is outside of the traditional boundaries of Europe.
The members of the Alliance also are committed to strengthening national and collective
policies; continuing to promote substantive relationships with member countries; and
promoting regional reconciliation and cooperation. In sum, these commitments represent
a milestone in NATO's transformation and further illustrate gradual institutionalism of
NATO member countries' attitudes and policies within the global security environment.
Finally, speech act 8 asserts that the Alliance remains the basis of collective
security in the global security environment and is an essential transatlantic forum for
security and defense. The speech act illustrates that the structures and arrangements
which have been built since 1996 have not only enabled member countries to benefit
from the political, military and resource advantages of collective action and collective
defense but allows the member states to remain flexible, mobile, and maintain composure
of multi-nationality.

Additionally the arrangements are based on a gradual

institutionalization of an integrated structure; common funding and operational planning;
multinational formation; an integrated air defense system (such as AWACS) balance of
roles amongst the member states; common standards and procedures; and infrastructure,
armament, and logistics cooperation.277 The assertions, directives, and commitments of
the member nations illustrate the gradual transformation and institutionalization of the
Alliance in order to promote stability, peace, and security in the global security
environment of the 21 st century. In short, the net effect of each speech act illustrates that
the member countries of the Alliance are gradually transforming themselves and
277

"Chapter 2: The Transformation of the Alliance - The Role of Allied Military Forces and the
Transformation of the Alliance's Defense Posture," available from
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0204.htm; Internet, accessed 18 March 2009.
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institutionalizing procedures, policies, and structures.

This transformation has

substantially affected NATO's agenda and shifted the Alliance's policy regarding out-ofarea missions.

x

i;

Argument Analysis
The argument analysis formalizes "the alternating, context-constructing flow of
argumentative dialogue."278 This type of analysis is suppose to show the proponents of a
thesis, which then forms categories or 'proviso' assertions, these may be countered by
•
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'cautious' or 'proviso' denials of the assertions.

However, based upon the consensus

decision-making process of NATO, the speech acts reveal no disputes which may have
been generated by the pragmatic analysis. In this context, each speech act follows the
beliefs and norms of/the member nations of NATO. Each is a policy statement and a
testament for shift in NATO's policy regarding out-of-area missions. Each speech act
accounts for the collective security rules and arrangements in the development of the
global security environment.

,
Summary of Findings

This chapter has briefly outlined NATO, its structures, its major players and
explored the history of Afghanistan and the member nations' policy toward out-of-area
missions and operations, This information provided the background information needed
to conduct the analysis. This analysis has proposed dialogical analysis as a method for
analyzing NATO's out-of-area policy. This methodology combines the knowledge of
historical background and the linguistic analysis of the speech acts to test hypotheses. By
(
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tackling the assertion, directive, and commitment discourses and the background
278
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assumptions (which make the speech acts understandable), dialogical analysis illustrates
a deeper and more refined understandings of member nations' attitudes, policies and
actions of the Alliance from 1996 to 2003. This allows for elaborate understandings of
NATO's policy regarding out-of-area which played significant role in the Alliance's
involvement in the Afghanistan 2001 operations.
The use of dialogical analysis was used in an analysis of eight speech acts
obtained from the communiques published by the North Atlantic Council. A surface
reading of each speech act supports the contention that the member nations have
progressively expanded the Alliance's missions and operations since 1996 while
gradually institutionalizing its procedures, policies, and structures. However, a deeper
contextual reading of each of the speech acts revealed (a) a chronological timeline of the
member nations' policies and activities regarding missions and operations in the global
security environment from 1996 to 2003, (b) the member states' recognition and
utilization of collective security rules, and (c) the transformative280 nature of the member
states in conjunction with the Alliance within the global security environment.
The speech acts, spanning between 1996 through 2003, have revealed a detailed
timeline of policies and activities the members nations have directed and committed to.
Recall from the speech acts that there were several monumental events which the
member states have engaged in between 1996 to 2003. Between 1996 and 1997, the
member states launched the Mediterranean Dialogue; continued to enhance the
Partnership for Peace Program alongside strengthening its "European pillar;" conducted
air operations against Bosnian Serb forces; and deployed military forces in Bosnia and

280

Transformative nature throughout this thesis will mean to undergo a change in form, appearance, or
character.
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Herzegovina.

Additionally, the members of NATO signed a special NATO-Russia

agreement and NATO-Ukraine Charter while reinforcing their relationship with its
partner countries. In parallel, in 1998 the Taliban regime came to power in Afghanistan.
The 1999 was marked with the celebration of NATO's 50th anniversary; the signing of
three new member countries; the adoption of a new Strategic Concept; NATO's air
campaign to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo; and the deployment of a NATO-led forces
c

• •

in Kosovo. The end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000 were marked with the ratification
•

•

'

•

•

.
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of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and SALT II by Russia. Under the dark cloud of
the large-scale terrorist attacks perpetrated against the U.S. in 2001, the member states
invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history; the member nations continued with their
institutionalize efforts within the Alliance; the member countries deployed forces to the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and the Alliance members became involved in
an international coalition against terrorism in Afghanistan. In 2002, the member nations
formalized when and where it is necessary to fight terrorism; introduced major reforms to
prepare the Alliance against major threats and challenges; and the member states worked
with Russian representatives to create NATO-Russia Council whose aim was to
strengthen relations between Russia and the member countries. The end of the analysis
closes with the year of 2003. In 2003, the member nations streamlined its military
command structure; NATO became the leader of the ISAF in Afghanistan; and the first
NATO Response Force prototype was launched. The sequential events found in the
speech acts illustrate the member nations' shift in policy regarding out-of-area.
In short, the Alliance is an environment which brings the member countries
together for a common purpose. In order for the member countries to survive in the
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global security environment, they along with the Alliance must change. As a result the
members of NATO have transformed gradually by formalizing policies, procedures, and
out-of-area activities. The transformative nature of the member countries has led NATO
to become involved on a larger scale in the global security environment. The timeline of
events reveals that the member countries change gradually as they respond to the
challenges of the global security environment. It is indeed the transformation of member
nations' policy of out-of-area which contributed to the Alliance's engagement in
operations in Afghanistan in 2001.
NATO's active participation in the global security environment through
transformation and adoption of policy, and involvement in selective out-of-area missions
depicts an understanding and use of collective security rules by the member countries.
The collective security rules adopted by the member nations help to merge the bridge
between theoretical application and actions. The adherence of the collective security
rules by the member nations have helped to lay the foundation for the Alliance's
interaction within the global security environment and help to dictate its policies and
actions. Each rule of the Alliance - Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use
of Force - allows the member states to understand the overlapping relationships that are
present within the global security environment. Adherence to collective security rules
and an understanding of the social arrangements in the global security environment has
allowed the member nations to comprehend what logics are guiding the global security
environment.

This in return has allowed the member countries to understand and

formulate policy accordingly. The collective security rules of the Alliance adopted by the
member states are required in order stabilize and secure themselves within the global
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security environment. Without a doubt, the collective security rules of the Alliance
played a critical factor in NATO's policy shift in out-of-area, wherein the member
countries commitment to efforts in Afghanistan.
The dialogical analysis of the speech acts has verified the member nations'
transformative and institutional nature within the global security environment. Based
upon the chronological timeline of NATO's policies and activities in relation to the
global security environment from 1996 to 2003 and NATO's recognition and utilization
of the collective security rules, the Alliance is gradually transforming and the member
nations are institutionalizing its policies, procedures, and out-of-area missions. Each of
these elements converged to lead NATO to become involved in Afghanistan. In sum, the
analysis of NATO's communiques illustrates that the institutional attitude of the member
states towards out-of-area missions lead NATO to its involvement in Afghanistan.
The transformative and institutional nature of NATO member nations has allowed
the Alliance to maintain its historical roots and continue to survive in the global security
environment of the 21 st century. Additionally, this analysis has confirmed Frederking's
conclusion that 11 September was not a driving factor which led NATO involvement in
Afghanistan. This analysis illustrates that attacks of September 11th and its aftershocks
are not a substantial driving force to cause an immediate rearrangement of the collective
security rules or cause a complete overhaul of policy within the Alliance.

Rather

September 11th only exacerbated the already present tension evident in the global security
environment. In accordance with the tenets of Frederking and this analysis, uncertain
events and ad hoc attitudes do not dictate the attitude of member countries regarding the
out-of-area policy. Nevertheless these events help to contribute to the member nations'
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continual adherence to gradualism and institutionalization which help the countries to
deal effectively with the out-of-area policy and at large with the threats and challenges of
the global security environment.
Finally, the methodology of this thesis has revealed several factors and led to
several conclusions. First, the use of dialogical analysis illustrates this methodology is a
viable method used in the study of language. In this sense, dialogical analysis has the
ability to help develop theoretical approaches into practical applications. The
methodology of this thesis is an approach to analyze language, its affects, and influence
on social interactions within global security environment.
Secondly, the use of this methodology has revealed strengths and weakness of the
research. On one hand, the methodology has helped to further the understanding of
NATO's consensus decision-making process; provided a definition of global security;
allowed for the use of primary resources to explain what has affected the shift in policy;
and created a consistent theoretical framework. On the other hand, the dialogical analysis
of the NATO communiques does not allow for formal argument analysis. Since, the
analysis is unable to reveal any disputes which may be present within the speech acts, the
entire picture of the communique cannot be seen and the actions throughout the
consensus decision-making process are absent.

The reader is led to believe that

transformation of NATO is picturesque when regarding the member nations' attitudes
and shift of out-of-area policy; however the consultation and the decision-making process
are lengthy and difficult to navigate at times. In short, the reader is unable to fully
comprehend the full meaning of the communiques, the decision-making process, and
fundamentally the transformation of NATO and its member nations.
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Thirdly, the use of dialogieal analysis has revealed a chronological timeline of the
member nation's policies and activities regarding out-of-afea missions from 1996 to
2003, the member countries' recognition and utilization of collective security rules, and
the transformative and institutional nature of the member states in conjunction with the
Alliance within the context of the global security environment. Each of these elements
contributes to the rule-orientated constructivist theory by acknowledging the use of
language by the member states. This use of language helps to establish a pattern of rules
which helps the Alliance comprehend and recognize the existence of particular social
arrangements. In return, NATO has been able to uphold its mission while adopting an
institutional attitude toward out-of-area missions' which led to its involvement in
Afghanistan.

In conclusion, dialogieal analysis supports the theory of rule-orientated

constructivism, helps to uphold the conclusions of this thesis and also contributes to the
theory and conclusions made by Frederking.
The summary of findings presented in this analysis presents two conclusions.
First, the findings establish dialogieal analysis as a viable methodology, exposed the
strengths and weaknesses of the research, and verified the theory of rule-orientated
constructivism. Secondly, the findings help to develop an understanding of the member
nations' shift in policy regarding out-of-area and helps to explain what may have
contributed to NATO's involved in Afghanistan.

NATO's adherence to collective

security rules established a particular ideology and a means to engage in specific actions
within the global security environments. These actions in return provided a basis for the
formation of social arrangements. These social arrangements allowed NATO to maintain
security and stability while it member states broadened its agenda and shifted the
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Alliance's out-of-area policy, which help lead the Alliance to become involved in
Afghanistan operations in 2001. In short, NATO's involvement in Afghanistan was a
result of NATO member nations' change in attitudes and ideologies, gradual
development of policy and procedures, and transformation of out-of-area missions within
the global security environment.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

In over half a century of existence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its
member nations, and the global security environment have developed in ways in which
the NATO's founding fathers would have never imagined.

As the global security

environment continues to change, and challenges arise, NATO member nations have
continued to adapt and transform the Alliance at an ever increasing pace. Today, the
member nations have to cope with a larger array of security threats and challenges than it
has in the past.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization main mission is to "safeguard the
freedom, common heritage and civilization of their people" while trying to "promote
stability and well being in the North Atlantic area."281

The organization of NATO

created an environment which brought countries that were willing to come together for a
common cause, prepared to integrate military forces, and willing to engage in
multinational activities over a particular period of time. Within the Alliance, member
states have worked in cooperation and through the consensus decision-making process to
establish policy and procedures. The policy and procedures agreed upon by the members
of NATO have been sought after and achieved through political and military means.
Essentially, the military and political policy and structures of NATO have enabled

281
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member countries to secure themselves within the global security environment. As a
result, the Alliance has been able to uphold its mission while the member nations
continue to expand its agenda and engage in broader range of activities which includes
selective out-of-area missions.
Since the inception of the Alliance^ the member states of NATO have continued
to change while maintaining an air of cohesion and unity amongst one another. Despite
these picturesque conditions, the member nations have not always been unified;
particularly when dealing with mission and operations which took place beyond the
traditional borders of Europe.

The tensions revolving around the member nations'

inability to deal with out-of-area missions can be traced back to the foundation of the
Alliance.
From 1949 till the end of the Cold War, NATO member countries had extreme
difficulty in balancing collective interests with other shared and perceived commitments
throughout the world. The members of NATO were unable to find common grounds due
to conflicting ideologies, perceptions, and interests which would allow the Alliance to
participate in activities beyond the borders of Europe. Thus throughout the Cold War, the
Alliance continued to be hampered by its inability to deal with out-of-area issues.
Eventually, the member countries relied upon a non-policy on out-of-area missions and
operations.
Throughout the Cold War, NATO member countries continued to meet opposition
on out-of-area missions, however the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaled a major
shift in member countries' attitudes and policy regarding out-of-area. At the end of the
Cold War many member states began to pursue more global policies and practices. It is
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clear that although tensions revolving around ideologies, perceptions, and interests
concerning out-of-area had not been alleviated, the member states were able to work
through these differences and shift its policy. The shift in policy has led to NATO's
engagement in several missions throughout the 1990s and the Alliance's first out-of-area
operation in Afghanistan in 2001.
Main Conclusions Drawn from the Thesis
The study of this analysis has used dialogical analysis as a method for analyzing
NATO's policy regarding out-of-area, in hopes of understanding why NATO became
involved in Afghanistan. The analysis of eight communiques through pragmatic and
argumentative analysis reveals (1) a chronological timeline of the member nation's
policies and activities regarding out-of-area missions in the global security environment
from 1996 to 2003, (2) the member countries' recognition and utilization of collective
security rules, and (3) the transformative and institutional nature of the member states in
conjunction with the Alliance within the context of the global security environment.
First, the speech acts bring to light a timeline, extending between 1996 through
2003, of policies and activities the member nations have directed and committed. This
timeline reveals the transformative and institutional nature of the Alliance and indicates a
gradual shift in out-of-area policy by the member nations.

The transformative and

institutional nature of the member nations illustrates the acknowledgement of the changes
and challenges within the global security environment and indicates the necessary steps gradual shift in policy and adoption of institutional methods - the nations are willing to
uphold its mission while adapting to ever-changing global security environment. In
short, the timeline of policy and events unveils (1) that the member nations change
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gradually as they respond to challenges in the global security environment; (2) an
institutional attitude toward out-of-area missions has been adopted; and (3) gradual shift
in out-of-area policy contributed to NATO's Afghanistan engagement.
Second, NATO's recognition and utilization of collective security rules allows the
Alliance to be an activexparticipant in the global security environment.

Within this

environment, the Alliance's actions are "determined by shared ideas rather than by
material forces," and "identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these
shared idea rather than by the given nature."282 Thus member nations use collective
security rules in order to interact within the global security environment at large. Each
collective security rule adopted by the Alliance allows the member nations to
comprehend the logic that is driving the global security environment. This has allowed
NATO members to formulate policy accordingly and gradually apply institutional
methods in order to create stability and security while enabling nations to have the ability
to transform. In brief, the member nations' adoption and adherence of the collective
security rules have (1) allowed the member countries to be active members in the global
security environment; (2) help determine and dictate the shift in policy regarding out-ofarea; and (3) provided an environment in which the member nations formulate policy and
commitment to activities in a gradual and institutional manner.
Building upon the chronological timeline of NATO's policies and activities and
NATO's recognition and utilization of the collective security rules, the speech acts verify
the transformative and institutional nature of NATO member states within the confines of
the global security environment. The transformation of the Alliance by the member
countries, both internally and externally, is exhibited by the adoption of an institutional
282
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attitude by the member nations, a shift in NATO's out-of-area policy, and gradual
adherence to institutionalism within the Alliance. Each of the member nations are willing
to work in cooperation with one another and each acknowledges the necessary
capabilities - political and military measures - needed to sustain and survive within the
global security environment. Evidentially, the Alliance is gradually transforming and the
member nations are institutionalizing its policies, procedures, and operational
engagements. Each of these elements coincided to lead NATO to become involved in
Afghanistan.

All told, the thesis upholds that if NATO member nations adopt an

institutional attitude towards out-of-area missions then NATO will become involved in
Afghanistan.
The findings presented above explain that there was a shift in NATO's out-of-area
policy. The shift in the policy occurred based upon adherence to collective security rules
and gradually adoption of institutional measures by the member nations of NATO. The
shift in policy, adoption and use of collective security rules, and institutional attitude of
the member countries were elements that contributed to NATO's involvement in the 2001
operations in Afghanistan.

•

In addition to using dialogical analysis as the primary method for analyzing
NATO's policy regarding out-of-area, the methodology can be used in the analysis of
Frederking's conclusions and be used to conduct a discussion regarding the theory of
rule-orientated constructivism.

As such, the use of dialogical analysis reveals (1)

viability in regards to ontological analysis; (2) methodological strengths and weaknesses;
and (3) contribution to the theory of rule-orientated constructivism.
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First, the use of dialogical analysis in the analysis of eight communiques
establishes its viability as a tool when analyzing language. Dialogical analysis can be
used as an interpretive approach by helping to explain action. It can do so by showing
consistency between speech acts and patterns of rules for a specific social arrangement.
In accordance with Frederking, dialogical analysis can be added to the toolkit of
interpretive methods,283 using it to study NATO member nations' attitudes and helping to
explain the shift in out-of-area policy. In short, dialogical analysis is an approach to
analyze social interaction.
Second, this particular methodology has exposed the strengths and weakness of
within this research. Building upon the weaknesses of Frederking, the use of dialogical
analysis has (1) provided a definition of global security; (2) allowed for the use of
primary resources to explain what has affected the shift in policy; (3) created a consistent
theoretical framework; and (4) developed an understanding regarding NATO's consensus
decision-making process. Additionally, the use of dialogical analysis in this particular
research does not lend itself to formal argument analysis. Unlike Frederking's research
who uses formal argument analysis, this research does not divulge 'proviso' assertions
which are to be countered by 'cautious' assertions. The lack of formal argument analysis
results in the reader's inability to entirely grasp the NATO decision-making process.
Rather than revealing the bumpy reality of the communique process and non-linear
transformative nature of the Alliance, the illusion of a smooth transformative process is
imprinted on the reader's mind.

In conclusion, the dialogical analysis allows for

strengths and weaknesses to surface which can then be used as lessons learned for future
research.
283
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Finally, the use of dialogical analysis contributes to the support the theory of ruleorientated constructivism.

In the context of constructivism, the rule-orientated

constructivist theory of constructivism within this thesis establishes that the global
security environment is made up of overlapping social arrangements.

These social

arrangements are mainly influenced by language. The use of language makes action
possible through the establishment of patterns of rules. These rules "tell us how the
world works; they tell us who we are and who others are; they tell us what we should
do."284

In short, dialogical analysis (1) supports the theory of rule-orientated

constructivism.; (2) establishes consistency with the tasks associated with the theory
(assert the existence of social arrangements; show how these rules make action
intelligible; and help agents "go on" in the world);

and (3) confirms the conclusions

made by Frederking.
The summary of findings of this thesis makes two conclusions.

First, it

establishes that there was a shift in NATO's out-of-area policy. The shift in the policy
occurred based upon adherence to collective security rules and gradually adoption of
institutional measures by the member nations of NATO. The shift in policy, adoption
and use of collective security rules, and institutional attitude of the member countries
were elements that contributed to NATO's involvement in the 2001 operations in
Afghanistan. Secondly, it establishes dialogical analysis as a viable methodology and
verifies the theory of rule-orientated constructivism. In short, each of the conclusions
drawn from the thesis have helped to explain why NATO become in involved in
Afghanistan and will act as building blocks for future research.
284
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Recommendations for Future Studies
In light of this case study's finding, there are several possibilities for future
studies. Future studies could measure the viability of rule-orientated constructivism and
dialogical analysis. This can be carried out by a applying this theory and methodology to
a different case study. Additionally, future case studies could generate a new set of rules
which constitute the global security environment. These rules then could be tested on the
same case study or a different case study. Also, future studies could be conducted at the
domestic level of analysis. The conclusions drawn from the domestic level could then be
compared and contrasted to those results at the domestic level. Finally, future studies
working at the international level, could conduct a cross analysis. A cross analysis could
include the dialogical analysis of several resources. Each of these resources then could
be complied and compared in order to compose a complete picture and dispute or justify
the findings of this thesis.

Thus, future studies could apply several techniques to

determine the viability as well as the accuracy of rule-orientated constructivism and the
dialogical method.

Final Thoughts

Analyzing NATO's policy regarding out-of-area operations has provided an
opportunity leam about the institutional attitude of NATO members and the
transformative nature of an Alliance.

This thesis has briefly outlined NATO, its

structures and its major players while exploring the history of the member nations' outof-area policy. This thesis has used dialogical analysis to analyzing NATO's policy. The
combination the historical background knowledge, and linguistic analysis, has revealed
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that the institutional attitude of NATO member nations and the institutional policy and
-

i

procedures in the Alliance's military and political structures have led to a gradual shift in
out-of-area policy. This shift in policy contributed to NATO's involvement in its first
out-of-area mission - Afghanistan in 2001. In conclusion, this thesis illustrates that the
NATO has maintained its mission while transforming and adapting to the global security
environment due to its member nations' adherence to collective security rules and gradual
adoption of institutional measures.

Additionally, the thesis has verified the use of

dialogical analysis as a viable tool in ontological studies and provided evidence in
support of rule-orientated constructivism. In the future, this thesis can serve as a basis for
making sound policies and procedures while justifying selective out-of-area missions and
operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and provide a base for research
which involves rule-orientated constructivism and dialogical analysis.
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APPENDIX A

Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1996) 165 held at NATO HQ Brussels 10 Dec 1996

Final Communique
Issued at the Ministerial Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council

1. As we look ahead, the new NATO is taking shape, reflecting the fundamental
changes in the security environment in Europe and the enduring vitality of the
transatlantic partnership which underpins our endeavors. The broad vision of
this new NATO and its role in the development of a new European security
architecture was set out at the 1994 Brussels Summit and further defined at our
last meeting in Berlin. The Alliances adaptation and reform is well underway.
We will take this process forward today.
The Alliance is resolved to preserve its political and military strength, ensuring
its ability to carry out the full range of its missions - as IFOR and its planned
successor SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly show. We have issued a
separate statement in this regard. The Alliance will continue to strengthen
European security by maintaining its capability for collective defense, admitting
new members, expanding and strengthening cooperative relationships with all
Partners, including building a strong security partnership with Russia and a
distinctive relationship with Ukraine, and realizing the European Security and
Defense Identity within the Alliance.
The evolution of the Alliance takes place in the context of our aim to help build
a truly cooperative European security structure. We welcome as a contribution
the important decisions taken at the recent OSCE Summit in Lisbon and the
decision by the States Parties to the CFE Treaty to begin negotiations in early
1997 with a view towards adapting the Treaty to the changing security
environment in Europe.
2. Against this background, we have decided to recommend to our Heads of State
arid Government to convene a Summit meeting in Madrid on 8/9 July 1997 to set
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the course for the Alliance as it moves towards the 21st century, consolidating
Euro-Atlantic security. To achieve this aim, major decisions will have to be
taken by the time of the Summit concerning NATOs internal adaptation, the
opening of the Alliance and its ability to carry out all its new roles and missions.
The agenda for our Summit will include:
o agreeing a new command structure, which enables all Allies to
participate fully, and further advancing the implementation of the
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept, in order to enhance the
Alliance's ability to carry out the full range of its missions, while
preserving the capability for collective defense, based on a strong
transatlantic partnership;
\
o finalizing, to the satisfaction of all Allies, all the necessary arrangements
for the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO,
which will allow for the preparation and conduct of WEU-led operations
with the participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose;
o inviting one or more of the countries which have expressed interest in
joining the Alliance to begin accession negotiations;
o pledging that the Alliance will remain open to the accession of further
members and will remain ready to pursue consultations with nations
seeking NATO membership, as it has done in the past;
o strengthening cooperative relations with all our Partners including
through an enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the initiative to
establish an Atlantic Partnership Council;
o intensifying and consolidating relations with Russia beyond the
Partnership for Peace by aiming at reaching an agreement at the earliest
possible date on the development of a strong, stable and enduring
security partnership;
o further developing an enhanced relationship with Ukraine;
o enhancing our Mediterranean dialogue;
o further developing our ability to carry out new roles and missions
relating to conflict prevention and crisis management; and
o further enhancing our political and defense efforts against the
proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their
delivery means.
We warmly welcome the decision of the Government of Spain, endorsed by the
Spanish Parliament on 14 November 1996, to take the necessary steps to
participate in the Alliance's new structure. Spain's participation will further
strengthen the cohesion and military effectiveness of the Alliance, as it takes on
new roles and missions, reinforce the transatlantic link and help develop ESDI
within the Alliance.
Stability and security in the whole Euro-Atlantic area are our primary goal. We
want to help build cooperative European security structures which extend to
countries throughout the whole of Europe without excluding anyone or creating
dividing lines. Recent decisions at the OSCE Summit meeting in Lisbon on
European security cooperation and the decision to adapt the CFE Treaty to the
new European security environment establish a cooperative foundation for our
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common security. The Alliance, for its part, has developed a broad pattern of
intensive cooperation with North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and PfP
Partner countries and with other international organizations and is thereby
contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. With the same
aim, we are now working towards opening the Alliance to new members;
developing ever-closer and deeper cooperative ties with all Partner countries
who so wish; building a strong, stable and enduring security partnership with
Russia; strengthening our relationship with Ukraine; and enhancing our
Mediterranean dialogue.
5. We reaffirm that the nuclear forces of the Allies continue to play a unique and
essential role in the Alliances strategy of war prevention. New members, who
will be full members of the Alliance in all respects, will be expected to support
the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons play in the
Alliances strategy. Enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATOs
current nuclear posture and therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no
plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members
nor any need to change any aspect of NATOs nuclear posture or nuclear policy and we do not foresee any future need to do so.
6. A number of countries have long-standing aspirations to become full members
of our Alliance and have undertaken intensive and wide-ranging preparations
and reforms with this aim in mind. We are now in a position to recommend to
our Heads of State and Government to invite at next year's Summit meeting one
or more countries which have participated in the intensified dialogue process, to
start accession negotiations with the Alliance. Our goal is to welcome the new
member(s) by the time of NATO's 50th anniversary in 1999. We pledge that the
Alliance will remain open to the accession of further members in accordance
with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. We will remain ready to pursue
consultations with nations seeking NATO membership, as we have done in the
past.
We are satisfied with the intensified, individual dialogue which the Alliance has
been conducting throughout this year with interested Partners. This dialogue has
improved their understanding of specific and practical details of how the
Alliance works. It has provided the Alliance in turn with a better understanding
of where these countries stand in their internal development as well as in the
resolution of any external issues with neighboring countries. We have tasked the
Council in Permanent Session to prepare comprehensive recommendations for
decisions to be taken by the Summit on which country or countries to invite to
begin accession negotiations. The process should include:
o

an intensified dialogue with interested Partner countries including in a
"16+1" format, as appropriate;
o analysis, on the basis of further political guidance to be elaborated by the
Council in Permanent Session, of the relevant factors associated with the
admission of potential new members;
o preparation of recommendations on the adaptation of Alliance structures
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necessary to integrate new members into the Alliance;
o preparation of a plan for conducting the accession talks with one or more
new members.
7. We look forward to tomorrow's meeting of the NACC, which will mark its fifth
anniversary. The NACC has provided us over the years with a valued
opportunity to consult regularly with our Partners on political and security
issues. Through NACC and Partnership for Peace, we have achieved the
development of common approaches to European security and brought the
NACC countries closer together in a spirit of cooperation and a common
commitment to European security. We are committed to ensuring that the
.NACC goals of enhancing transparency and confidence in security matters
among member states remain central to future cooperation. In order to derive
maximum benefit from our NACC meetings, we want to move towards further
deepening our political dialogue and giving it more focus.
8. We are pleased with the dynamic development of Partnership for Peace and the
role it plays in building European security cooperation. The Partnership for
Peace will continue as a,permanent element of the Alliances cooperative effort
to contribute to the development of a more stable European security area and,
with those Partners seeking to join NATO, will also facilitate their preparations
to meet the responsibilities of membership in the Alliance. Substantial progress
has been achieved in enhancing the scope and substance of our Partnership
cooperation, in particular the growing range of exercises, the broadening and
deepening of the PfP Planning sand Review Process, the intensification of work
on civil-military relations, and civil emergency planning and disaster relief. In
the current IFOR operation, in which 13 Partner countries are cooperating with
Alliance armed forces, the Partnership for Peace has proved its value with regard
both to political commitment to joint crisis management and to military
interoperability.
v
We want to develop on the basis of transparency ever-closer and deeper
cooperative ties open to all Partner countries by making the Partnership more
operational; strengthening its political consultation element, taking full account
of the respective activities of the OSCE and the relevant European institutions
such as the WEU and the EU; and involving Partners more in operations
planning and Partnership decision-making. To this end, the Alliance has set up a
Senior Level Group to develop by the time of the Summit meeting a clearly
strengthened and thus more attractive Partnership for Peace. We have received
an interim report on the ongoing work and agree that work should begin without
delay to implement its recommendations. These include:
o

enhancing the political dimension of the Partnership through increasing
opportunities for political consultations;
o expanding the agreed fields of military missions within PfP to the full
range of the Alliance's new missions, as appropriate, including Peace
Support operations over and above previously agreed areas;
o broadening the NATO/PfP exercise program in accordance with the
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o
o

o

o
o

o
o

expanded scope of the Partnership;
enabling Partner countries to participate in the planning and execution of
PfP activities (exercises and operations);
involving Partners more substantively and actively in PfP-related parts of
the regular peacetime work of NATO's Military Authorities;
affording the appropriate opportunity to Partners who join future NATOled PfP operations to contribute to the provision of political guidance for
oversight over such operations, drawing on the experience gained in
Operation Joint Endeavour;
examining, together with Partners, the possible modalities for the
elaboration of a political-military framework for PfP operations, building
on the current work of the Political-Military Steering Committee;
enhancing Partner participation in decision-making for PfP program
issues;
increasing regional cooperation within the Partnership provided it
remains open to all Partners and remains an integral part of the overall
PfP;
expanding the Planning and Review Process; and
as soon as the Brussels Agreement on the Status of Missions and
Representatives of Third States to NATO comes into force, offering
Partners the opportunity to establish diplomatic missions with NATO.

We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to ensure implementation of
these recommendations without delay and to continue the work on the
enhancement of Partnership for Peace and also tofreview its common funding
and resource implications, with a view to providing a further report by the SLG
with recommendations for decisions at the time of the Spring Ministerial
meeting.
9. With the rapid growth of our activities under both NACC and PfP, we have
identified a need for greater coherence in our cooperation in a framework which
will establish with Partners a more meaningful and productive cooperative and
consultative process, building on the elements of NACC and PfP which we and
our Partners deem most valuable. To this end, we have agreed to work with
Partners on the initiative to establish an Atlantic Partnership Council (APC) as a
single new cooperative mechanism, which would form a framework for
enhanced efforts in both practical cooperation under PfP and an expanded
political dimension of Partnership. We have accordingly tasked the Council in
Permanent Session to draw up the modalities for such a council, in close
coordination with Partners, by the time of our next meeting.
10. We affirm our support for the political and economic reform process in the
Russian Federation. We welcome the landmark Presidential elections in Russia.
We applaud the progress toward a lasting, peaceful settlement of the conflict in
Chechnya.
A broad process of integration and cooperation is underway in Europe; Russia is
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a part of it through its membership in the OSCE and the Council of Europe and
its relationship with NATO as well as the European Union and the WEU. The
pattern of consultations anchored by our regular "16+1" discussions, provide a
firm foundation on which to build. We welcome Russia's participation in
Partnership for Peace and encourage it to take full advantage of the opportunities
which the Partnership offers.
_ <• . •
We value the close and effective cooperation between Russia and NATO in
IFOR. This cooperation demonstrates that NATO and Russia can collaborate
effectively in the construction of cooperative security structures in Europe. We
appreciate and welcome Russia's readiness to contribute to a follow-on
operation to consolidate peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We look forward to
continuing the experience of working closely together, which we believe will
have a lasting, positive impact on our relationship.
Today, we reiterate our commitment to a strong, stable, and enduring security
partnership between NATO and Russia. This partnership demonstrates that
European security has entered a fundamentally new, more promising era. It
constitutes an important element of the developing European cooperative
security architecture to which Russia has an essential contribution to make. It
will further enhance stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. By the time
of the Summit, we aim to reach agreement with the Russian Federation on
arrangements that can deepen and widen the scope of our current relationship
and provide a framework for its future development. We want to ensure that
NATO and Russia have a strong, flexible means to consult and cooperate as part
of our evolving relationship. Agreement might be expressed in a document or
could take the form of a Charter, which could encompass:
o
o

the shared principles that will form the basis of our relationship;
a broad set of areas of practical cooperation in particular in the political,
military, economic, environmental, scientific, peacekeeping, armaments,
non-proliferation, arms control and civil emergency planning fields;
o mechanisms for regular and ad hoc consultations; and
o mechanisms for military liaison and cooperation.

We therefore task the Council in Permanent Session to develop further guidance
on these matters on the basis of which the Secretary General could explore with
Russia the possibility of such agreement.
11. We continue to support Ukraine as it develops as a democratic nation and a
market economy. The maintenance of Ukraine's independence, territorial
integrity and sovereignty is a crucial factor for stability and security in Europe.
Ukraine's development of a strong, enduring relationship with NATO is an
important aspect of the emerging European security architecture. We greatly
value the active participation of Ukraine in the Partnership for Peace and look
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forward to next year's exercise near Lviv. We also value Ukraine's cooperation
with European institutions such as the EU and the WEU. Ukraine has made an
important contribution to IFOR and UNTAES, and we welcome its commitment
to contribute to a follow-on operation to consolidate peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
We welcome the continued development of our broad cooperation beyond PfP.
We note with satisfaction the recent meeting between the Alliance and Ukraine
on issues related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We
welcome the progress made towards establishing a NATO information office in
Kyiv, and look forward to its opening in the near future. We welcome Ukraine's
active interest in further enhancing its relations with the Alliance. We are
committed to the development in coming months, through high level and other
consultations, of a distinctive and effective NATO-Ukraine relationship, which
could be formalized, possibly by the time of the Summit, building on the
document on enhanced NATO-Ukraine relations agreed in September 1995, and
taking into account recent Ukrainian proposals.
12. We support the Middle East peace process, and urge all participants to remain
firmly committed to it.
We reaffirm our conviction that security in Europe is closely linked with
security and stability in the Mediterranean, and that the Mediterranean
dimension is consequently one of the various components of the European
security architecture. In this regard, as part of the adaptation of the Alliance, we
will work towards enhancing our relations with non-NATO Mediterranean
countries through our dialogue.
The dialogue complements other international efforts, such as those undertaken
by the Barcelona process, the OSCE and the WEU without creating any division
of labor. We welcome the report of the Council in Permanent Session on the
progress of and recommendations for future steps to develop the dialogue with
Mediterranean countries through political dialogue and other activities agreed by
the Alliance. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia have
reiterated their interest in the development of our relations. We have decided to
enhance our Mediterranean dialogue in a progressive way and have tasked the
Council in Permanent Session to report at our next meeting on the
implementation of the activities foreseen in the report as well as on the scope for
further development.
13. We are carrying forward the process of the Alliance's internal adaptation, with
the fundamental objectives of ensuring the Alliance's military effectiveness,
maintaining the transatlantic link, and developing the ESDI within NATO. In
keeping with the decisions taken by NATO Heads of State and Government at
the 1994 Summit Meeting and by the Ministerial meetings in June this year in
Berlin and Brussels and with a view to preparing for the Summit next year, our
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primary focus has been on three closely linked issues: the development of a new
command structure for the Alliance; the implementation of the CJTF concept;
and the development of the ESDI within NATO.
14. We welcome the progress made in the development of the future command
structure, noting that two structural alternatives have been selected by the
Military Committee for future assessment and subsequent political consideration
and agree the proposed way ahead. We urge the Council in Permanent Session
and the Military Committee to complete the work as quickly as possible. Once
approved, this new command structure will help ensure the Alliance's military
effectiveness so that it is able, in the changing security environment facing
Europe, to perform its traditional mission of collective defense and through
flexible and agreed procedures to undertake new roles in changing
circumstances and to provide for increased participation by Parmer countries. It
will constitute a renovated, single multinational command structure, reflecting
the strategic situation in Europe and enabling all Allies to participate fully.
15. We welcome the progress made towards realizing the CJTF concept, on the basis
of the Overall Politico-Military Framework approved by us last June. We direct
the Council in Permanent Session and the NATO Military Authorities to pursue
vigorously their work on this concept, bearing in mind its importance for future
Alliance operations, including the possible involvement of nations outside the
Alliance, as well as for the development of ESDI.
16. We are pleased with the progress made in developing the appropriate
arrangements for ESDI within NATO, as decided at the Brussels Summit and at
our meeting last June in Berlin. The newly created Policy Coordination Group
has contributed significantly to this process.
17. We note in particular the steps taken towards implementing the concept of
separable but not separate capabilities:
o the decisions of the Council in Permanent Session on political guidance
concerning the elaboration of European command arrangements within
NATO able to prepare and conduct WEU-led operations;
o the decisions of the Council in Permanent Session regarding the
arrangements for identifying NATO capabilities and assets which might
be made available to the WEU for a WEU-led operation;
o the progress to date on arrangements for the release, monitoring and
return or recall of Alliance assets and capabilities;
o the decision of the Council in Permanent Session with respect to
modalities of cooperation with the WEU;
o the progress on work regarding planning and conducting exercising for
WEU-led operations, following receipt of illustrative profiles for WEU
missions.
18. We have directed the Council in Permanent Session to submit to the Spring 1997
Ministerial meetings a report on the adaptation of Alliance structures and
procedures related to the future command structure, on the implementation of
the CJTF concept, and on further progress with recommendations for decisions
in the development of ESDI within the Alliance.
19. We welcome the close and intensifying cooperation between NATO and the
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WEU. At their meeting in Ostend on 19 November 1996, WEU Ministers
agreed that it would be valuable for WEU to become actively involved in the
Alliances defense planning process and expressed their readiness to participate.
Early agreement is now being sought in the WEU on the participation of all
European Allies in WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities, as
well as in planning and preparing for such operations. This would be a key
contribution to the development of ESDI within the Alliance. We have tasked
the Council in Permanent Session to develop the NATO-WEU relationship
further in order to ensure effective cooperation in preparing for possible WEUled operations.
20. We are pleased with the successful outcome of the OSCE Summit in Lisbon and,
in particular, the adoption of a declaration on security as a result of work on a
Common and Comprehensive Security Model for the 21st Century. The Lisbon
Summit has created a security framework in which all European states can
participate on an equal footing. The Security Model adopted in Lisbon is a
comprehensive expression of the endeavor to strengthen security and stability. It
complements the mutually reinforcing efforts of NATO and other European and
transatlantic institutions and organizations. We attach great importance to the
role of the OSCE as a primary instrument in preventive diplomacy, conflict
prevention, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation, as well
as to the enhancement of its operational capabilities to carry out these tasks. We
believe the OSCE, as the only pan-European security organization, has an
essential role to play in European peace and stability. We are committed to
supporting its comprehensive approach to security. The principles and
commitments on which the OSCE is built provide the standards for the
development of a comprehensive and cooperative European security structure.
We commend the OSCE for its essential contribution to the implementation of
civil aspects of the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in
supervising the preparation and conduct of the elections, in promoting and
monitoring human rights and in overseeing the implementation of agreed
confidence - and security - building measures and sub-regional arms control
agreements. The OSCE thereby demonstrates its central role in contributing to
regional stability and security.
We are pleased with the support given by IFOR to the OSCE in carrying out its
tasks. The cooperation between OSCE and IFOR is a good example of our
concept of mutually reinforcing organizations. The practical assistance given by
NATO to the OSCE in helping to establish measures to verify the confidencebuilding and arms control agreements of the Dayton Accords testifies to a
growing cooperation between NATO and the OSCE. We reiterate our readiness
to further develop the cooperation between the two organizations.
The democratic and economic development, independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of all states are essential factors for stability and security in
the Euro-Atlantic area. We commend the OSCE for its mediation efforts in a
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number of regional conflicts through its various missions, and recognize the
valuable work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. We support
the efforts of the Minsk Group to achieve a political settlement of the conflict in
and around Nagorno-Karabakh.
The OSCE acquis in the field of disarmament, arms control, and confidence- and
security-building measures continues to contribute significantly to political and
military stability. We consider the full implementation, the further development,
and if necessary, the adaptation of these measures to be indispensable elements
in our effort to further enhance the European security architecture. We welcome
the recent adoption by the Forum for Security Cooperation of the Framework for
Arms Control and its Future Agenda.
21. The CFE Treaty is a fundamental cornerstone of security and stability for all in
the Euro-Atlantic area. We are committed to maintain and strengthen it.
Consistent with our broader goal of enhancing political cooperation and military
stability in a Europe without dividing lines, we welcome the decision of the 30
States Parties to the CFE Treaty on 1 December 1996 in Lisbon to launch
negotiations to adapt the Treaty to the changing security environment in Europe.
We look forward to beginning negotiations in the Joint Consultative Group in
Vienna in January 1997 on the basis of the scope and parameters (Terms of
Reference) document agreed in Lisbon.
Our common goal is to enhance security for all States Parties, irrespective of
whether they belong to an alliance, and preserve their right to choose and change
their security arrangements.' Within the broader political context of enhanced
security for all, this process should strengthen the cooperative pattern of
relationships between States Parties, based on mutual confidence, transparency,
stability and predictability. Committed, like the other States Parties, to adapting
the Treaty by developing mechanisms which will enhance the Treaty's viability
- and effectiveness, we will pursue steps to review the Treaty's group structure, to
adapt the Treaty system of limitations and to enhance its verification and
information provisions. To that end, the members of the Alliance will develop
and table proposals for the negotiations in Vienna.
We reaffirm our support for the CFE Flank Agreement, reached at this year's
Review Conference in Vienna. We urge all States Parties who have not yet done
so to approve this Agreement before the end of the extended provisional
application period.
We will play our full part in the intensive continuing efforts directed at resolving
outstanding implementation issues.
(
The members of the Alliance reaffirm the commitment made at Lisbon to
exercise restraint during the period of negotiations as foreseen in the document
in relation to the current postures and capabilities of their conventional armed
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forces - in particular, with respect to their levels of forces and deployments - in
the Treaty's area of application. As decided in Lisbon, this commitment is
without prejudice to the outcome of the negotiations, or to voluntary decisions
by the individual States Parties to reduce their force levels or deployments, or to
their legitimate security interests. We believe that the CFE Treaty must continue
to play a key role in ensuring military stability into the 21st century, and are
committed to adapting it expeditiously in order to take account of new security
challenges.
22. We emphasize the importance of the START Treaties for international stability
and security. We note with satisfaction the progress made by the United States
and the Russian Federation in the implementation of START I. We urge the
Russian Federation to follow the United States in ratifying the START II Treaty.
We welcome the successful conclusion and signing by the great majority of UN
members of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and we urge all other nations
to sign this important international arms control agreement. We look forward to
the early start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.
We are pleased that the Chemical Weapons Convention will soon enter into
force and we look forward to its early implementation. We welcome the fact
that States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention have at the
Fourth Review Conference in Geneva in December 1996 again solemnly
declared their recognition that effective verification could reinforce the
Convention.
Recognizing the heightened concern of the international community of the
suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, we support the vigorous
pursuit of an effective, legally binding international agreement to ban the use,
stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines and, as an important
step to this end, support the early ratification of the revised Second Protocol of
the Convention on Inhumane Weapons.
We urge the early ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies by those states which
have not already ratified.
23. Proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery
means continues to be a matter of serious concern to us. Progress in expanding
and intensifying NATOs political and defense efforts against proliferation, as
directed by NATO Heads of State and Government in January 1994, is an
integral part of NATOs adaptation to the new security environment. These
efforts also contribute to NATOs ability to conduct new roles and missions. We
remain committed to preventing proliferation in the first place, or, if it occurs, to
reversing it through diplomatic means. The Alliance is improving its
capabilities to address the risks posed by proliferation. We welcome further
consultations and cooperation with Partner countries to address the common
security risks posed by proliferation. We note with satisfaction the report of the
169

'

)

•

•

•

'

Alliances Joint Committee on Proliferation on the activities of the Senior
Political-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defense Group on
Proliferation and direct them to continue their vital efforts.
We attach particular importance to a solid preparation of the first preparatory
committee of the strengthened review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), scheduled for April 1997. This process will significantly
contribute to the further strengthening of the NPT, which is the cornerstone of
the global non-proliferation system.
24. We reaffirm our commitment to the Alliance's common-funded program.
We note with appreciation the progress made in moving existing resources to the
highest priority program, such as Partnership for Peace and the support of
enhanced information activities in Moscow and Kyiv. We have directed the
Council in Permanent Session to keep under review the allocation of resources
in order to ensure their optimal use. We have also directed the Council-in
Permanent Session to identify the implications of adaptation for NATOs
common-funded budgets and to make appropriate recommendations for dealing
with these.
25. We continue to support all efforts to combat terrorism, which constitutes a
serious threat to peace, security and stability.
26. The Spring 1997 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session
will be held in Sintra, Portugal, on 29 Ma

y
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Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1997) 155 held at NATO HQ Brussels 16 Dec 1997

Final Communique
Issued at the Ministerial Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council

1. Our Heads of State and Government, at their Summit in Madrid on 8th-9th July,
took historic decisions to transform the Alliance. We welcome today the
substantial progress made by the Alliance in putting into practice that far-reaching
vision. In particular:
o we will sign today Protocols of Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland to the North Atlantic Treaty;
o we have endorsed politico-military guidance for the development of
options for a future NATO-led military presence in Bosnia and
Herzegovina following the end of SFOR's mandate;
o substantial progress has been achieved on the Long Term Study and an
agreement has been reached on a new command structure as a whole, and
in particular on the type, number and location of headquarters.
Furthermore:
o we will cooperate closely with the three invited countries through the
coming months, building on the successful accession talks this year, and
we will work for the timely ratification of the Protocols of Accession;
o we have completed the initial estimates of the resource implications for
accession of the three invitees, and have confirmed that the costs will be
manageable;
o we look forward to continuing in January 1998 intensified dialogues with
those nations that aspire to NATO membership or that otherwise wish to
pursue a dialogue with NATO on membership questions;
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o we intend to realize the full potential of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council (EAPC), which has opened new consultative and cooperative
channels with Partners, and of the enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP)
through expanding the scope and range of Partnership activities;
o we will pursue vigorously our consultations and cooperation with Russia
under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, and
look forward to the implementation of the 1998 work program;
o we will carry forward our program of consultations and cooperation with
Ukraine under the new NATO-Ukraine Charter, and will endorse later
today with Ukraine a work plan for 1998;
o we have carried out through our Mediterranean Cooperation Group a new
round of individual dialogues with our six Mediterranean Dialogue
Partners, and established a work program for cooperation;
o we welcome the substantial progress in our internal adaptation and
approve the progress made in the continued successful implementation of
the Combined Joint Task Forces concept;
o we note with satisfaction that significant progress has been made on
developing the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the
Alliance;
o we will work constructively towards conclusion of the CFE Treaty
Adaptation negotiations as expeditiously as possible, aimed at enhancing
security and stability, and have introduced proposals to this end.
Our aim is to reinforce peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on
Allied solidarity and cohesion, as reflected in our common commitment to the
core function of collective defense, and in the maintenance of a strong
transatlantic link, a new cooperative partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations,
building a ESDI within NATO, and the Alliance's effectiveness for the full range
of its missions.
With this aim in view, NATO enlargement is part of a comprehensive process. It
includes not only the decision of our Heads of State and Government to invite the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO, but
also the continued openness of the Alliance to new members under Article 10 of
the Washington Treaty; broad cooperation with Partners in the EAPC and the
enhanced PfP; a strong, stable and enduring partnership with Russia; a distinctive
Partnership with Ukraine; and an enhanced Mediterranean dialogue.
We received a report by the Secretary General on the successful conclusion of the
accession talks with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. We will sign later
today the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on their accession and look
forward to timely ratification of the Protocols of Accession by our respective
countries in order to allow the three invited states to accede to the North Atlantic
Treaty in time for the Alliance's 50th anniversary in April 1999. We are
convinced that the accession of the invitees will contribute to the security and
effectiveness of the Alliance. We are pleased by the thorough and detailed
preparations undertaken by the three nations for the accession talks. We welcome
the confirmation by the invited countries of their willingness to assume the rights
and obligations of NATO membership and to meet the associated political
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commitments. They have confirmed their intention to participate fully in
NATO's military structure and collective defense planning and, for the purpose of
taking part in the full range of Alliance missions, to commit the bulk of their (
armed forces to the Alliance. All three fully support the continued openness of
the Alliance towards new members, in accordance with Article 10 of the
Washington Treaty as further elaborated in Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit
Declaration.
We will progressively involve the invited countries, to thev greatest extent possible
and where appropriate, in Alliance activities, to prepare them to undertake the
responsibilities and obligations of membership. In this regard, we welcome the
proposal to develop a cooperation program with the invited countries, using
Partnership for Peace tools and mechanisms, which is comprehensive and ensures
transparency between multilateral and bilateral assistance program.
5. As reaffirmed by our Heads of State and Government at the Madrid Summit,
admitting new members will entail resource implications for the Alliance. We
took note of a report on the resource implications of the accession of the three
invited states, with particular emphasis on common-funded budgets. It provides
an initial assessment of those costs which would be eligible for common funding,
amounting to the equivalent of about 1.5 billion US dollars over a period of 10
years, of which 1.3 billion US dollars would be for the NATO Security
Investment Program.
Overall, the analysis of the resource implications of the accession of the three new
members has justified the confidence of our Heads of State and Government that,
in the present and foreseeable security environment in Europe, Alliance costs
associated with the accession of the three invitees will be manageable, and that
the resources necessary to meet these costs will be provided. The analysis also
concludes that the available and planned military forces and the capabilities of the
current Allies and the three invitees are sufficient to ensure fully the collective
defense of all members of the enlarged Alliance in the present and foreseeable
security environment. We note with satisfaction that the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland will also make valuable contributions to the Alliance's
ability to perform the full range of its missions. The newly acceding countries
will assume all rights and obligations of membership and are ready to shoulder
the resulting burdens. They plan to increase significantly their defense spending
and to contribute appropriately to the Alliance's common-funded budgets.
6. We remain committed to the ongoing process of enlargement in the terms set out
in Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration, in which our Heads of State
and Government clearly reaffirmed NATO's open door to new members under
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and we welcome the valuable efforts by
countries which are aspiring members. To that end, we are maintaining our active
cooperation with those nations that have expressed their interest in NATO
membership as well as those who may seek membership in the future. We will
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further encourage their active participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council and the Partnership for Peace. We will also continue our intensified
dialogues with those nations that aspire to NATO membership or otherwise wish
to pursue a dialogue on membership questions. In this context we have adopted
modalities for the continuation of the intensified dialogues. These dialogues,
which have already begun, will cover the full range of political, military, financial
and security issues relating to possible NATO membership, without prejudice to
any eventual decision. We will keep that process under continual review, looking
forward to the review of the enlargement process which will take place at the
meeting of our Heads of State and Government in 1999. We direct the Council in
Permanent Session to report to us at our Spring Session on the intensified
dialogues.
7. Decisions taken at the Madrid Summit and the Sintra Ministerial earlier this year
created the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as the overarching
framework for expanding the political and security dimensions of our partnership
and practical cooperation under the Partnership for Peace. We look forward to
tomorrow's meeting with our EAPC counterparts. The EAPC will deepen and
focus political and security-related consultations and cooperation, and increase
transparency among its 44 member states. For our part, we will continue
developing the EAPC as an action-oriented forum with practical, cooperative
tasks on its agenda. To this end, we look forward to endorsing with our Partners
the EAPC Action Plan for 1998-2000.
8. We are pleased with the progress of implementation of the EAPC Basic
Document since its adoption in Sintra last May. We welcome the deepening
consultations on political and security-related issues, including those in a limited
format between the Alliance and open-ended groups of Partners to focus on
functional matters or, on an ad hoc basis, on appropriate regional matters. We
also note with satisfaction the growing number of cooperative activities under the
auspices of the EAPC, which is based on the principles of inclusiveness and selfdifferentiation, including in the fields of defense economic issues, science,
defense-related environmental issues, cooperation in peacekeeping, and civil
emergency preparedness. We welcome the establishment by a growing number of
Partners of diplomatic missions to NATO under the Brussels Agreement.
9. The Partnership for Peace continues to be the focal point of our efforts to build
with Partners new patterns of practical cooperation across a wide range of security
issues. We are pleased with the progress made since our Sintra meeting last May.
We welcome the decisions to establish PfP Staff Elements at the strategic and
regional levels of NATO's military command structure and note that Defense
Ministers have mandated a report for May 1998 on the possibility of establishing
them also at the sub-regional level. We also welcome proposals for the further
development of the Planning and Review Process and the establishment of
international military posts for Partners at the Partnership Coordination Cell. We
note with satisfaction the identification of the first PfP projects to be supported
under the NATO Security Investment Program and the start of work with Partners
on the development of a political-military framework for NATO-led PfP
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operations. We invite all Partner countries to take full advantage of the new
possibilities to draw closer to the Alliance through the enhanced PfP.
We look forward to endorsing with our Partners at tomorrow's EAPC meeting the
concept to establish a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre and a
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit.
We task the Council in Permanent Session to increase further the effectiveness of
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the enhanced Partnership for Peace, in
cooperation with Partners, and to report to us at our next meeting.
10. The Partnership for Peace has shown its value in contributing to stability in
Europe through the special assistance the Alliance is continuing to provide to
Albania, in the context of PfP and drawing on the experience of the Italian-led
Multinational Protection Force, in the rebuilding of its national armed forces
following the crisis in that country in early 1997. We welcome the voluntary
contributions of nations to Albania.
11. The signature in Paris last May of the NATO-Russia Founding Act marked the
beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. We
are pleased that consultations in the Permanent Joint Council, created by the
Founding Act, are developing into practical cooperation, on the basis of the 1997
work program. which we adopted with Minister Primakov at the first PJC
Ministerial meeting last September. Since then, NATO and Russia have made
significant progress towards establishing the deeper relationship envisioned in the
Founding Act. NATO and Russia have consulted together on many of the issues
central to security in the Euro-Atlantic area, including the situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and ongoing implementation of the Peace Accords, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and conduct of peacekeeping operations. We are
encouraged by the progress made in the working groups on civil emergency
planning, peacekeeping, and defense conversion. We welcome the commitment
shown by Russia to the broad range of cooperative activities, including the
development of an active Individual Partnership Program in the context of PfP
and the appointment of a Russian military representative at NATO Headquarters.
This will open a new chapter in NATO-Russia defense-related and military-tomilitary cooperation.
We therefore look forward tomorrow to our second meeting with the Foreign
Minister of the Russian Federation in the framework of the Permanent Joint
Council. At that meeting, we expect to adopt a substantive work program for
1998 that will further deepen our cooperation and strengthen mutual trust. We
look forward in particular to enhancing NATO's information efforts in Russia,
and we expect to open a NATO Documentation Centre in Moscow, as foreseen in
the Founding Act, by 31st January 1998. The timely establishment of military
liaison missions at various levels, as foreseen in the Founding Act, will usefully
support its objectives. We encourage Russia to play an active role in the EAPC
and the enhanced PfP.
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The activities of the Permanent Joint Council will build upon the principles of
reciprocity and transparency. In opening a new era in European security relations,
we are fully committed to working together with Russia to realize the provisions
and potential of the Founding Act.
12. The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, signed at
the Madrid Summit by Allied Heads of State and Government and President
Kuchma, underscores the Alliance's view that Ukraine has a key role to play in
European security. We underline our firm belief that Ukraine's sovereignty,
independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity
and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state are key factors for security and
stability in Central and Eastern Europe and on the continent as a whole.
We are committed to launching a rich and varied program of consultation and
practical cooperation with Ukraine. We welcome the substantial progress already
made in this regard since the conclusion of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, on the
basis of initial elements agreed by the NATO-Ukraine Commission on 10th
October 1997. We look forward to the implementation of the NATO-Ukraine
work plan for 1998, which we, together with Ukraine's Foreign Minister
Udovenko, will endorse later today when the NATO-Ukraine Commission meets
for the first time at Ministerial level. We also look forward on this occasion to the
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Emergency Planning and
Disaster Preparedness between NATO and Ukraine. We will continue to support
an active information effort in Ukraine through the NATO Information and
Documentation Centre in Kyiv.
We also welcome Ukraine's intention to play an active role within the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council and the enhanced PfP. We are working with
Ukraine on the development of a more focused Individual Partnership Program.
We are pleased with the initial steps we have taken with Ukraine to implement
this new partnership. We look forward to further progress in 1998 and beyond.
13. We continue to give great attention to the Mediterranean region since security in
the whole of Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the
Mediterranean. NATO's Mediterranean dialogue has continued to develop
progressively, and thus contributes to enhancing security and stability in the
Mediterranean region. The Mediterranean dialogue is an important component of
the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation. We welcome the progress
made by the Mediterranean Cooperation Group, created at the Madrid Summit,
which has the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean dialogue under the
authority of the North Atlantic Council, and the expansion of the dialogues with
our Mediterranean Partners, including in a 16+1 format. We also welcome the
establishment of an appropriately funded work program for cooperation activities,
which will help in building confidence through cooperation on security-related
issues, and we task the Council in Permanent Session to provide a progress report
next year on its implementation.
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14. We attach great importance to an early and successful completion of the process
of the Alliance's internal adaptation, on the basis of decisions taken in Berlin and
Brussels in 1996 and subsequently. The fundamental objectives of this adaptation
are to maintain the Alliance's military effectiveness for the full range of its
missions including collective defense and its ability to react to a wide range of
contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and to develop the European
Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance.
We received a comprehensive report describing the progress made since the
Madrid Summit in the three main areas: the development of the Alliance's future
1
command structure; the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces
concept; and the building of the European Security and Defense Identity within
the Alliance.
Substantial progress has been achieved on the Long-Term Study and an
agreement has been reached on a new command structure as a whole, and in
particular on the type, number and location of headquarters. The structure will
comprise two Strategic Commands (SC), one for the Atlantic and one for Europe.
SC Atlantic will comprise three Regional Commands (RC), RC West (Norfolk),
RC East (Northwood) and RC Southeast (Lisbon) as well as STRIKFLTLANT
and SUBACLANT, both based at Norfolk. In SC Europe, two RCs are foreseen RC North (Brunssum) and RC South (Naples). Two component commands (CC)
- CC Air (Ramstein) and CC Nav (Northwood) - will report to RC North together
with three Joint Sub-Regional Commands (JSRC) - JSRC Centre (Heidelberg),
JSRC Northeast (Karup) and JSRC North (Stavanger). RC South will command
two CCs - CC Air and CC Nav (both at Naples) - and four JSRCs - JSRC
Southeast (Izmir), JSRC Southcentre (Larissa), JSRC South (Verona) and JSRC
Southwest (Madrid). Taken together, this will represent a reduction from 65
headquarters at present to 20 in the proposed new command structure. The
NATO Military Authorities have been tasked to develop a detailed plan, as
proposed by the Military Committee, for the transition to the new command
structure, for consideration and endorsement by Ministers next year.
Allies welcome Spain's announcement of its intention to join the Alliance's new
military structure and thus to take part in the new command structure on which an
agreement has been reached in the terms stated above. Spain's full participation
will enhance its overall contribution to the security of the Alliance, help develop
the European Security and Defense Identity within NATO and strengthen the
transatlantic link.
Implementation of the CJTF concept will enhance the Alliance's ability to plan
and conduct quickly and effectively a wide range of military operations
employing multinational and multi-service forces capable of being generated and
deployed at short notice. We are pleased with the progress made in implementing
the CJTF concept, noting that an initial trial has already successfully been
conducted.
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We note with satisfaction that work on building the ESDI within the Alliance is
progressing in close cooperation with the WEU. Important work has been carried
out on European command arrangements; on consultation and informationsharing; the development of mechanisms for the identification, release,
monitoring and return or recall of NATO assets and capabilities made available
for WEU-led operations; on the planning and conduct of WEU-led operations
involving the use of such assets and capabilities; the modalities for the WEU's
involvement in NATO defense planning; and military planning and exercises for
illustrative WEU missions.
We welcome the steady strengthening of cooperative relations between NATO
and the WEU, and the successful, ongoing consultation between our two
organizations under the aegis of the NATO-WEU Joint Council. We will
continue to develop the arrangements and procedures necessary for the planning,
preparation, conduct and exercise of WEU-led operations using NATO assets and
capabilities. In this context, we welcome the WEU's readiness to consult on and
coordinate all ESDI-related work at the earliest possible stage, including through
greater use of joint working groups and through the possibility of setting up ad
hoc expert working groups on specific topics. In addition we welcome the
decisions of the WEU Council of Ministers at Erfurt to improve the WEU's
operational capability in relation to crisis management and peacekeeping
operations (the Petersburg tasks). We also welcome the results of the WEU
Ministerial Council in Erfurt that aim at enhanced forms of cooperation between
WEU and NATO, supporting the process of translating the political directives
formulated by the respective Ministerial Councils into practical links between
both organizations leading in particular to arrangements for WEU-led operations
making use of Alliance assets and capabilities.
We task the Council in Permanent Session to pursue further work, as required, on
internal adaptation and to report to us at our next meeting.
15. The Alliance Strategic Concept adopted by our Heads of State and Government in
Rome in 1991, sets out the principal aims and objectives of the Alliance. As
Foreign Ministers, we attach particular importance to the far-reaching, positive
political developments which have occurred since 1991 in the security landscape
in Europe and to new cooperative security structures which are being built
throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. We therefore endorse the terms of reference
agreed by the Council in Permanent Session for the examination, and updating as
necessary, of the Alliance Strategic Concept, as mandated by our Heads of State
and Government in Madrid. This work will confirm our commitment to the core
function of Alliance collective defense and the indispensable transatlantic link.
We look forward to receiving a progress report at our next meeting on the
substantive work, which will begin early in 1998 for presentation to Heads of
State and Government at their next Summit meeting in April 1999.
16. We reaffirm our commitment to further strengthening the OSCE as a primary
instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post, 178

conflict rehabilitation as well as for enhancing cooperative security and advancing
democracy and human rights. Examples of the important role the OSCE plays as
a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter are its tasks as a
flexible coordinating framework for international assistance in Albania, the
mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the efforts of the Minsk Group, and the
mission in Croatia which will acquire particular importance in 1998 after the
termination of the UNTAES mandate. We are committed to supporting the
OSCE's comprehensive approach to security and its work on a Common and
Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, in
accordance with the decisions of the 1996 Lisbon Summit, including
consideration of developing a Charter on European Security. We welcome the
initiative of the Chairman-in-Office to strengthen non-hierarchical cooperation
between security institutions which accept and adhere to the principles and
commitments contained in the relevant OSCE documents. In this regard, we
recall the precepts set out in the Lisbon Document that security organizations as
such are transparent and predictable in their actions, whose members individually
and collectively adhere to OSCE principles and commitments, and whose
membership is based on open and voluntary commitments. We look forward to a
productive and successful OSCE Ministerial meeting in Copenhagen later this
week.
17. NATO remains committed to the full and unconditional implementation of the
Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the establishment of that
country as a single, democratic and multi-ethnic state. We welcome the progress
achieved in many areas, including the conduct of elections, the reduction of
armaments and the reform and restructuring of police. In addition, many refugees
have returned. However, much more could have been achieved had the
authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina contributed their full share. Peace, and the
institutions of civil society to uphold it, remain fragile^
Accordingly, we strongly endorse the conclusions of last week's Peace
Implementation Conference (PIC) in Bonn that are intended to achieve further
progress in consolidating the peace. We support the High Representative's
intention to facilitate implementation of the Peace Agreement by using his
authority fully to promote the resolution of difficulties through binding decisions,
as he judges necessary, on the issues identified by the Peace Implementation
Council. In this context, we also consider it important to achieve early progress
on such basic matters as the building of common institutions, the creation of a
common currency and common symbols, and the establishment of a uniform
vehicle registration system. We confirm that our countries will continue to
support those who support implementation of the Peace Agreement, and to oppose
those who seek to obstruct the peace process.
NATO contributes to consolidating the peace by organizing and leading a
Stabilization Force (SFOR) with the participation of all 16 Allies and 20 nonNATO countries, including Russia and 14 other Partners. At our meeting today,
we reviewed the SFOR operation twelve months into its eighteen-month mission.
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Following consultations last week with the non-NATO contributors, we
confirmed that SFOR would continue at its present force levels, subject to prudent
adjustments, until otherwise directed. This will allow SFOR to continue its firm
and even-handed approach to implementing its mandate and supporting civil
implementation. We extend our deep-felt appreciation to the men and women of
SFOR for their essential contribution. We express deep sympathy to the families
of those who have lost their lives and to those who have been injured in the cause
of peace.
To succeed, the Peace Agreement must continue to be implemented in an
environment of general security. The PIC recognized and supported the emerging
consensus on the need for a military presence to continue beyond June 1998. It
was the PIC's judgment that such a force should provide appropriate support to
civil implementation while being readily available and effective enough to
respond quickly to events on the ground in and across Bosnia and Herzegovina.
With this in mind, we have endorsed politico-military guidance to the NATO
Military Authorities for the development of options for a NATO-led military
presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the end of SFOR's mandate.
NATO Military Authorities will provide these options to the Council in
Permanent Session no later than mid-January 1998 to allow for the early selection
of an option, following consultations with non-NATO contributors and a careful
assessment of the likely security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina after
SFOR's mandate expires in June 1998.
We welcome the continuing development of the confidence- and security-building
measures under Article II of Annex IB of the Peace Agreement and the successful
completion of declared reduction liabilities under Article IV of Annex IB. We
congratulate the parties on the reduction of almost 6,600 pieces of armament. We
underline the importance of starting the Article V process without delay to build
on the achievements reached under Article II and IV. Steps in this context should
not prejudice the integrity of existing arms control and CSBM agreements. A
broad security dialogue would represent a significant element in establishing
regional stability.
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Securing the peace over the long term will also require further steps to promote
confidence and cooperation among the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and to encourage the development of democratic practices and central defense
mechanisms such as the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM).
NATO is organizing courses for military and civilian defense officials of Bosnia
and Herzegovina at the NATO School to promote reconciliation among the
formerly warring factions. We have also decided to launch an initial set of
security cooperation activities with Bosnia and Herzegovina to include both
Entities and all three ethnic groups. These activities, to be coordinated through
the SCMM, will include additional courses, seminars and an assessment of how
NATO can assist the SCMM in becoming fully effective.
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While NATO will do its part to consolidate the peace, ultimately this
responsibility rests with the democratically elected officials of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, as well as with the other Parties to the Peace Agreement. We will
continue to insist that the Parties to the Peace Agreement comply fully with their
commitments, including the transfer of indicted war criminals to The Hague. The
results of last month's elections in Republika Srpska show encouraging signs of
emerging genuine multi-party politics, which are essential for a strong democracy.
We look forward to the early establishment of a new government committed to
implementing the Peace Agreement and thereby allowing the people in that part
of Bosnia and Herzegovina to benefit more fully from the peace.
We confirm that NATO's interest in stability extends beyond Bosnia and
Herzegovina to the surrounding region. We share the concerns expressed at the
PIC concerning the escalating ethnic tension in Kosovo and other areas. We call
upon those concerned to refrain from activities that might exacerbate existing
difficulties and to strive for mutually acceptable solutions through responsible
dialogue.
18. We share the commitment of all 30 States Parties to continued full
implementation of the CFE Treaty, and its associated documents, including the
Flank Agreement. We are determined that the adaptation of CFE will strengthen
the Treaty's continued key role in the European security architecture and as a
cornerstone of European stability and security.
The agreement reached in July 1997 on the Basic Elements of CFE Treaty
Adaptation was an important step in the adaptation process. We note with
appreciation the substantial progress achieved by the Alliance's High Level Task
Force in elaborating the Alliance position on the operation of the future Treaty's
system of limitations, appropriate flexibilities and consultative mechanisms, with
the aim of enhancing security and stability in Europe. Introduction of Allies'
illustrative Territorial Ceilings, together with their underlying rationale, in the
Vienna negotiation is a further indication of the importance we attach to progress
on CFE adaptation and our determination to work cooperatively with other Treaty
Partners. We will work as expeditiously as possible towards the conclusion of the
adaptation negotiation as foreseen in the timetable agreed in Lisbon on 1st
December 1996. We call on other CFE States Parties to engage actively in the
negotiations, including by putting forward proposed equipment ceilings under the
adapted Treaty, considering reductions in their entitlements as NATO Allies have
already done. We hope that these common efforts will enhance the climate of
cooperation and confidence.
19. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their
means of delivery poses risks to the Alliance. The principal non-proliferation
goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring,
or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. We note the report of
the Joint Committee on Proliferation regarding the activities of the Senior
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Political-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defense Group on
Proliferation.
The Alliance shares with its Partners many of the risks arising from the
proliferation of NBC weapons. We will therefore pursue a dialogue on this issue
in the framework of EAPC and with Russia and Ukraine, with the aim of
enhancing our cooperation in countering these risks.
20. We note with satisfaction that implementation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention is proceeding well, and that the number of countries ratifying this
important agreement continues to grow. We particularly welcome the CWC
ratification by the Russian Federation in early November. We urge all states that
have not yet signed and ratified the Convention to do so, and call upon those that
have ratified to carry out fully their obligations under the Convention.
We continue to endorse efforts to negotiate an effective verification regime to
strengthen the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
We support early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and an
early start to negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.
We continue to urge the Russian Federation to ratify the START II Treaty as soon
as possible, so that negotiations on START III can begin. In this context, we
welcome the agreements signed by Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister
Primakov on 26th September 1997 to enhance the prospects for Russia's
ratification of START II. We urge Russia to honor its commitments as stated by
President Yeltsin in 1992 to substantially reduce its tactical nuclear weapons
stockpile.
We attach great importance to the Treaty on Open Skies and urge the Russian
Federation, Belarus and Ukraine to take the necessary steps to permit its entry into
force.
We welcome the signing in Ottawa on 3rd and 4th December, 1997 of the
Convention on the prohibition of the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of
anti-personnel landmines and on their destruction. The impact of this agreement
on NATO will be fully assessed in the months ahead. We will take the necessary
action to ensure that national obligations under the Convention are compatible
with our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. We welcome the efforts
pursued in the Conference on Disarmament and in other fora on the issue of antipersonnel mines and urge the Conference to intensify its efforts to achieve
progress on the issue.
21. We recognize the achievements of the NATO Science Program in fostering
transatlantic exchanges and intra-Alliance cohesion. We welcome ongoing efforts
to adjust the Program to NATO's new structures and tasks.
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22. We strongly condemn all acts of terrorism. We will continue to support all efforts
to combat terrorism, including using arrangements in the Alliance for consultation
on threats of a wider nature that affect Alliance security interests. In accordance
with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation
possible to prevent and suppress this scourge.
23. We accepted with pleasure an invitation from the United States to host the
meeting of Allied Heads of State and Government in Washington in Spring 1999,
on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty.
24. The Spring 1998 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session will
be held in Luxembourg, on 28th May 1998.

183

APPENDIX C

Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1998) 140 held at NATO HQ Brussels 8 Dec 1998

Final Communique
Issued at the Ministerial Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council

1. At our meeting today, we discussed preparations for the Alliance's next Summit
meeting in Washington in April 1999. At this Summit, which will mark the 50th
anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, we will celebrate the
historic achievements of NATO as a strong, united and successful Alliance and
will welcome the three invited countries - the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland - as members of the Alliance. The Summit will also provide an
opportunity to define the Alliance's role for the future, including ever closer
relations with Partner countries. Accordingly, we recommend to our Heads of
State and Government that at the Washington Summit they set out their shared
vision of the Alliance in the years ahead - an Alliance adapted, renewed and ready
to meet the security challenges of the 21 st century
We reviewed the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the future of the
NATO-led Stabilization Force, and consulted on the situation in and around
Kosovo. On both these important subjects, we have issued separate statements.
We have also issued a separate statement on "Adaptation of the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Restraint and Flexibility". We
gave additional guidance to the Alliance's ongoing work in implementing the
decisions of the Madrid Summit of July 1997 to shape the new NATO. We are
pleased with the successful completion by all Allies of the ratification process for
the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Washington
Treaty. We welcome the progress made in preparations for membership by the
invited countries, and encourage them and the NATO Military Authorities to
accelerate their efforts towards completion of the relevant minimum military
requirements of the Alliance. The membership of these countries will contribute
to an overall strengthening of the Alliance and to enhancing security and stability
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in Europe. We look forward to welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland as our new Allies before the Washington Summit.
2. We reaffirm that the door remains open to NATO membership under Article 10 of
the North Atlantic Treaty and in accordance with Paragraph 8 of the Madrid
Summit Declaration. Taking into account a report on the intensified dialogue on
membership questions, we reviewed this process, as mandated by our Heads of
State and Government, in preparation for the comprehensive review which they
will carry out at their meeting in Washington. We tasked the Council in
Permanent Session to develop for the Washington Summit a comprehensive
package that will continue the enlargement process, operationalize our
commitment to the open door policy and underscore our willingness to assist
aspiring countries in meeting NATO standards.
3. We received a comprehensive report describing the progress made in our internal
adaptation, to which we continue to attach great importance. The fundamental
objectives of this adaptation are to maintain the Alliance's military effectiveness
for the full range of its missions building on its essential collective defense
capabilities and its ability to react to a wide range of contingencies, to preserve
the transatlantic link, and to develop the European Security and Defense Identity
(ESDI) within the Alliance. Implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces
(CJTF) concept and preparations for implementation of the new command
structure are well in hand. Our aim is to have the necessary preparations
completed to enable the Council to take a single and irreversible decision on the
activation requests of all headquarters of the new NATO command structure by
the beginning of March 1999, and we tasked the Council in Permanent Session
accordingly.
We reviewed the progress made in building the ESDI within NATO and welcome
the close cooperation and consultation with the WEU in this regard. Regular
meetings of the NATO and WEU Councils in Joint Session and of subordinate
bodies, and arrangements for close consultation on the planning and conduct of
WEU-led operations and exercises involving the use of NATO assets and
capabilities, are important elements of the development of ESDI within the
Alliance. Preparation within the Alliance for WEU-led operations making use of
Alliance assets and capabilities is now well advanced. In this context, we
welcome the results of the joint workshop on the NATO-WEU consultation
process and look forward to a crisis management seminar in February 1999,
leading up to a joint NATO-WEU crisis management exercise in 2000. We
appreciate the steady strengthening of cooperative links between NATO and the
WEU which was reaffirmed at the WEU Council of Ministers held in Rome on
16th-17th November. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to ensure that
the key elements of the work on implementing the Berlin and Brussels decisions
relating to ESDI are in place, as set out in the report on internal adaptation
submitted to us, by the Washington Summit. Moreover, we direct the Council to
make recommendations on how best to further enhance the effectiveness of ESDI
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within the Alliance, including the contribution made by all European Allies,
beyond the Washington Summit.
4. We reviewed the ongoing work on the examination^ and updating as necessary, of
the Alliance's Strategic Concept, as mandated by our Heads of State and
Government at their Summit meeting in Madrid in July 1997. This work must
ensure that the Strategic Concept is fully consistent with the Alliance's new
security environment. It should reaffirm our commitment to collective defense
and the transatlantic link; take account of the challenges the Alliance now faces;
and present an Alliance ready and with a full range of capabilities to enhance
security and stability for countries in the Euro-Atlantic area in the 21st century,
including through dialogue, cooperation and partnership and, where appropriate,
non-Article 5 crisis response operations, such as that in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
with the possible participation of partners. We instructed the Council in
Permanent Session to pursue this work vigorously so that the new text is available
by the time of the Washington Summit.
5. We are pleased that the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and an
enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) are resulting in a stronger consultative
forum and a more operational Partnership. This will improve the ability of Allies
and Partners to contribute to security and stability through political consultations
and practical cooperation. The EAPC has proven a valuable forum for
consultations on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the crisis in
Kosovo. We received a comprehensive progress report on implementation of the
EAPC Basic Document and the enhanced Partnership for Peace.
We welcome the EAPC's substantial updated Action Plan for 1998 - 2000 which
includes exploring new issues. In the area of arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation issues, these would include arms control, political and defense
efforts against proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and
missiles, and arms trafficking, control of small arms transfers and means of
encouraging de-mining.
We welcome as a positive development the inauguration last June of the EuroAtlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, which has already coordinated
emergency aid for relief operations in Albania and Ukraine.
6. The Partnership for Peace continues to be the focal point of our efforts to build
with Partners new patterns of practical military and defense-related cooperation
across a wide range of issues.
We note with satisfaction the ongoing discussions with Partners on the
development of a political-military framework for NATO-led PfP operations.
This will enhance future cooperation by establishing a basis for Partner
involvement in political consultations and decision-making, command
arrangements and operational planning for NATO-led non-Article 5 operations.
The political-military framework will be a key element in future cooperation and
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will provide for an increased role of Partners in one of the Alliance's major new
tasks. The intention is to finalize this work, in tandem with the Strategic Concept,
by the Washington Summit.
We welcome the Concept for PfP Training Centers, which will advance the broad
politico-military goals of PfP's overall education and training efforts, particularly
in supporting enhanced military cooperation and interoperability.
We are pleased that a substantial number of interested Partner countries are taking
up the opportunity, provided under the expanded Planning and Review Process
(PARP), to adopt initial Partnership goals in Spring 1999. This is an important
effort towards closer Partner cooperation with Alliance structures and procedures,
in particular by enhancing interoperability, a priority for the Alliance.
We welcome the increased attention given to multinational formations as a means
to enhance military cooperation between Allies and Partners, as in IFOR/SFOR in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
We tasked the Council in Permanent Session to put together, with Partners, the
initiatives above and other work now underway to form a coherent package of
measures intended to reinforce PfP's operational capabilities for the Washington
Summit.
Partnership for Peace program can also play an important role in contributing to
Alliance efforts in reinforcing regional stability, such as in the Balkans. In this
context, the Alliance has promoted, with participation of Partners, a substantive
program of assistance to Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia.
7. We are encouraged by the developing process of consultation and practical
cooperation with Russia under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC)
and remain committed to working together with Russia to achieve a strong, stable
and enduring partnership, On the basis of the principles of common interest,
reciprocity and transparency, as called for in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
The crisis in Kosovo has confirmed the value of the PJC as a consultative forum.
The ongoing SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a valuable
example of practical cooperation between NATO and Russia.
We are pleased that military-to-military cooperation is progressing well, and that
agreement has been reached on the establishment of a NATO Military Liaison
Mission in Moscow by the end of this year.
We look forward to signing with Russia a Memorandum of Understanding on
Environmental Protection and to establishing as soon as possible a NATO
Information Office in Moscow. We welcome the establishment of the NATO187

Russia Scientific and Technological Cooperation Committee, which recently held
its inaugural meeting in Moscow; agreement on the establishment of an
Information and Consultation Centre in Moscow on the retraining of retired
military personnel; and Russian participation in the PfP exercise "Cooperative
Assembly". We will continue to work closely with Russia to develop an updated
and substantial Individual Partnership Program (IPP) to include a wide range of
practical defense-related and military-to-military cooperative activities.
8. We reaffirm our view that Ukraine has a key role to play in European security.
We attach importance to the development of strong and active practical
cooperation and political consultations with Ukraine, under the aegis of the
NATO-Ukraine Charter. We welcome the announcement by the President of
Ukraine of a "State Program of Cooperation with NATO to the Year 2001" as a
tangible signal of Ukraine's commitment to a productive relationship with NATO.
We intend to utilize as fully as possible the potential offered by Ukraine's active
participation in enhanced PfP and the agreed NATO-Ukraine Work Plan for 1999.
We also note with satisfaction the growing military cooperation between NATO
and Ukraine. The newly established NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on
Defense Reform is a unique partnership program.
We welcome the agreement to be signed tomorrow on the appointment of two
NATO liaison officers to Kyiv to enhance mutual cooperation. We will continue
to support an active information effort in Ukraine through the NATO Information
and Documentation Centre in Kyiv.
9. Security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the
Mediterranean. We therefore give great attention to our Mediterranean Dialogue
which is part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security, contributes to
building confidence with participating countries and mutually reinforces other
international efforts towards this end. We look forward to the positive
contribution that the newly designated Allied Contact Point Embassies will have
in fostering the Dialogue. We are committed to further improving the political,
civil and military aspects of our Dialogue. We encourage Partners in the
Dialogue to take full advantage of all its possibilities, including in the military
field. We are ready to consider possibilities to enhanqe cooperation with
participating countries in preparation for the Washington Summit.
10. The establishment of the Kosovo Verification Missions has opened a new stage in
cooperation between NATO and the OSCE. Through the close coordination with
the OSCE over the last months in the planning and establishment of these
missions, and our continuing cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have
further demonstrated in practice our ability to work together in crisis situations.
We also welcome the strengthening of relations between NATO and the OSCE
over the past year, in the spirit of the OSCE's Common Concept for the
Development of Cooperation between Mutually Reinforcing Institutions. We
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continue to support the efforts of the OSCE to develop a Document-Charter on
European Security, worthy of adoption at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999.
We welcome the outcome of the OSCE Oslo Ministerial of 2nd-3rd December
1998.
11. We continue to consider the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security.
We are committed to a successful adaptation of the Treaty. We will play our full
part in seeking to complete this by the time of the OSCE Istanbul Summit. To
this end, we will support efforts aimed at the resolution of key outstanding issues
and the start of drafting work in the first months of next year. To assist this
process, the North Atlantic Council and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
have today issued a separate statement entitled "Adaptation of the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Restraint and Flexibility." Pending
Entry into Force of the Adapted Treaty, we regard continued strict
implementation of the current Treaty and its associated documents as vital.
12. We welcome the communique of the five nuclear weapons states of 4th June this
year affirming their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article
VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We call on Russia to ratify the
START II Treaty without delay. This would pave the way for considerable
reductions of nuclear arsenals and would allow negotiations on a START III
Treaty aiming at further far-reaching reductions of nuclear weapons stockpiles.
We remain committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, and call upon all countries to accede to and implement the Treaty in due
course. We support the early conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.
13. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their
means of delivery continues to be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance.
We note the report of the Joint Committee on Proliferation regarding the activities
of the Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defense
Group on Proliferation. The Alliance and its members remain committed to
preventing proliferation and to reversing it, should it occur, through diplomatic
means. At the same time, we recognize that proliferation can pose a direct threat
to the Alliance. Building on the successful work of the NATO groups on
proliferation, we are prepared to expand NATO's efforts to address the evolving
proliferation threat. We therefore task the Council in Permanent Session to
prepare for the Washington Summit proposals for an initiative to ensure that the
Alliance has the political and military capabilities to address appropriately and
effectively the challenges of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of
delivery.
,
14. We underline the risk to international and regional stability posed by the spread of
NBC weapons. In particular, we urge all countries to accede to arid fully
implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime.
15. We are determined to achieve progress on a legally binding protocol including
effective verification measures to enhance compliance and promote transparency
that strengthens the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons
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Convention. We re-emphasize the importance of universal adherence to the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
16. We call on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to ratify the Open Skies Treaty without
delay.
17. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability which can
threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our condemnation of
terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our
international commitments and national legislation.
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APPENDIX D

Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1999) 166 held at NATO HQ Brussels 15 Dec 1999

Final Communique
Issued at the Ministerial Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council

1. At our meeting today, we recalled NATO's major achievements in 1999:
o We set forth NATO's vision for the 21st century and approved an updated
Strategic Concept at the Washington Summit, where we also celebrated
the Alliance's 50th Anniversary;
o We admitted as new members the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland;
and
o We contributed decisively, in particular through the conduct of our air
campaign and the subsequent deployment of KFOR, to the international
community's objective of creating the basis for long-term peace and
stability in Kosovo.
We reviewed progress in implementing the Washington Summit decisions and
took steps1 to further adapt the Alliance to the new security environment. We
reaffirmed the Alliance's commitment to its fundamental security tasks, as set out
in the Strategic Concept, and the importance of our individual and collective
efforts to achieve our guiding objective of enhancing the security and stability of
the Euro-Atlantic area.
2. Against the background of political developments in the Balkans, we reviewed the
status of NATO's comprehensive approach and continuing commitment to the
promotion of security, stability, peace and democracy, and the peaceful resolution
of disputes in the region, including through the NATO-led operations in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, and the implementation of NATO's South-East
Europe Initiative. Through the Council in Permanent Session and the NATO
Military Authorities, we continue to monitor closely" the situation across the
region.
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3. We pay tribute to the service-men and women of all nations who are serving in
the Balkans for their professionalism and dedication to the cause of peace and
stability. We express deep sympathy to the families of those who have lost their
lives and to those who have been injured in the cause of peace.
4. The Kosovo air campaign, which demonstrated the cohesion and unity of the
Alliance and its determination to act, reinforced the diplomatic efforts of the
international community and achieved the key objectives of the NATO Allies and
their Partners. The humanitarian catastrophe has ended; some 850,000 refugees
have returned; a NATO-led international peace force (KFOR) has been
successfully deployed; and the international community has assumed
responsibility for the civil administration through the United Nations Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK).
5. We are determined to play our part in meeting in full the aims of the international
community as set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1244. We remain
committed to a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo where all peoples
can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on
an equal basis, including through participation in democratic institutions.
We noted the progress made in restoring peace and stability since the deployment
of KFOR in Kosovo in accordance with UNSCR 1244, in particular the reduction
in violence and the re-establishment of civil institutions. We commend the work
undertaken by UNMIK and are pleased with the excellent level of co-ordination
and cooperation established between KFOR and UNMIK. Close civil-military
relations are essential for the success of our common goals and of our peacebuilding efforts in the region. In this respect, we have invited the UN Secretary
General's Special Representative, Dr. Kouchner, to tomorrow's meeting of the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
6. While progress has been achieved, much remains to be done, in particular the
continued protection of all ethnic groups and minorities. We condemn all acts of
violence and intimidation from whatever quarter. We underline KFOR's
determination to put an end to ethnically motivated violence and to act swiftly and
decisively against all perpetrators, including through maintaining an effective
military presence in Serb minority areas. We strongly commend KFOR's
determination to combat arms trafficking, illegal possession of weapons, the
development of parallel structures that threaten KFOR or UNMIK objectives or
the rule of law, to monitor and provide security at the borders and boundaries of
Kosovo and to work with UNMIK to avoid canonization.
The achievement of the de-militarization and the dissolution of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) under the supervision of KFOR was an important step in
establishing an environment for post-conflict reconciliation. We welcome the
establishment of a civilian, multi-ethnic Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) as
another important step in the development of a civil society for the benefit of all
communities. Close control of the KPC by UNMIK and KFOR is essential. We
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underscore KFOR's determination to continue to provide day-to-day operational
direction and tasking, under the overall authority of the United Nations Secretary
General's Special Representative.
/
KFOR will continue to co-operate closely with UNMIK, providing support to its
efforts towards establishing a fully functioning administration and democratic
institutions, promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights, and assuring
the safe return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes. It will be
vital that UNMIK is adequately funded and staffed to fulfill its mission,
particularly in the area of local administration and civilian international police.
We will continue to do our utmost to provide a secure environment and we will
give appropriate support for the conduct of free and fair elections under the
auspices of the OSCE, which are to be held next year. We will also continue to
provide strong support for the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia.
We urge all community leaders in Kosovo, irrespective of their ethnic
background, to work together and with the international community in the
reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic society founded
on the rule of law, tolerance and respect for human rights. We call in particular
on the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community to renounce violence, to
demonstrate its commitment to a tolerant, democratic, multi-ethnic Kosovo, and
to co-operate with UNMIK and KFOR against those who advocate and practice
violence. In this context we welcome the creation by UNMIK of a Joint Interim
Administrative Structure, and in particular the establishment of an Interim
Administrative Council. We are encouraged by Kosovar Albanian agreement to
participate in these structures, and underline the importance of early participation
by representatives of all Kosovar peoples, including the Serb community. We
expect all parties to co-operate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, including by facilitating the conduct of its investigations.
The continuing support of the international community will depend upon an
adequate response to these requirements.
Our common efforts in Kosovo demonstrate the value of the concept of mutually
reinforcing institutions, a concept long championed by the Alliance. In this
respect, our individual bilateral efforts, the substantial role of the EU and that of
other international bodies, are making a decisive contribution to the economic
reconstruction of Kosovo. We also commend the UNHCR for organizing relief
efforts and resettlement, the UN Mine Action Centre for its role in coordinating
the removal of mines, and the OSCE for its institution-building, human rights
work and training of Kosovo police. We also express our appreciation for the
significant role played by the many non-governmental organizations.
We express our deep appreciation for the robust practical and political support
provided by Partner countries of the region throughout the air campaign and
thereafter. This support was and remains critical to success. In particular, we
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reiterate our appreciation for the ongoing efforts of Albania and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in supporting KFOR.
We are grateful to NATO's Partners and other nations for the substantial
contributions they are making to efforts to bring peace and stability to the
Balkans, which are the practical expressions of these countries' commitment to
our shared values.
10. The crisis in Kosovo demonstrated the resilience of the Dayton/Paris Peace
Agreement. The Alliance remains committed to supporting a peaceful future for
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single democratic state composed of two multiethnic Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika
Srpska. We are encouraged by the continuing progress in the full implementation
of the Dayton Agreement. We welcome the appointment of Ambassador Petritsch
as High Representative, whose vigorous approach to the implementation of the
Dayton Agreement we strongly support. We note in particular the progress made
in:
o the development of functioning civil institutions;
o increases in the level of refugee returns, especially to areas in which
returnees are in the minority;
o civil reconstruction;
o reduction in arms holdings; and
o the development of the role of the Standing Committee on Military
Matters.
We also welcome the progress made in the ongoing arms control and confidence
building negotiations in the framework of the Dayton Agreement with the goal of
establishing a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia. We urge all
parties to demonstrate fully their commitment to the Dayton process and their
cooperation with the High Representative, as the basis for further progress in
transferring administrative responsibility to local authorities.
11. SFOR has helped to secure a more stable and secure environment in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. As a result, it has been able to undertake significant restructuring.
Early next year a smaller, more flexible force will be in place and will remain
fully capable of carrying out its mandate. SFOR will continue to contribute to the
maintenance of a secure environment and to give targeted and focused support to
civilian implementation. In this respect, we fully endorse SFOR's close working
relationship with the High Representative and other civil agencies in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and in particular SFOR's continuing strong support for the
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in bringing
indicted war criminals to justice.
12. Despite this encouraging progress, important challenges remain, such as;
o the return of displaced persons to minority areas;
o further reduction of both Entities'armed forces;
o further progress in humanitarian de-mining;
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improving the effectiveness of all common institutions, notably the
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and cooperation between Entities;
o transferring to the ICTY persons indicted for war crimes;
o the fight against corruption, organized crime and illegal secret services;
o judicial and police reform; and
" b the establishment of a state border service.
Accordingly, we expect the Entities to work together fully in co-ordination with
the Presidency, the Council of Ministers and on all other levels. We applaud the
spirit of cooperation exhibited among the common institutions and between
authorities of both Entities during preparations for hosting the Stability Pact
Summit. We call upon the Presidency to implement in full the commitments
made in the New York Declaration of 15 November, and to support the work of
the Standing Committee on Military Matters. We also demand that all parties
fully co-operate with the ICTY, in particular by surrendering inductees within
their territory. Only on the basis of justice can a lasting peace be established. We
emphasize the fundamental significance of implementing market oriented
economic reforms.
Taken together, these steps will reinforce the efforts of the High Representative to
make the leaders and authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina the "owners" of the
process of peace implementation and open the way to the integration of their
country into Euro-Atlantic institutions. As Co-chair of the Stability Pact Working
Table on Security Issues, Bosnia and Herzegovina can play an important role in
promoting stability in the region.
13. We remain concerned about continued tensions between Belgrade and the
democratically elected government of Montenegro. We are therefore paying
close attention to developments there. We call on both sides to resolve their
differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any destabilizing
measures. We express our support for the objective of a peaceful and democratic
FRY, which protects the rights of all minorities, including those in Vojvodina and
Sandjak. This would open the way for the eventual return of the FRY to the
Euro-Atlantic family of nations.
14. The forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Croatia will be
crucial for its future. We hope that the entire Croatian leadership will seize the
chance to re-vitalize implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, and
demonstrate their commitment to democratic elections and due constitutional
process. There is an opportunity for the next Croatian government to move
towards a closer relationship with Euro-Atlantic institutions.
15. Our goal remains the integration of all the countries of South-East Europe into the
Euro-Atlantic Community. To this end, we are building on the Alliance's already
extensive cooperation in 4he region as evidenced by NATO's leadership of the
SFOR and KFOR operations. The South-East Europe Initiative, launched at our
Washington Summit, is also working to achieve this goal, including through PfP
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tools, the EAPC and the Consultative Forum, which all play valuable roles in our
post-conflict efforts to win permanent peace in the region. Today we received a
consolidated progress report on the South-East Europe Initiative and we note with
satisfaction the range of activities already undertaken, by the countries in the
region and by Allies, with the aim of harmonizing assistance program for the
states of the region, as appropriate.
NATO's South-East Europe Initiative promotes regional security and cooperation;
it supports and complements the objectives of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern
J Europe, adopted by Ministers in Cologne in June and endorsed by Heads of State
and Government at the Sarajevo Summit in July. NATO is participating fully in
the work of the Regional Table and the Working Tables established to implement
the Stability Pact. The Alliance will continue to contribute to the success of the
Stability Pact by making available its wealth of experience and expertise in
practical military and defense-related cooperation and by ensuring that our efforts
complement and contribute to the goals of the Pact.
We welcome the constructive contribution of Partners and other nations of SouthEast Europe to the stabilization of that region. We applaud the engagement of
Montenegro in the Stability Pact and look forward to the time when the FRY will
be able to play its rightful part in this endeavor.
We direct the Council in Permanent session to pursue vigorously the various
efforts under the South-East Europe Initiative and the Alliance's contribution to
the objectives of the Stability Pact, and to report on progress by the time of our
next meeting.
16. In its Strategic Concept, NATO has committed itself to contribute to effective
conflict prevention. Our common efforts to build peace and security in Kosovo,
to support a peaceful future for Bosnia and Herzegovina and to enhance
cooperation, including security cooperation, in South-Eastern Europe, are
examples of such contributions by the Alliance, as are the recent initiatives to
promote practical regional cooperation in the EAPC/PfP framework. We direct
the Council in Permanent Session to continue to consider means to ensure an
effective and coherent Alliance contribution to the efforts of the international
community to prevent and defuse conflicts, and to make recommendations where
and if appropriate.
17. Our experience in Kosovo has confirmed that NATO must continue to adapt and
improve its defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational
operations across the full range of Alliance missions. Implementation of the
Defense Capabilities Initiative (DO), agreed in Washington, will ensure that
NATO's forces can meet the challenges of mobility, deployability, sustainability,
effective engagement, survivability and interoperable and effective command,
control and communications systems. The DCI will also promote greater
interoperability among Alliance forces and, where applicable, between Allied and
Partner forces. The DCI is essential to strengthening European defense
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capabilities and the European pillar of NATO, so that European Allies will be
able to make a stronger and more coherent contribution to NATO. It will also
improve their capability to undertake EU-led operations where the Alliance as a
whole is not engaged. We are encouraged by the useful initial results achieved to
date in implementing the D O and look forward to further essential improvements
in Alliance defense capabilities. Though the implementation of DCI is first and
foremost a national responsibility, the provision of adequate resources, including
multinational, joint and common funding arrangements, will be a critical factor.
18. The development of an effective ESDI will strengthen the Alliance, through
which we remain ready to pursue common security objectives wherever possible.
We are committed to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar. Building on
existing arrangements between NATO and the WEU as agreed in Berlin, and
reaffirmed at our Washington Summit, we support the development within NATO
of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European
requirements and contribute to Alliance security. These developments will also
result in a stronger and more balanced transatlantic relationship.
19. We have set in train work on the development of the European Security and
Defense Identity within the Alliance as set out in the Washington Summit
Communique and the Strategic Concept. In this context, we have initiated
discussions in the Alliance to address means to ensure the development of
effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency, building on the
mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU; participation of non-EU
European Allies; as well as practical arrangements for assured EU access to
NATO planning capabilities and for ready EU access to NATO collective assets
and capabilities on a case-by-ease basis and by consensus as set out at
Washington.
20. Alliance work will proceed on the Washington Summit agenda, on an ongoing
basis, taking into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU. In
this regard, we note the results of the European Council meeting in Helsinki on
the strengthening of the common European policy on security and defense and on
the development of modalities for EU/NATO relations, which represent a major
contribution to the process of reinforcing our Alliance and its European pillar.
We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for
autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where
the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. We note that this process will avoid
unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army. In
this regard:
a. We note the European Union's decision to set a common European
headline goal and to develop collective capability goals to improve
European military capabilities. The contribution of the non-EU European
Allies to this process is and will be important. We applaud the
determination of all European Allies to take the necessary steps to
strengthen their defense capabilities. The EU's headline and capability
goals and the objectives arising from NATO's DCI will be mutually
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reinforcing, using - subject to the necessary decisions - existing defense
planning procedures including, as appropriate, those available in NATO
and the Planning and Review Process of the PfP, noting that in addition
EU Ministers will develop a method of consultation and a regular review
of progress made.
b. We reiterate our readiness to define and adopt, in accordance with our
decisions taken in Washington, the necessary arrangements for European
Union ready access to separable but not separate NATO collective assets
and capabilities, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not
engaged militarily as an Alliance, respecting the requirements of NATO
operations and the coherence of its command structure.
c. We note the decision of the EU to set up, in future, appropriate structures
to ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with
European NATO members which are not members of the EU on issues
related to European security and defense policy and crisis management. In
this respect, we underline, as we did at the Washington Summit, the
importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies, for the necessary
involvement of non-EU European Allies in these structures.
We note that the non-EU European NATO members will participate, if
they so wish, in the event of an operation involving the use of NATO
assets and capabilities, and that they will be invited, upon decision by the
EU, to take part in other EU-led Operations. We see these EU decisions as
important steps to achieve the goals envisaged by our Heads of State and
Government at the Washington Summit. Participation of non-EU
European Allies will enhance the effectiveness of EU-led military
operations and will contribute directly to the effectiveness and vitality of
the European pillar of NATO.
d. We recognize the European Union's decision to establish permanent
political and military structures and interim bodies, and its commitment to
develop, under the Portuguese Presidency, modalities for full consultation,
cooperation and transparency between NATO and the EU. We note that
this, as with all the tasks entrusted to the Portuguese Presidency, is to be
carried forward as a matter of priority. We reciprocate the EU's intention
to develop appropriate modalities for a close and confident relationship
between the two organizations. We welcome as a first step the informal
contacts between the NATO Secretary General and the EU High
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.
21. We welcome the participation in our discussions of Dr. Javier Solana. As
Secretary General of the Western European Union, his presence symbolizes the
close relationship that has developed between NATO and the WEU. The Alliance
continues to work with the WEU to complete and implement arrangements to
facilitate cooperation between the two organizations in the event of a WEU-led
military operation using NATO assets and capabilities. We look forward to
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exercising these arrangements in a crisis management exercise between NATO
and the WEU scheduled for February 2G00.
22. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to proceed with its work as set out at
the Washington Summit, taking into account the developments described above,
and report to us at our next meeting.
23. The Alliance reaffirms its commitment to remain open to new members. The
Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing
and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as
NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall
political and strategic interests of the Alliance and the inclusion would enhance
overall European security and stability. The three new members will not be the
last.
At the Washington Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government approved a
Membership Action Plan (MAP) to reinforce NATO's commitment to the
openness of the Alliance. We have received today a report on the implementation
of the MAP to date. We are pleased that the MAP process has made an effective
start and met with a positive response of the nine aspiring countries. Aspirants
have submitted annual national program which enable the Alliance to provide
them with direct advice, feedback and assistance on their preparations for possible
future membership.
24. We encourage all aspirants to set themselves realistic, prioritized goals and
timelines and to allocate the necessary resources to them. We stand ready to
assist the aspirants in their efforts to meet the goals they have set. To this end, we
will develop with them Planning Targets in the defense/military field and tailored
PfP Individual Partnership Program. Meetings of the Council will take place next
Spring with each aspirant to examine progress made. We will keep the
enlargement process, including implementation of the MAP, under continual
review. We expect the annual consolidated progress report on activities under the
MAP at our next Ministerial.
25. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council remains the key forum for regular
consultation on security and defense related issues between the Alliance and its
Partners. We welcome the expansion of activities within the EAPC/PfP
framework to promote practical cooperation, including regional cooperation
notably in South-East Europe, as well as in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Enhanced cooperation in support of, inter alia, peacekeeping, global humanitarian
mine action and addressing the challenges of small arms and light weapons
underline the role of the EAPC as a vital and dynamic institution in enhancing
security in the Euro-Atlantic area.
26. We are pleased with the progress made in implementing the Washington Summit
decision to further enhance the Partnership for Peace and make it more
operational. We welcome the approval of the first Ministerial Guidance of the
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PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the development of Partnership
goals as a substantial step forward in bringing the force planning processes of
Partners closer to those of Allies. We also welcome the progress that has been
made in involving Partners as troop contributing nations in consultations,
planning, conduct and political oversight of the present operations in the Balkans,
in accordance with the Political-Military Framework (PMF) for NATO-led PfP
operations. We endorse the Operational Capabilities Concept which will
reinforce PfP's operational capabilities and improve the capability and
interoperability of Partner forces, as well as enhance the Alliance's overall ability
to put together tailored force packages to mount and sustainiuture NATO-led PfP
operations along the lines of SFOR and KFOR. The Concept will continue to
evolve. We appreciate the substantial progress achieved so far on the Training
and Education Enhancement Program. We look forward to a report by the
Council in Permanent Session on progress made on these important initiatives at
our Spring 2000 meeting.
27. We welcome the recent signing by Ireland of the PfP Framework Document and
we look forward to close cooperation with Ireland in the PfP and EAPC.
28. We continue to attach importance to consultations and practical cooperation with
Russia. Our aim remains to establish a strong, stable and enduring partnership
within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
29. We note the progress made in recent consultations in the PJC framework on
issues relating to the operation in Kosovo. We note with satisfaction the valuable
experience of practical cooperation between NATO and Russian forces both in
SFOR and KFOR.
30. We encourage Russia to resume cooperation on the broad range of issues foreseen
in the Founding Act and to engage actively in the EAPC and the Partnership for
Peace. At the same time, we emphasize that the further development of our
cooperation depends on Russia's respect for international norms and obligations.
31. We are deeply concerned about the conflict in Chechnya, continuing reports of
civilian casualties there and the plight of displaced persons. We condemn, in
particular, Russian threats against unarmed civilians, such as those in Grozny.
We acknowledge the right of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity and to
protect its citizens against terrorism and lawlessness. We condemn terrorism in
all its manifestations but believe that Russia's pursuit of a purely military solution
to the conflict is undermining its legitimate objectives. The continuing
disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force against the civilian population is
incompatible with the commitments Russia has undertaken within the OSCE and
its obligations as a member of the United Nations and the Council of Europe. In
this context, we also recall the principles enshrined in the NATO-Russia
Founding Act. We therefore urge Russia to exercise the fullest restraint, to refrain
from the use of force against civilians and protect their human rights, to facilitate
the provision of humanitarian aid to those in need, and to co-operate fully with
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international relief agencies and to ensure security for their operations. Bearing in
mind the importance of regional stability and respect for the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of neighboring states, we are deeply concerned about the impact
of the crisis of the entire Caucasus region and stress the need to avoid steps that
would further undermine regional security.
We urge Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict. To this
end, it is essential that the Russian government and Chechen representatives take
meaningful steps toward a renewed dialogue. We also urge the Chechen
authorities to condemn terrorism and to take action against it. We expect Russia
to respect the commitments made in Istanbul and to make good use of today's
visit by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to the region in order to facilitate a
political process to end the conflict.
32. We welcome the progressive development of the NATO-Ukraine distinctive
partnership in accordance with the Charter signed in Madrid in 1997. We are
pleased that this partnership is providing a framework for cooperative initiatives
such as the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, which is
actively engaged with Ukrainian media, universities and think-tanks. We also
note that a NATO Liaison Office has been operational in Kyiv since April, and is
providing a valuable contribution to facilitating Ukraine's full participation in the
Partnership for Peace program and more generally, to enhancing cooperation
between NATO and Ukrainian authorities.
33. We continue to support the efforts of the Joint Working Group on Defense
Reform and remain prepared to provide advice, as appropriate, to assist Ukraine
with the transformation of its defense establishment. In the economic area, we
welcome the initiation of a program for the retraining of retired military officers.
Cooperation is also developing in the fields of civil emergency planning, airtraffic management, armaments-related partnership activities, defense research
and technology, and science. We reiterate our view that a speedy ratification of
the Status of Forces Agreement by Ukraine will further the goals of our
cooperation.
34. We encourage Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic
reforms, and reaffirm NATO's support for Ukraine's efforts to this end. In this
context, we welcome Ukraine's commitment to exploit the full potential of the
NATO-Ukraine Charter and express our appreciation for Ukraine's concrete
contribution to peace and stability in the Balkans, in particular through its
participation in KFOR. We look forward to today's meeting of the NATOUkraine Commission in Foreign Ministers'session.
35. The Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance's cooperative
approach to security since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to
security and stability in the Mediterranean. We are pleased with the progress
achieved in strengthening the Mediterranean Dialogue as agreed at the
Washington Summit. The last round of political consultations with the six
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Mediterranean Dialogue countries held in October and November, offered an
opportunity for sharing views on the implementation and future development of
the Dialogue, including the Work Program for 2000. We recognize the interest of
our Mediterranean partners in developing the Dialogue, including through a
strengthened cooperation in areas where NATO can bring added value.
36. We acknowledge the role played by the recently-designated Contact Point
Embassies and we encourage the Mediterranean Cooperation Group to continue
its.efforts to progressively develop the Dialogue. Visits by NATO representatives
have improved the prospects for closer contacts and cooperation. We welcome
and encourage Allied nations and Mediterranean Dialogue countries to organize
events such as the Rome Conference in 1997 and the Valencia Conference in
1999, as positive steps to strengthen mutual regional understanding. We direct
the Council in Permanent Session to report at our next meeting on the political
and practical cooperation in the Dialogue agreed in Washington.
37. We welcome the adoption of the OSCE Istanbul Charter on European Security, in
particular the emphasis in the Charter on closer cooperation among international
organizations; We also welcome the adoption of the Platform for Cooperative
Security. The adoption of the Vienna Document 1999 on Confidence and
Security Building Measures constitutes an important step towards increased
transparency in military matters among OSCE participating states. We look
forward to further intensifying cooperation between NATO and OSCE, notably in
the areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, crisis management and postconflict rehabilitation.
38. We reaffirm that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to
play an important role in the achievement of NATO's security objectives.
39. The Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe, signed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul on 19 November, will ensure the
continuing viability of the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security and
stability. The Allies made comprehensive proposals which served as an important
basis for the negotiations, in particular for the introduction of a system of
nationally based equipment limits and improvements to the Treaty provisions
concerning stability, transparency and predictability. The Adapted Treaty will
enhance security throughout Europe, not least as it introduces a more constraining
structure of National and Territorial Ceilings, while permitting sufficient
deployment flexibility for routine training purposes and effective crisis
management, thereby ensuring NATO's ability to fulfill its responsibilities. We
are pleased that the Adapted Treaty will permit accession by new States Parties
and strengthen Treaty requirements concerning host nation consent to the
presence of foreign forces.
40. We welcome the important political commitments contained in the CFE Final
Act, in particular the bilateral agreements reached by Russia and Georgia, and
Russia and Moldova, on withdrawal of Russian Forces. But it is essential that the
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CFE Treaty remains effective and credible. NATO countries are concerned about
continued Russian non-compliance with the Treaty's Article V («flank») limits.
We note Russia's commitment to comply with all the Treaty's provisions and
limitations. We also note Russia's assurances that its exceeding of CFE limits
will be of a temporary nature. NATO Allies expect Russia to honor its pledge to
comply with CFE limits as soon as possible and, in the meantime, to provide
maximum transparency regarding its forces and weapons deployed in the North
Caucasus, in accordance with the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document. Entry
into Force of the Adapted Treaty can only be envisaged in the context of
compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty's limitations. It is on this basis
that we will work towards bringing the Adapted Treaty into force. Pending the
completion of this process, the continued implementation of the existing Treaty
and its associated documents remains crucial.
41. The Alliance attaches importance to preserving strategic stability. In this respect,
we call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay. This would pave
the way for considerable reductions of nuclear arsenals and would allow
negotiations on a START III Treaty aiming at further far-reaching reductions on
nuclear weapons stockpiles. We underscore the importance of achieving a
successful conclusion to the upcoming Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference in Spring 2000. In this context, we reiterate our full support of all
efforts towards universal adherence, full implementation and further
strengthening the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime
and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We reaffirm
our commitment to efforts aimed at reducing nuclear weapons.
We remain committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty and call upon all countries to accede to and implement the Treaty as soon
as possible. We call for the early start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
42. The prevention of the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery remains
our primary aim. We remain committed to preventing proliferation and reversing
it where it has occurred through diplomatic means. We recognize that
proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means
of delivery, which pose a potential threat to the Allies' populations, territory and
forces, can continue to occur despite our preventive efforts and can pose a direct
military threat to those populations, territories and forces.
We continue to attach the utmost importance to full implementation and rigorous
verification of international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. We note
with satisfaction that the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention is
proceeding well and welcome the progress made in the negotiations in Geneva on
a legally binding Protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by
ensuring effective verification measures to enhance compliance and promote
transparency. We urge that additional efforts be made to complete the remaining
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work as soon as possible before the Fifth Review Conference of the BWC in
2001.
43. We welcome the progress made by the Alliance in implementing the Initiative on
Weapons of Mass Destruction. NATO's new WMD Centre, which we expect to
be operational in early 2000, will provide an effective additional means to address
both the political and defense challenges of the proliferation of NBC weapons and
their means of delivery, and will promote more active and regular intra-Alliance
consultations and cooperation on this important issue. Significant progress has
been made in setting in place an enhanced WMD intelligence database and
information repository, which will aim at improving the quality and increasing the
quantity of intelligence and information sharing among Allies to support efforts
by NATO members to address proliferation issues. We support deepening
consultations with Russia in these areas within the Permanent Joint Council, as
well as with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission and with other Partners
in the EAPC, as well as with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries.
44. At the Washington Summit, our leaders committed the Alliance to consider
options for confidence and security building measures, verification, nonproliferation and arms control and disarmament, in the light of overall strategic
developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons. We have, decided to
set in train this process and have instructed the Council in Permanent Session to
task the Senior Political Committee, reinforced by political and defense experts as
appropriate, to review Alliance policy options in support of confidence and
security building measures, verification, non-proliferation, and arms control and
disarmament, so that a comprehensive and integrated approach to the
accomplishment of the remit agreed at the Washington Summit is ensured. The
responsible NATO bodies will contribute to this review. We have directed the
Council in Permanent Session to submit a report to Ministers for their
consideration in December 2000. We believe that this process will reinforce the
Allies' contribution in advancing confidence and security building measures,
verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament.
45. In order to enhance the effectiveness of Civil-Military Cooperation, confirmed in
the Strategic Concept as essential to the Alliance's operational capability, a
fundamental review of civil emergency planning in NATO is nearing completion.
We welcome the progress made. A close working relationship between the civil
and military communities will contribute to a more effective use of Allied and
Partner civilian resources in Alliance activities such as peace support operations.
We look forward to the completion of this review at an early date. We will
continue and consolidate the excellent cooperation with Partners in this field,
including through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre,
which played an important role in contributing to the relief of the humanitarian
crisis in and around Kosovo, and in supporting Allied national authorities
following recent natural disasters.
46. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability that can
threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our condemnation of
terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our
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international commitments and national legislation. The terrorist threat against
deployed NATO forces and NATO installations requires the consideration and
development of appropriate measures for their continued protection taking full
account of host nation responsibilities.

47. At the Washington Summit our leaders took the steps to ensure that our Alliance
will remain the bedrock of our collective defense, and continue to play a key role
in the development of a secure and stable peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. Today,
as we enter the 21st century, we can state with confidence that NATO is ready to
face the challenges of the future.
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APPENDIX E

Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2000) 124 held at NATO HQ Brussels 15 Dec 2000

Final Communique
Issued at the Ministerial Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council

1. At our meeting, we took stock of the progress made in NATO's ongoing efforts to
bring lasting peace and stability to South-East Europe, and gave guidance for
further implementation of the Washington Summit decisions.
2. We reaffirm NATO's strong commitment to the achievement of security, stability,
peace, democracy and respect for human rights in South-East Europe and will
continue to pursue this objective vigorously, primarily through the NATO-led
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. We
welcome the progress achieved in our relations with Croatia and the significant
changes which have taken place in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
These encouraging changes offer new prospects of lasting stability in the region
and further progress towards regional integration. They also bring closer the day
when all countries in the region take their place in the Euro-Atlantic structures.
3. We pay tribute to the men and women of all nations serving in SFOR and KFOR
for their professionalism and dedication to the cause of peace and stability. We
express our deep sympathy to the families of those who have lost their lives or
been injured in the course of their mission. We are grateful to NATO's Partners
and other nations for the substantial contributions they are making to this effort.
We reiterate our appreciation for the ongoing efforts of Albania and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in supporting KFOR.
4. We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all
countries in the region. We emphasize our determination to promote long-term
stability based on regional reconciliation, good neighborliness, confidencebuilding measures, regional cooperation, a lasting resolution to the problem of
refugees and displaced persons, and cooperation with the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
5. We welcome the results of the Summit meeting between the European Union and
the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process held in Zagreb on 24
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6.

7.

8.

9.

November 2000. This meeting was an important step on the way towards
reconciliation, increased regional cooperation and long-term stabilization. We
also welcome in this regard the informal Summit of the South-East Europe
Cooperation Process organized in Skopje on 25 October with the participation of
all South-East Europe countries, which was also the first meeting attended at
summit level by the new FRY democratic authorities.
We welcome the democratic changes that have taken place in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia after September's parliamentary and presidential
elections. We warmly welcome the admission of the FRY to the United Nations,
the OSCE and other international fora. We also welcome the FRY's admission to
the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, as well as the normalization of its
diplomatic relationships with Allies. We support the democratic aspirations of the
people of the FRY and the efforts of President Kostunica to lead his country
towards the development of democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law
and full international participation. We look forward to the forthcoming
parliamentary elections in Serbia and hope that they will consolidate the
democratic process.
The democratic changes in the FRY will pave the way for increased stability
across the region and offer new opportunities for regional cooperation. We
welcome the FRY's willingness to improve its relations with its neighbors, and to
co-operate towards the full implementation of the General Framework Agreement
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1244. We note the FRY's more cooperative stance towards the ICTY
and look forward to further steps in this direction. We welcome the lessening of
tension between Serbia and Montenegro and the ongoing discussions on their
future constitutional relationship within the FRY.
Recent acts of violence by insurgent elements in the Presevo Valley and the
Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) adjacent to the internal boundary between Kosovo
and Serbia, are of concern to NATO and KFOR. We commend the efforts of
KFOR to prohibit support from Kosovo for these elements. We condemn the
violence caused by extremists and call on the perpetrators to cease their illegal
activity forthwith. Any extremist activity and the possibility of an escalation of
violence present a continuing threat to stability in the region, especially for
neighboring countries. We note the commitment by the present FRY authorities
to abide by the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA), and to use the Joint
Implementation Commission to address this sensitive area, and recognize their
current policy of restraint. We express our strong support for the steps taken by
COMKFOR to increase control and enhance security, and welcome the recent
positive correspondence between President Kostunica and the Secretary General.
We reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of UNSCR 1244. We are
determined to continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural
and democratic Kosovo where all its people, irrespective of ethnic origin or
religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and
freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in democratic
institutions. We express our strong support for the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Special Representative of
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the Secretary General (SRSG), and commend the excellent cooperation between
KFOR and UNMIK in implementing UNSCR 1244. We thank Dr. Bernard
Rouchner for his efforts as SRSG, and welcome the appointment of Mr. Hans
Haekkerup, the Minister of Defense of Denmark, to take up the position in
January.
10. The municipal elections in late October were a milestone for democratic
development in Kosovo. We applaud the conduct of these elections and the close
cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK in supporting the OSCE's leading role
in the process. These elections provide an important foundation for the further
development of provisional, democratic self-governing institutions, in accordance
with UNSCR 1244.
11. We fully support the efforts of the SRSG to establish local democratic, selfgoverning institutions in Kosovo. We call upon the new representatives on the
Kosovo municipal councils to carry out their duties responsibly, in close
cooperation with the international community. We encourage all the people of
Kosovo to participate fully in this process.
12. The protection and security of all the people of Kosovo remain a priority. KFOR
will continue to play a key role in ensuring public security in Kosovo and to carry
out its duties in a robust and even-handed manner. In this connection, we strongly
commend KFOR's continued efforts regarding the seizure and destruction of
illegal arms. We note that substantial progress has been made in reducing
violence in Kosovo. Violence from any quarter, whether ethnically, politically or
criminally motivated, is unacceptable. In particular, we condemn the recent
bombing of the FRY liaison office in Pristina and the politically motivated
assassination of Mr. Xhemajl Mustafa, Mr. Ibrahim Rugova's adviser. We
remain concerned about the high level of organized crime which is a continuing
threat to the people of Kosovo and neighboring countries. We call upon all
Kosovo inhabitants to support the significant efforts being made by KFOR and
UNMIK to strengthen the rule of law. We welcome the increase in numbers of
UNMIK police, who are now deployed throughout the province, and stress the
importance of maintaining a high level of support to UNMIK in this area. We
also commend the efforts of the OSCE in training and establishing the Kosovo
Police Service (KPS). We support the efforts of the international community to
establish a functioning judicial system in Kosovo, but acknowledge that much
work remains to be done in this respect.
13. The release of all Kosovar Albanians detained in Serbia without proper grounds is
a matter of urgency, as is accurate accounting for all missing persons, including in
Kosovo. We are pleased to note that UNMIK and the FRY have initiated
constructive talks to help resolve these issues. In this respect, we welcome
especially the release of human rights campaigner Flora Brovina as a step in the
right direction. We also underscore the right of all displaced persons and
refugees, including Kosovo Serb and other ethnic minorities, to return to their
homes, under secure and safe conditions. We call upon all communities in
Kosovo to work towards this goal in cooperation with KFOR and UNMIK.
14. We note the progress that has been made in establishing the Kosovo Protection
Corps (KPC), and the reduced number of non-compliance cases. We are aware
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that improvements are still needed, especially with regard to full compliance, and
will support efforts to ensure that the KPC has the means and proper tasking to
fulfill its designated civilian role. KFOR will continue to exercise close
supervision over the KPC.
15. We welcome the decision of our Defense Ministers to maintain KFOR's overall
force levels at present and that the Council in Permanent Session should conduct a
further review of KFOR's role and missions.
16. We remain firmly committed to the full implementation of the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We fully support
the objectives of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) as set out in its
Ministerial Meeting held in Brussels in May 2000, and its determination to
integrate Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single, multi-ethnic, democratic state into
Euro-Atlantic structures. Following the recent elections, we hope to see the
incoming executive and legislative authorities, at state as well as entity level, in
place and functioning effectively as soon as possible. We will continue to work
closely, in particular through SFOR, with the High Representative and with other
organizations, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the
International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
17. Five years after the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreement and despite the
sustained efforts and resources of the international community, it is clear to us
that greater and more rapid progress needs to be made in Bosnia and Herzegovina
towards a self-sustaining, multi-ethnic democracy. The responsibility for
achieving this lies with the leaders of communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
who have too often been unwilling to look beyond their ethnic allegiances.
18. We welcome the successful conduct of the general elections in November under
the supervision of the OSCE. We are encouraged by the increased support for
moderate parties, while the continuing appeal of hard-line nationalist parties
remains a cause for concern. We call on the newly elected leaders of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to commit themselves to the full implementation of the Dayton
Peace Accords, taking on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process.
In particular, we encourage them to redouble their efforts to improve the
functioning of state level institutions.
19. We welcome the progress made so far in increased levels of refugee returns, civil
reconstruction, reductions in Entity military manpower and defense expenditures,
the inauguration of the State Border Service and the continued compliance with
the establishment of the Brcko district and its demilitarization. Nonetheless,
important challenges remain. In particular, further progress must be achieved in
market reform, economic re-construction and the creation of a self-sustaining
economy and a single economic space; the adjudication of property claims
enabling the return of refugees and displaced persons especially to areas in which
their ethnic groups are in the minority; improving the effectiveness of all state
level institutions and cooperation between Entities; transferring to the ICTY
persons indicted for war crimes; the fight against corruption, organized crime and
illegal secret services; judicial and police reform; and the full functioning of the
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State Border Service. We support the High Representative in his use of the
authority accorded to him to advance this agenda. . •
20. We urge the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the objectives of
Annex I B of the Dayton Peace Agreement concerning confidence-building and
security measures. We encourage the Presidency to give priority, through the
Standing Committee on Military Matters (S'CMM), to the relevant military issues
addressed by the Peace Implementation Council in May 2000, Bosnia and
Herzegovina needs armed forces with a unified command and control capable of
joint deployment and joint action under international and regional security
organizations. We welcome the additional 15% reduction in Entity military
manpower and defense expenditures which will be accomplished by the end of
this year and call for rapid progress in further reducing and restructuring the
Entities' armed forces, pursuant to development and implementation of a common
defense policy. We support SFOR's efforts in this regard and its efforts to
strengthen the SCMM. We reaffirm our commitment to further contribute to
enhancing stability and confidence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to strengthen
cooperation between the Entities' armed forces. We call upon the countries
neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina to support the full implementation of the
Dayton Peace Agreement, in particular those countries which are signatories of
this Agreement.
21. We endorse SFOR's continuing close working relationship with the civilian
agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We reaffirm that SFOR will continue to
support the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, while
stressing that the Entities continue to carry primary responsibility for bringing to
justice persons indicted for war crimes.
22. We welcome the conclusions of our Defense Ministers who reviewed SFOR's
force levels and structure and concluded that they should be maintained for the
present. They directed our Permanent Representatives to provide advice on a
medium-term strategy, including a full range of options for the future size and
structure of SFOR, for consideration at their next meeting. We note, inter alia, the
need to fully resource the Multinational Specialized Units to agreed levels.
23. We received the Consolidated Progress Report on the Implementation of the
Alliance's South-East Europe Initiative (SEEI). We noted with satisfaction the
achievements to date of the SEEI, launched at the Washington Summit, which
supports and encourages regional cooperation and helps individual countries in
their efforts to draw closer to Euro-Atlantic institutions. NATO's efforts are
aimed at enabling the countries of the region to work together to ensure their own
security and thus support and complement the objectives of the Stability Pact for
South-East Europe. We welcome the progress achieved by the countries of the
region in implementing the specific activities in the framework of NATO's SEEI,
including the South East Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group
(SEEGROUP) and the Regional Common Assessment Paper on Regional
Security Challenges (SEECAP). Through such initiatives, the SEEI has also been
making a significant contribution to the Stability Pact, particularly to its Working
Table on security issues.
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24. We applaud the cooperation between the Alliance, the World Bank, Bulgaria,
Croatia and Romania, facilitated through the Stability Pact, to retrain and
reintegrate former military officers into the civilian economy. The Alliance is
ready to assist in drawing up a similar program for Albania. We look forward to
contributing to the Stability Pact effort to develop a South-East Europe regional
civil-military emergency response capability through its Disaster Prevention and
Preparedness Initiative.
25. We look forward to a further progress report from the Council in Permanent
Session on implementation of the SEEI and its contribution to the Stability Pact at
our next regular meeting in Spring 2001.
26. We reviewed progress achieved to date in implementing the Defense Capabilities
Initiative (DO), and endorse the statement by our Defense Ministers on this
subject. DCI will provide the forces and capabilities the Alliance urgently
requires to meet the security challenges of the 21st century by ensuring the
effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of
Alliance missions. DCI's purpose is to facilitate the Alliance's movement
towards forces that are more interoperable, more mobile, readily deployable and
highly capable. Furthering the objectives of DCI continues to require sustained
commitment - both at NATO and in capitals. We believe that we have reached an
important stage in implementing the DCI. We remain committed to providing
sufficient resources to ensure its implementation. We are also committed to
making the most effective use of resources and to finding innovative approaches
to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of national contributions
and possible cooperative and collective arrangements and mechanisms, including
multinational, joint and common funding.
Ultimately, however, the
implementation of DCI will depend on the adequacy of national defense budgets.
We endorse the decision of our Defense Ministers to extend until 2002 the
mandate of the High Level Steering Group, which is charged with overseeing the
implementation of the DCI, in order to maintain the necessary high level
engagement by nations in the initiative.
27. The DCI will also promote greater interoperability among Alliance forces and,
where applicable, between Allied and Partner forces. The efforts of the Alliance
and Allied nations to implement DCI and the efforts of the EU to enhance
European capabilities are mutually reinforcing. Therefore, implementation of
DCI will also strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and improve the
capability of European Allies to undertake EU-led operations where the Alliance
as a whole is not engaged. Because Partners have an important part to play in
future NATO-led operations, we welcome their current engagement in elements
of the DCI.
28. We took stock of the progress made to date on the development of the European
Security and Defense Identity in accordance with the decisions taken at the
Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings. We reaffirmed our
determination to reinforce NATO's European pillar and remain committed to a
balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership. We share the goal endorsed by
EU Member States at the Nice European Council for a genuine strategic
partnership in Crisis management between NATO and the EU. The Alliance will
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remain the foundation for the collective defense of its members and continue
actively to play its important role in crisis management as set out in the Strategic
Concept. The partnership between NATO and the EU and the development of a
capable and effective ESDI, in accordance with the principles set out at the
Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings, will strengthen the
Alliance through which we remain ready to pursue common security objectives
wherever possible.
29. We welcome the intensification of the dialogue between the Alliance and the
European Union since our last meeting in Florence. In this context, we look
forward to the working dinner between Foreign Ministers of NATO and the
European Union later today, which is an important step towards establishing a
close, confident and mutually beneficial relationship between the two
organizations. We have made progress in the NATO-EU ad hoc working groups
which have met to discuss security issues, permanent arrangements for
consultation and cooperation, modalities for EU access to NATO assets and
capabilities, and capability goals - taking into account all relevant matters,
including those related to participation. Together with the two meetings of the
North Atlantic Council and the EU interim Political and Security Committee in
September and November, they have enhanced the understanding of the two
organizations and their members on how they might most effectively cooperate in
the future. We look forward to their future work as well as to future meetings of
the North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security Committee with a view
to developing all the elements of the envisaged NATO-EU relations. We also
welcome the establishment of an interim security agreement between the two
organizations and note NATO's readiness to conclude a permanent security
agreement with the European Union as a matter of priority.
30. The European Allies are committed to further strengthening their military
capabilities and to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar. This will enhance
their ability to contribute both to the Alliance's missions and to EU-led operations
for Petersburg tasks where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. We note that
this process does not imply the creation of a European army and that the
commitment of national resources for EU-led operations will be based on
sovereign decisions. We welcome the efforts made in the EU towards meeting its
Headline Goal by 2003 as set out at the Helsinki European Council, thus
contributing to the improvement and strengthening of European military
capabilities. Alliance experts, on the basis of a Council decision, have
contributed military and technical advice to the work of EU experts on a
catalogue of forces and capabilities for the EU Headline Goal. We note the EU's
acknowledgement of the value of this input. NATO stands ready to provide,
subject to the necessary decisions, further expert advice upon request by the EU.
We welcome the pledges made at the recent EU Capabilities Commitment
Conference, noting the EU's appreciation of the significant additional
contributions offered by non-EU European Allies to the pool of forces available
for EU-led operations. Such contributions, as expressed on 21 November 2000 at
the meeting between the EU and the non-EU European Allies, are important and
will enhance the range of capabilities potentially available to the EU. We note the
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EU's recognition of the need for further capability improvements. The Alliance's
Defense Capabilities Initiative is also supporting the enhancement of European
capabilities. The objectives arising from NATO's DCI and the EU's Headline
Goal are mutually reinforcing.
31. We note and welcome the proposals made by the European Council at Nice for
permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency, consultation and cooperation
between NATO and the EU. We agree that consultations and cooperation will be
developed between the two organizations on questions of common interest
relating to security, defense and crisis management, so that crises can be met with
the most appropriate military response and effective crisis management ensured.
We look forward to the early establishment of such mutually satisfactory
arrangements based on the principles enunciated in Washington and at subsequent
Ministerial meetings, which will be taken into account in the framework
agreement establishing these arrangements. These arrangements are key to a
close, confident and transparent relationship between the two organizations as
foreseen at the Washington Summit.
We welcome the intention of the European Union that this dialogue should be
pursued through a regular pattern of meetings at Ministerial, North Atlantic
Council/Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and expert level as
well as through contacts with Secretariats to ensure consultation, cooperation and
transparency. We endorse the view of the EU that in the emergency phase of a
crisis contacts and meetings will be stepped up. In the view of the Alliance,
meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security
Committee outside times of crisis should be held not less than three times, and
Ministerial meetings once, per EU Presidency; either organization may request
additional meetings as necessary.
We welcome the Nice provisions on invitations for the NATO Secretary General,
Chairman of the Military Committee and DSACEUR, in accordance with his
terms of reference, to EU meetings. For our part, on the basis of reciprocity, we
will invite the EU Presidency and Secretary General/High Representative to
NATO meetings. The Chairman of the EU Military Committee or his
representative will similarly be invited to meetings of the NATO Military
Committee.
The Alliance agrees that these proposals constitute the basis for the permanent
NATO/EU agreement. We stand ready to work to finalize this agreement without
delay.
32. We underline, as we did at the Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial
meetings, the importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies to the issue
of participation. We note the provisions agreed by the European Council at Nice
for dialogue, consultation and cooperation with non-EU European Allies on issues
related to security and defense policy and crisis management and as well as the
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modalities for participation in EU-led military operations. We welcome the
commitment to intensify consultation in times of crisis, which will also enable
non-EU European Allies to raise their concerns when they consider their security
interests might be involved. It is particularly important in this context that nonEU European Allies can request meetings with the European Union and submit
proposals for agenda items.
Allies look forward to the broad and effective practical implementation of these
arrangements, in particular for consultation and cooperation with the EU Political
and Security Committee and EU Military Committee and, as appropriate, with the
EU military staff, so as to ensure that the Allies concerned derive maximum
benefit from them and to enable the Allies concerned to contribute effectively. In
this context, in accordance with the Washington Treaty, we stress the importance
we attach to respecting the security interests of all Allies and the obligations
which they have to each other as Allies.
We also welcome the EU's decision at Nice on initial proposals to develop
dialogue, cooperation and consultation with Canada, including a commitment to
intensify consultation in times of crisis, particularly when the EU is considering
an operation using NATO assets and capabilities.
33. Taking into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU, work on
ESDI is continuing within the Alliance as directed at the Washington Summit and
agreed at subsequent Ministerial meetings. It has proceeded on the principle that
nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed - the participation issue is also
relevant in this context. On this basis, and consistent with the decisions taken at
Washington and subsequent Ministerial meetings, work has progressed on the
various aspects of the Washington agenda. Subject to this, we intend to put in
place arrangements for: assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to
contribute to military planning for EU-led operations; the presumption of
availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for
use in EU-led operations; the identification of a range of European command
options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order
for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities; and the
further adaptation of the Alliance's defense planning system, taking account of
relevant activities in and proposals from the European Union. Allies will be
consulted on the EU's proposed use of assets and capabilities, prior to the
decision to release these assets and capabilities, and kept informed during the
operation.
34. Important work remains to be done which we will pursue intensively. We direct
the Council in Permanent Session to continue work on the implementation of the
ESDI decisions on the basis of the agenda above, and to report to us at our next
meeting.
35. We note the decisions taken at the Ministerial meeting of the WEU held in
Marseille in November, particular that WEU/NATO routine consultations
mechanisms will be suspended, except for those that still need to be applied
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during the transition period, in particular for the joint exercise study next year,
JES 2001, to which we look forward. We appreciate the WEU's important
contribution to the development of the European security and defense
architecture. We have valued the close cooperation between NATO and the WEU
and pay tribute to the work of the WEU and NATO staffs in support of it.
36. Recalling the decisions taken at the Washington Summit, we reaffirm the
Alliance's commitment to remain open to new members. The Alliance expects to
extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume
the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that
the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic
interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European
security and stability. No European democratic country whose admission would
fulfill the objectives of the Washington Treaty will be excluded from
consideration regardless of its geographic location, each being considered on its
own merits.
37. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) process underlines NATO's commitment to
its Open Door policy by assisting the nine aspiring countries in their own efforts
to prepare for possible future membership. We welcome the streamlining of this
process, which we have undertaken in consultation with aspirants, to improve its
efficiency and effectiveness. In the second annual cycle of the MAP we continue
to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring countries on their
preparations for possible future membership. We noted a report on the
implementation of the second annual cycle to date. We welcome the aspirants'
continuing strong commitment to reform, including to defense reform and the
modernization of their armed forces as expressed by their Defense Ministers, and
encourage them to build on the progress achieved so far. The aspirants should
continue to pursue vigorously the challenging goals they have set themselves,
ensuring that clear priorities are established and sufficient resources allocated to
them.
38. We look forward to receiving a Consolidated Progress Report on the results of the
second annual cycle of the MAP at our next meeting, as part of our ongoing
review of the enlargement process, including the implementation of the
Membership Action Plan. Heads of State and Government will review this
process at the next Summit to be held no later than 2002.
39. We continue to place high priority on the strengthening of our partnership with all
members of the Euro-Atlantic community through the EAPC and the Partnership
for Peace. We believe that Partnership is pivotal to the role of the Alliance in
promoting security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and contributes to the
enhancement of the Alliance's capabilities in crisis management. We welcome
the activities within the EAPC/PfP framework to enhance transparency,
confidence and cooperation among all members of the Euro-Atlantic Community
and we remain firmly committed to the continued development of the EAPC as a
key forum for political consultation and practical cooperation on Euro-Atlantic
security issues.
40. We note with satisfaction the many EAPC/PfP activities to promote practical
regional cooperation in South-East Europe, as well as in the Caucasus and Central
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Asia. We value the role of the Regional Ad Hoc Working Groups on South-East
Europe and the Caucasus in promoting and supporting regional cooperation. We
welcome continued efforts in the EAPC/PfP framework to support broader efforts
underway to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and in
support of global humanitarian mine action and the promotion of International
Humanitarian Law, among other EAPC priority areas. In particular, we welcome
the recent establishment of a PfP Trust Fund on Anti-Personnel Landmine
Stockpile Destruction and look forward to periodic reports on its activities. We
support steps to strengthen the EAPC/PfP cooperation in promoting conflict
prevention and crisis management, which will complement the work of other
relevant institutions. We also support initiatives for further developing
cooperation on information and outreach opportunities and welcome Partners'
continuing interest in cooperation in civil emergency preparedness.
41. We noted reports on the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership, and the
implementation of the Operational Capabilities Concept. We value highly the
continuing progress in making the Partnership for Peace more operational and
look forward to reviewing progress on these initiatives at our next meeting. We
look forward to exploring with our Partners how we can help support their efforts
to reorganize and restructure their defense establishments and armed forces, and
will continue to make full use of the existing clearing house mechanisms to help
Partners ensure optimum use of scarce resources in these reform efforts. We
remain strongly committed to the full implementation of the Political-Military
Framework for NATO-led PfP operations. Within this Framework, we attach
great importance to enhancing Partners' roles in the political guidance and
oversight, planning, and command arrangements for NATO-led crisis response
operations. We look forward to receiving at our next meeting a report by the
Council in Permanent Session on progress achieved in implementing the PoliticalMilitary Framework.
42. We remain committed to building a strong, stable and enduring partnership with
the Russian Federation in accordance with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, on
the basis of the principles of transparency and reciprocity. We welcome the
progress made in resuming consultations and cooperation on a broad range of
issues in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC).
43. We attach great importance to the continued dialogue and cooperation in the
framework of the PJC on issues relating to the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo,
building on the valuable experience of practical cooperation with Russian forces
in both SFOR and KFOR.
44. We value our ongoing consultations and cooperation with Russia in the
framework of the PJC on such issues as strategy, defense policy and military
doctrines, infrastructure development program, nuclear weapons, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, theatre
missile defense, air defense, and other disarmament and arms control issues,
including CFE and Open Skies, scientific and environmental issues, civil
emergency preparedness, and the retraining of discharged military personnel. In
particular, we look forward to implementing the program of cooperation between
NATO and Russia on search and rescue at sea agreed by PJC Defense Ministers
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on 5 December 2000 and to the early signature of a Memorandum of
Understanding with Russia on environmental protection. We welcome the
progressive resumption of Russian participation in the EAPC and would welcome
active Russian participation in PfP.
45. We welcome the exchange of letters on the establishment of a NATO Information
Office in Moscow and" look forward to developing NATO's information activities
in Russia. We attach great importance to the further development of military-tomilitary cooperation and are pursuing our negotiations with Russia with a view to
opening a NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow in the near future, as called
for in the Founding Act.
46. In connection with the situation in North Caucasus, we reaffirm that a mutually
satisfactory, just and durable solution to the conflict in Chechnya is urgent and
essential and that the parties must take steps to begin a dialogue that can lead to a
settlement. While acknowledging the right of Russia to preserve its territorial
integrity and its right and responsibility to protect all its citizens against
criminality and terrorism which we condemn in all its forms, we urge Russia to
respect its international obligations as a member of the UN, the OSCE, the
Council of Europe, as well as the relevant principles enshrined in the Founding
Act. We call on the Chechen side to co-operate in good faith in seeking a solution
to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take action against it.
47. We urge the Russian government to expedite the OSCE Assistance Group's return
to Chechnya under its existing mandate. We deplore the continued loss of life
and material damage inflicted upon the civilian population; this calls for prompt
and independent investigation of violations of human rights and breaches of
international law. We recall the importance we attach to the efforts of
humanitarian assistance organizations to relieve the suffering of the displaced and
call on Russia to support them fully.
48. We value our relationship with an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine
and Ukraine's contribution to ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe and
the continent as a whole. We are satisfied with the successful implementation of
cooperative and consultative activities under the NATO-Ukraine Work Plan,
which has contributed to a steady deepening of the distinctive partnership. We
are determined to build on these achievements in 2001 and to ensure further
implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Charter.
49. We are pleased with Ukraine's enhanced participation in PfP, both in its military
and non-military aspects. We will continue to support the implementation of
Ukraine's defense reform and welcome the enhanced role and new initiatives of
the Joint Working Group on Defense Reform. We encourage Ukraine to pursue
these efforts, and in that regard we welcome the approval of Ukraine's state
program for the reform of the armed forces, and the recent Presidential Decree on
its implementation. We reiterate pur appreciation for Ukraine's continuing
contribution to KFOR, which is an expression of Ukraine's commitment to our
joint effort to build peace and stability in the region. Our cooperation in KFOR
also contributes to improving interoperability between Ukraine's forces and those
of the Allies. We welcome the ratification by the Verkhovna Rada of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
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50. We continue to attach particular importance to the NATO Liaison Office, which
plays a key role in enhancing Ukraine's participation in PfP. We also value the
important role of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, as a
means to increase public awareness of our distinctive partnership and to
consolidate it.
51. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is an essential part of the Alliance's cooperative
approach to security, since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to
security and stability in the Mediterranean. We are pleased with the progress
achieved so far with respect to the implementation of decisions on enhancing the
Mediterranean Dialogue taken at the Washington Summit, and look forward to
cooperation in the field of search and rescue, maritime safety, medical evacuation
and humanitarian relief. We reaffirm the progressive nature of the Dialogue, and
will continue to consider ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions
of our cooperative relations with all the Mediterranean partners in accordance
with the Washington Summit decisions, in areas where NATO can bring an added
value and where partners have expressed interest. We direct the Council in
Permanent Session to report at our next meeting on the political and practical
cooperation in the Dialogue. We hope that the Mediterranean Dialogue
conference originally planned to take place in November will be rescheduled as
soon as possible.
52. Although the Alliance is not involved in the Middle East Peace Process, we
strongly support it and urge all participants to remain firmly committed to it.
53. We applaud the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. We
welcome the significant role played by the OSCE in the Euro-Atlantic area,
notably in South-East Europe. We encourage the speedy implementation of the
commitments undertaken and the initiatives launched at the Istanbul Summit for
strengthening the OSCE's operational capability, thus improving its crisis
management capacity. We recall NATO's support for the Platform for
Cooperative Security, in which the OSCE declared its intention to work with
other institutions.
We welcome the substantial progress made in the
implementation of the Platform, particularly the enhanced contacts and
cooperation between NATO and the OSCE on matters of common interest.
54. We welcome the work of the OSCE in assisting in the implementation of the
Dayton/Paris Peace Accords and its contribution to the creation of a framework
for peace and stability in South Eastern Europe. We call upon the States
participating in the negotiations on regional stability under the Accords to make
use of the fresh impetus generated by the participation of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in the OSCE, with the aim of concluding their work by the agreed
deadline. NATO stands ready to support the implementation of such an
agreement within the framework of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe.
55. Recalling the Alliance's longstanding commitment to the goals of arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation, we welcome the comprehensive report on
options for confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), verification,
non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament called for by our Heads of
State and Government in Washington. We task the Council in Permanent Session
to pursue vigorously implementation of the recommendations contained in this
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report* including with Russia through the PJC. A public report has been released
as a NATO document.
56. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the signing of the CFE Treaty we
recognize the vital contribution the Treaty makes to the stability and security of
Europe. The overall implementation of the Treaty since its entry into force in
1992 has brought positive results including significantly reduced holdings of
Treaty-limited equipment, enhanced transparency and predictability. However,
there continue to be both substantive and technical concerns with specific aspects
of CFE implementation, which must be addressed. As we approach the next CFE
V review conference in 2001, we will seek intensified efforts to resolve these issues.
Pending the completion of the process of ratifying the Adapted Treaty, the full
and continued implementation of the Treaty and its associated documents remains
crucial.
57. Early entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty, which was signed last year by
Heads of State and Government at the Istanbul OSCE Summit, will ensure CFE's
continuing viability as a cornerstone of European security and stability. We are
committed to that end and are pleased that the Adapted Treaty will permit
accession by new States Parties. However, as we have made clear ever since
Istanbul, we believe ratification by our governments can only be envisaged in the
context of compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty's agreed levels of
armaments and equipment and consistent with the commitments contained in the
CFE Final Act. In this regard we welcome President Putin's recent reaffirmation
of Russia's intention to fulfill all CFE Treaty obligations and commitments. We
expect concrete results consistent with that assurance. We remain particularly
concerned about the continued high levels of Russian Treaty-limited equipment in
relation to the Treaty's Article V ("Flank") limits. We continue to attach special
importance to early and complete fulfillment of Russia's assurances of 1
November 1999, that its current equipment levels in the North Caucasus are of a
temporary nature and will be reduced to CFE limits as soon as possible, in
conditions of maximum transparency and in a manner consistent with agreed
counting rules and procedures.
58. We look for no less timely and effective fulfillment of the CFE Final Act
commitments requiring the reduction and withdrawal of Russian military forces
from Georgia and Moldova in accordance with the timelines agreed at Istanbul.
We welcome progress thus far in Georgia, but note the importance of full Russian
withdrawal of excess Treaty-limited equipment by the end of this year, and of
actual closure of designated Russian military bases by the middle of next year.
However, there has been little tangible progress in implementation of the
unconditional commitment to complete withdrawal of Russian forces from the
territory of Moldova. To-, meet the deadlines set at Istanbul, the pace of
withdrawal should be accelerated. We applaud and support the efforts of
individual Allies and OSCE Partners to facilitate these activities through financial ~
and other assistance.
59. We continue to attach great importance to the ratification of the Open Skies
Treaty and call on Russia and Belarus to ratify the Treaty to allow it to enter into
force as soon as possible. Joint trial observation flights conducted by Signatories,
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including Russia, have demonstrated the potential of the Open Skies Treaty for
enhancing security and confidence.
60. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their
means of delivery continues to be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance as it
poses risks to international and regional security and can pose a direct military
threat to Allies' populations, territory and forces. The principal non-proliferation
goal of the Alliance and its members is unchanged: to prevent proliferation from
occurring, or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. In this
context we continue to place great importance on non-proliferation regimes,
international arms control and disarmament, and export control regimes as means
to prevent proliferation.
• •' .
61. Our response to the NBC threat should be consistent with the indivisibility of
Allied security. We reaffirm that the Alliance's defense posture must have the
capability to address appropriately and effectively the risks associated with the
proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery. We note continued
work in NATO inter alia on Theatre Missile Defense for point and area defense,
in particular on the feasibility study on a possible system for the defense of
deployed NATO forces. We will continue consultations in the Alliance on TMD
issues.
62. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear
disarmament. Alliance nations have dramatically reduced nuclear weapons and
delivery systems, and reaffirm their commitment to work for the further reduction
of nuclear weapons globally. We confirm our full support and commitment to the
implementation of the conclusions of the NPT Review Conference which agreed
on the importance of universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT, and
reaffirmed the commitment of all States Parties to disarmament, safeguards and
peaceful nuclear cooperation.
63. Last May we welcomed Russian ratification of the START II Treaty. We
continue to attach greatest importance to an early entry into force of that Treaty
and of an early conclusion of a START III agreement, while preserving and
strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and a basis
for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons. Given the need to reduce
the uncertainties surrounding substrategic nuclear weapons in Russia, we believe
that a reaffirmation - and perhaps codification - of the 1991/92 Presidential
Initiatives might be a first, but not exhaustive, step in this direction. We remain
committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) and, in the meanwhile, urge all states to refrain from any acts
which would defeat its object and purpose. Similarly, we remain committed to
the immediate commencement, in the Conference on Disarmament, of
negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in accordance with the Mandate
of the Special Coordinator.
64. We continue to emphasize the importance of universal accession and adherence
to, as well as full compliance with, the Chemical Weapons Convention. We
continue to regard as a matter of priority the conclusion of negotiations on
appropriate measures, including possible verification measures and proposals to
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strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWG), to be
included as appropriate in a legally binding instrument. We reiterate our
commitment to efforts to achieve such an instrument as soon as possible before
the 5th Review Conference of the BTWC in 2001. We remain strongly
committed to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as an important
element in our efforts to counter the proliferation of means for delivering weapons
of mass destruction. During the past year, the MTCR partners have focused
increasingly on new ideas for addressing the ongoing global missile threat and
responses to face the challenge posed by indigenous missile program and exports.
We will encourage countries that are not part of the MTCR to subscribe to and
adopt its principles, commitments, confidence-building measures and incentives.
We support ongoing efforts to achieve a code of conduct against ballistic missile
proliferation on the basis of these ideas.
'
65. We have continued consultations on the United States consideration of a limited
National Missile Defense system. We took note of President Clinton's decision
not to take steps now to begin deployment of such a system. As the President
noted, the view of NATO Allies was a critical consideration in that decision.
NATO will continue its consultations on this issue.
66. We are pleased that the implementation of the WMD Initiative is proceeding well
and that the newly established WMD Centre is already contributing to improve
co-ordination of all WMD-related activities at NATO Headquarters, including the
strengthening of our commitments to arms control and non-proliferation.
67. The Alliance is currently engaged in very productive consultations with Russia
under the Permanent Joint Council on proliferation-related matters, and we are
continuing to prepare for discussions with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine
Commission, with Partners under the EAPC/PfP framework and with
Mediterranean Dialogue countries.
68. We deplore the recent terrorist attacks against nationals of several NATO
countries and deeply regret the tragic loss of life. Terrorism constitutes a threat to
internal and international security, to peaceful relations between States and to
their territorial integrity, to the development and functioning of democratic
institutions throughout the world and to the enjoyment of human rights and civil
liberties. We strongly condemn this scourge in all its manifestations, and reiterate
our strong determination to combat it in full compliance with all our international
commitments and national legislation.
69. The Alliance has completed the review of the role of civil emergency planning in
NATO and agreed the political direction for the future. It is currently translating
that direction into structures and procedures. The direction identified five roles
for Civil emergency planning, taking into account the results of the Washington
Summit, particularly the Alliance's new Strategic Concept, experience in Bosnia
and Kosovo and the advice of the NATO Military Authorities. These are: civil
support for Alliance military operations under Article 5; civil support for nonArticle 5 crisis response operations; support to national authorities in civil
emergencies, including disaster response; support for national authorities in the
protection of populations against the effects of weapons of mass destruction; and
cooperation with Partners. We recognize the important part played by the Euro221

Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre as a means of coordinating
EAPC countries' humanitarian assistance in times of disaster, bearing in mind the
leading role of the United Nations. Especially with a view to ensuring the
effective conduct of non-Article 5 crisis response operations, NATO civil
emergency planning will need increasingly to be coordinated with the work of the
United Nations, which has the primary responsibility for humanitarian relief, and
with other international organizations. Partners will be actively involved in this
work and will have a valuable contribution to make to its success.
70. We endorse the welcome of our Defense Ministers for the continuing work and
progress made to improve the resource management of the Alliance's military
common funded budgets.
71. A separate review with the objective of securing greater transparency and
efficiency is also required for the NATO Civil Budget. We task the Council in
Permanent Session to make recommendations for further consideration at our next
meeting.
72. We decided to hold the next NATO Summit in Prague and tasked the Council in
Permanent Session to identify an appropriate date.
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Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2001) 158 held at NATO HQ Brussels 6 Dec 2001

Final Communique
Issued at the Ministerial Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council

1. The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 resulted in the
invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the history
of the Alliance. We deplore the loss of life which affected so many NATO
members and partner countries. Today, we have issued a separate statement
addressing NATO's response to terrorism and contribution to the campaign
against this scourge. Against this background, we have taken stock of NATO's
broad agenda, and given further guidance on its implementation in the run-up to
the meeting of our Heads of State and Government in Prague next November.
2. Today we commit ourselves to forge a new relationship with Russia, enhancing
our ability to work together in areas of common interest. We reaffirm that a
confident and cooperative partnership between the Allies and Russia, based on
shared democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and
undivided Europe, as enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, is essential
for stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We have decided to give new
impetus and substance to our partnership, with the goal of creating, with Russia, a
new NATO-Russia Council, to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action
at 20. To that end, we have tasked the North Atlantic Council in Permanent
Session to explore and develop, in the coming months, building on the Founding
Act, new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and
coordinated/joint action. We intend that such cooperative mechanisms will be in
place for, or prior to, our next meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002. NATO's
fundamental objectives remain as set out in the Washington Treaty, under which
provisions NATO will maintain its prerogative of independent decision and action
at 19 on all issues consistent with its obligations and responsibilities.
3. We are pleased that Russia stands with us in the struggle against terrorism, and
believe this will contribute significantly to our common goal of a strong, stable
and enduring NATO-Russia partnership. We are intensifying our cooperation in
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5.

6.

7.

this and other areas, including non-proliferation, export control and arms control
matters, arms transparency and confidence building measures, missile defense,
search and rescue at sea, and military-to-military cooperation, which represents a
major step towards a qualitatively new relationship. We support Russia's right to
protect her territorial integrity, and recognize her right to protect all citizens
against terrorism and criminality. We welcome the initial steps Russia has taken
towards establishing a political dialogue over the conflict in Chechnya. We urge
Russia to build on these steps to find a prompt and lasting political and peaceful
resolution to the conflict and to respect and protect the human and legal rights of
the population. We call on the Chechen side to cooperate in good faith in seeking
a political solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take actions
against it.
At their Prague Summit in November next year, our Heads of State and
Government will launch the next round of NATO enlargement. We encourage
the nine aspirant countries to continue focused efforts to prepare for possible
future membership, making full use of the opportunities offered through our
Membership Action Plan (MAP). We look forward to receiving a Consolidated
Progress Report on activities under the MAP in 2001-2002 at our meeting next
Spring. We will continue the MAP process beyond the current cycle. While
aspirants continue their preparations, NATO is undertaking its own internal
preparations for the admission of new members. We direct the Council in
Permanent Session to report at our next meeting on the issues that need to be
examined in order to prepare comprehensive recommendations for decisions by
our Heads of State and Government at the Prague Summit.
We reaffirm our commitment to a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East
Europe, and our determination to oppose all violence, whether ethnically,
politically or criminally motivated. We reiterate our support for the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in South-East Europe. Working
together with our Partners in SFOR and KFOR and with other international
institutions, we will continue to promote regional reconciliation and cooperation,
good neighborliness, stable and secure borders, protection of rights of members of
all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures, a lasting solution
to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and full cooperation with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). All persons
indicted for war crimes by the ICTY must be brought to justice in The Hague.
Later this month, our Defense colleagues will review the status of NATO's
operations in the Balkans and possibilities for rationalization and an enhanced
regional approach, recognizing the need for continued close consultation with
other international organizations involved. Our overall efforts have the ultimate
aim of providing the foundation for self-sustaining peace and democracy in the
region that no longer require the presence of international military forces.
Over the past year, the Alliance has played a particularly active role in promoting
stability and security in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in close
cooperation with the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In this context, we commend the neighboring
states, especially Albania, for their constructive approach. We welcome the
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voluntary disarmament and disbanding of the so-called NLA, the Parliament's
adoption of changes to the country's constitution, and the amnesty declared by
President Trajkovski. We reaffirm our condemnation of the use of violence for
political ends. We urge all parties involved to implement the Framework
Agreement in full, and to continue to cooperate with the international community.
We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia. The Alliance stands ready to continue to contribute to
security by providing support for the EU and OSCE monitors for a further threemonth period, as part of its contribution to peace and stability in the country.
8. We remain firmly committed to the full implementation of the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and call on all
political leaders in this country to continue to renounce separatism and violence,
to support democratic institutions and to take on greater responsibility for and
ownership of the process of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement. We
strongly endorse the respective efforts of SFOR and the ICTY to detain and bring
to trial persons indicted for war crimes. In this context, we reiterate that the
Entities carry primary responsibility for bringing to justice persons indicted for
war crimes, and urge them to cooperate more effectively with SFOR to this end.
9. We welcome the Kosovo-wide elections of 17 November, in which all
communities participated in significant numbers, as an important step towards a
peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic Kosovo, where all its
people, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and
enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through
participation in democratic institutions. We encourage the newly elected leaders
to exercise their new functions in strict compliance with United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1244 and the constitutional framework for provisional selfgovernment and in full cooperation with UNMIK and KFOR. We also call on
them to establish effective cooperation with the authorities of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
10. We welcome Belgrade's constructive support for the participation of the Kosovo
Serb community in the recent Kosovo elections. We note with satisfaction the
continuing progress towards reconciliation between the parties in Southern Serbia
and will continue to pay close attention to the situation in that region. We
welcome the steady improvement of our relations with the FRY and look forward
to their further development. We reiterate our support for a democratic
Montenegro within a democratic FRY.
11. In celebrating the tenth anniversary of NATO's policy of Partnership and
Cooperation, we recognize the crucial contribution NATO's Partner countries are
making to the Alliance's efforts to foster peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic
region. We value, in particular, their contributions to our peacekeeping
-.' operations in the Balkans. We also appreciate the solidarity and support which
our Partners, and in particular those in Central Asia and the Caucasus, have
demonstrated in the international campaign against terrorism. We want to further
broaden and strengthen cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). We encourage
all our Partners to seek a more active relationship with the Alliance. We also
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want to broaden and strengthen cooperation with our Mediterranean partners, and
invite them to intensify their dialogue with us on security matters of common
concern.
12. We continue to attach great importance to further developing and enhancing the
NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership. In this context, we encourage Ukraine to
continue to take concrete steps to take its reform process forward and stand ready
to assist it in this regard. We also wish to emphasize the importance of meeting
our joint commitments and fulfilling our shared responsibilities in the Balkans.
13. We reaffirm our commitment to achieving a close, transparent and, coherent
NATO-EU relationship. Our joint efforts in the Balkans have furthered the
achievement of peace and stability in that region and shown that close cooperation
brings considerable benefits. The events of 11 September have underlined the
importance of enhanced cooperation between the two organizations on questions
of common interest relating to security, defense, and crisis management, so that
crises would be met with the most appropriate military response and effective
crisis management ensured. Important work remains to be done on the
arrangements for NATO support to EU-led operations, in accordance with the
decisions taken at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit and subsequent
Ministerial meetings. We remain determined to make progress on all the various
aspects of our relationship, noting the need to find solutions satisfactory to all
Allies on the issue of participation by non-EU European Allies. We note the
commitment of the EU to finalize the modalities for consultation with Canada and
for its participation in EU-led operations.
14. Events on and since 11 September show that our security is challenged in a
variety of different, sometimes unpredictable, ways. Through our Defense
Capabilities Initiative, we want to ensure that Alliance forces have the best
possible capabilities to meet these challenges and are able to work together
seamlessly. Enhancing European capabilities is central to this process.
15. We reaffirm that the Alliance must have the capability to defend appropriately
and effectively against the threats that the proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and their means of delivery can pose. Our response should be
consistent with the indivisibility of Allied security. We will continue to work
together to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges,
adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts. In this context, the
Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation
will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security
objectives. The Alliance stresses the importance of abiding by and strengthening
existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes and
international arms control and disarmament accords. We will continue to actively
contribute to the development of agreements and measures in this field and pursue
further arms reductions, transparency and confidence-building. We reaffirm our
determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and will work towards a successful
outcome of the upcoming review. We also support ongoing efforts to achieve an
International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation before the
end of 2002. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament along with
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deterrence and defense play an essential role in enhancing security against these
new threats and challenges. In this context, the role that missile defense could
play is being actively considered as we continue our consultations with the United
States on this issue. In this regard, we welcome continued work at NATO on
theatre missile defense.
16. Recalling the results of the second CFE Review Conference, Allies welcome
Russia's planned reductions of its excess equipment in the North Caucasus to
agreed levels, which must be transparent and verifiable, and progress in the
reduction and withdrawal of Russian equipment from Moldova. We call for swift
resolution of remaining issues between Russia and Georgia. Allies can envisage
ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty only in the context of full compliance by
all States Parties with agreed Treaty limits and consistent with the commitments
in the CFE Final Act. We look forward to the entry into force of the Open Skies
Treaty on 1 January 2002.
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Final

Communique

Issued at the Ministerial Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council

1. Since 11 September, NATO has acted on its core commitments to deter and
defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state, as
provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. Our countries are
contributing, as individual Allies, to the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan.
The Alliance and its members are playing their full part in the current campaign
against terror, confirming NATO's key role in ensuring Euro-Atlantic security,
including in the face of new threats. The Alliance, which embodies the
transatlantic link that binds North America and Europe in a unique defense and
security partnership, must, and will continue to adapt itself, to be better able to
perform its fundamental security tasks and to strengthen security right across the
Euro-Atlantic area. We will intensify our consultations on this process of
adaptation, looking to the meeting of our Heads of State and Government in
Prague in November to mark a decisive step forward in achieving this objective.
2. In preparation for the Prague Summit, we have today given guidance on the
development of vital new capabilities, on the process of NATO enlargement, on
the creation of a new security relationship with Russia, as well as on the
development of our relationships with Ukraine and all other Partners. We have
also re-affirmed NATO's commitment to a peaceful, stable and democratic SouthEast Europe, and to the development of close and effective relations between
NATO and the European Union.
31 We reiterate our determination to combat the threat of terrorism for as long as
necessary. There is no justification whatsoever for terrorist actions. In keeping
with our obligations under the Washington Treaty we will continue to strengthen
our national and collective capacities to protect our populations, territory and
forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad.
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We recognized this challenge in the Strategic Concept adopted at the 1999
Washington Summit, where we made clear that any armed attack on the territory
of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty and where we singled out terrorism as a risk to the security
interests of the Alliance. Meeting this challenge is fundamental to our security.
Actions taken to meet this challenge will be in accordance with our decisions and
in full compliance with all our commitments under international law and relevant
provisions of the United Nations Charter and national legislation.
4. Our countries are also working together to deal with the threat posed by possible
use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including their possible use by
terrorists, and the means of their delivery. Disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation make an essential contribution to preventing the use of WMD, along
with deterrence and defense. The Alliance is working on proposals to develop
critical defenses against biological and chemical weapons. We also attach
importance to reinforcing the role of the NATO WMD Centre within the
International Staff. We will also enhance our ability, through working on all
possible options, to provide support, when requested, to national authorities for
the protection of civilian populations against the effects of any terrorist attack,
and are cooperating with our Partners in this field, taking into account the various
proposals and initiatives put forward. We are exploring the scope for enhancing
cooperation with the European Union in this field. Together with our Defense
colleagues, we are developing a package of proposals to be in place for the Prague
Summit, to strengthen these capacities.
5. To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that
can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance
and time, and achieve their objectives. This will require the development of new
and balanced capabilities within the Alliance, including strategic lift and modern
strike capabilities, so that NATO can more effectively respond collectively to any
threat of aggression against a member state. We look forward to decisions by
Defense Ministers on specific recommendations for the development of new
capabilities, for approval by Heads of State, and Government at the Prague
Summit.
6. At their Prague Summit in November this year, our Heads of State and
Government will launch the next round of NATO enlargement. This will confirm
the Alliance's commitment to remain open to new members, and enhance security
in the Euro-Atlantic area. We received today a Consolidated Progress Report on
the results of the third cycle of the Membership Action Plan (MAP). We
congratulate all aspirants on the significant progress they have made thus far
towards achieving their objectives in the MAP. Heads of State and Government
will expect invitees to have demonstrated a commitment to the basic principles
and values set out in the Washington Treaty, the capability to contribute to
collective defense and the Alliance's full range of missions, a firm commitment to
contribute to stability and security, especially in regions of crisis and conflict, and
to be willing and able to assume the responsibilities of membership. We
encourage all aspirants to intensify their efforts in the coming months and to
continue them not only up to Prague but also in the years ahead.
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7. We commit ourselves to continuing to work with the aspirants to help them make
sufficient progress to be invited to begin accession negotiations at Prague. The
2002-2003 cycle of the MAP, which we launched today to conclude in Spring
2003, will include all the present participants, and be tailored to their individual
requirements. We look forward to submission of individual Annual National
Programs in the Autumn. After Prague, the MAP will continue to serve both
aspirants and those countries invited to begin accession talks with the Alliance.
8. As at Madrid, our goal is that all invitees should accede on a common date before
the next Summit. After Prague, we will expect invited countries to continue to
participate in the MAP. The accession process will take into account work
conducted under the MAP, and the MAP will be used to help the integration of
invitees into Alliance structures. During accession talks and on the basis of an
invitee's Annual National Program, the NATO Expert Team, on the basis of
political guidance to be elaborated, will discuss with individual invitees specific
issues and reforms upon which further progress will be expected before and after
accession in order to enhance their contribution to the Alliance. These will be
drawn from existing MAP objectives, Partnership Goals and other issues
identified by Allies and those associated with military integration identified by the
NATO Military Authorities. A timetable for the completion of these reforms
should be established, including for those that are unlikely to be realized until
after accession. This timetable should be reflected within a revised Annual
National Program. We look forward to the commitments that invitees will make
as part of this process. We look forward to signing the individual accession
protocols not later than our meeting in Spring of 2003. Invitees will participate in
subsequent MAP cycles until the ratification process has been completed.
9. We commend Croatia on the progress it has made in its reform efforts, making
full use of the options offered by Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Intensified Dialogue. We expect Croatia to
continue to contribute to stability in the Balkans. We welcome Croatia's
participation in the MAP and invite Croatia to present its first Annual National
Program in the Autumn and look forward to reviewing Croatia's progress at our
meeting next Spring.
10. NATO is undertaking internal preparations to ensure its readiness to accept new
members.
We direct the Council in Permanent Session to prepare a
comprehensive report on the relevant factors associated with decisions on
enlargement for consideration by Heads of State and Government in Prague. This
work will be conducted in keeping with political guidance provided by the
Council and will not create any preconditions or decisions on new members.
11. We welcome the decisive and substantial deepening of the NATO-Russia
relationship, which marks an historic step towards the Alliance's long-standing
goal of building a secure, cooperative and democratic Euro-Atlantic area. We
look forward to the approval this afternoon by the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint
Council of the document on the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, where
NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common
interest, while preserving NATO's prerogative to act independently. The
document will be adopted and signed at the inaugural session of the Council, to be
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held at a Summit meeting of Heads of State and Government in Rome on 28 May.
We are confident that the creation of the Council will lend new impetus and
substance to our partnership with Russia, and make a substantial contribution to
our common goal of a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, as enshrined in the
NATO-Russia Founding Act. A NATO-Russia Council meeting at the level of
Heads of State and Government in Prague would offer an opportunity to take
stock of our new relationship.
12. We support Russia's right to protect her territorial integrity, and recognize her
responsibility to protect all her citizens against terrorism and criminality. We
urge Russia to find a prompt and lasting political and peaceful resolution to the
conflict in Chechnya, and to respect and protect the human and legal rights of the
population. We call on the Chechen side to cooperate in good faith in seeking a
political solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take action against
it.
13. We note Ukraine's strong determination to pursue full Euro-Atlantic integration.
We continue to encourage Ukraine to implement the reforms required to achieve
this Objective and stand ready to continue to assist it in this regard. In that
context, we have decided to give new impetus and substance to our partnership
with Ukraine. To that end, we have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to
develop new mechanisms and modalities that build on the Charter on a Distinctive
Partnership and bring our relationship to a qualitatively new level. We expect to
deepen and expand our relationship, including through intensified consultations
and cooperation on political, economic and defense issues. In this context, Allies
look forward to a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, at the level of
Heads of State and Government, at the Prague Summit.
14. Since 11 September, the important contribution made by NATO's Partnerships to
Euro-Atlantic security has been confirmed and reinforced. We look forward to a
new, more substantive relationship with Partners, which intensifies our
cooperation in responding to new security challenges, including terrorism. In
light of the changing security environment, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
and Partnership for Peace are adapting to remain valuable and effective. We have
tasked the Council in Permanent Session to continue reviewing our Partnerships,
with a view to presenting bur Heads of State and Government at Prague with
concrete proposals for further developing the EAPC and PfP to better serve Allies
and Partners in addressing the challenges of the 21st century. We look forward to
the meeting of the EAPC at the level of Heads of State and Government in
Prague.
15. We have decided to upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our
Mediterranean Dialogue, including by consulting with Mediterranean partners on
security matters of common concern, including terrorism-related issues, as
appropriate. These efforts will aim to bring our Mediterranean partners even
closer to NATO, and give fresh impetus to the Dialogue by the Prague Summit.
16. We reaffirm our commitment to achieving a close, transparent and coherent
NATO-EU relationship. Our joint efforts in the Balkans have furthered the
achievement of peace and stability in that region and shown that close cooperation
brings considerable benefits. The events of 11 September have underlined the
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importance of enhanced cooperation between the two organizations on questions
of common interest relating to security, defense, and crisis management, so that
crises would be met with the most appropriate military response and effective
crisis management ensured. Important work remains to be done on the
arrangements for NATO support to EU-led operations, in accordance with the
decisions taken at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit and subsequent
Ministerial meetings. We remain determined to make progress on all the various
aspects of our relationship, noting the need to find solutions satisfactory to all
Allies on the issue of participation by non-EU European Allies. We welcome
recent progress towards finalizing EU modalities for consultation with Canada
and for its participation in EU-led operations.
17. We reiterate our commitment to a peaceful, stable, and democratic South-East
Europe, and reaffirm our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all
the countries in the region. The continued presence of NATO-led forces
demonstrates and embodies our determination to oppose all violence whether
ethnically, politically or criminally motivated, and to strengthen peace, tolerance,
the rule of law and democratic institutions in the region. Working together with
our Partners in SFOR and KFOR and with other international institutions, we will
continue to promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights
of members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures and
a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons. We remain
actively engaged in the field of border security and smuggling interdiction
operations and reaffirm the importance of a wider regional approach to these
issues.
18. In light of the progress achieved towards a lasting and self-sustaining peace, we
have reviewed the status of NATO's operations in the Balkans. Our Defense
colleagues will review the implementation of force restructuring which takes into
account a more regional approach and aims at rationalizing NATO's military
presence, as civilian authorities increasingly take up their responsibilities. Full
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) remains a priority. All persons indicted for war crimes by the ICTY must
be brought to justice in The Hague.
19. We remain determined to further support efforts towards security and stability in
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. NATO continues to contribute to
security by providing support for the EU and OSCE monitors through the
presence of Task Force Fox.
We are encouraged by, progress in the
implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and emphasize that the
passing of remaining legislation related to the Agreement and the holding of free
and fair general elections in September will together constitute important steps
towards peace and stability.
20. We remain committed to a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
full accordance with the principles of the General Framework Agreement, and call
on the local authorities in the country to take on greater responsibility for and
ownership of the process of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement. We
strongly endorse the respective efforts of SFOR and the ICTY to detain and bring
to trial persons indicted for war crimes. In this context, we reiterate that the
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Entities carry primary responsibility for bringing to justice persons indicted for
war crimes, and urge them to cooperate more effectively with SFOR to this end.
We look forward to the general elections this Autumn as an important step
towards a single, multi-ethnic, and democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina.
21. We look forward to further developing the Alliance's relations with the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and expect swift implementation of the agreement
that has been reached between Serbia and Montenegro in redefining their
relationship. We welcome the FRY's interest in joining PfP and look forward to
working with the FRY leadership in achieving the progress necessary to enable
participation in PfP. Full and continued cooperation with ICTY, democratic
reform and control of the military, as well as full and transparent implementation
of the Dayton Peace Agreement, are essential to a deeper relationship with the
Alliance.
22. With regard to Kosovo, we reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, and welcome the
establishment of provisional institutions of self-government which include
representatives of all communities. We call on the provisional institutions and
community leaders to assume their responsibilities and fully cooperate with
UNMIK, KFOR and the international community to promote a peaceful, multiethnic, multi-cultural and democratic Kosovo. We look forward to the local
elections in Kosovo this Autumn as another important step towards a peaceful,
multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic Kosovo, where all its people,
irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy
universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through
participation in democratic institutions.
23. The Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the
Alliance's security objectives. We will continue to work together to adapt the
Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet the threats posed by the proliferation
of WMD and their means of delivery, adopting an appropriate mix of political and
defense efforts. Our efforts to that end should be consistent with the indivisibility
of Allied security. The Alliance stresses the importance of abiding by and
strengthening existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes
and international arms control and disarmament accords. We will continue to
actively contribute to the development of agreements and measures in this field
and pursue further arms reductions, transparency and confidence and security
building measures. In that context, we welcome the U.S.-Russian agreement to
sign a treaty to reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and
2,200. We reaffirm our determination to contribute to the implementation of the
conclusions of the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
and welcome the full discussion of issues at the Preparatory Conference for the
2005 Review Conference in April 2002. We also support ongoing efforts to
achieve an International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
before the end of 2002. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, along
with deterrence and defense play an essential role in enhancing security against
these new threats and challenges. In this context, the role that missile defense
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could play is being actively considered as we continue our consultations with the
United States on this issue. In this regard, we welcome continued work at NATO
on theatre missile defense.
24. Concerning the CFE Treaty, we welcome the Russian Federation's December
declaration that it is now within agreed levels of armament and equipment. We
encourage Russia to enhance its cooperation with NATO to facilitate our efforts
to verify this claim as soon as possible. However, we can envisage ratification of
the adapted CFE Treaty only in the context of full compliance by all States Parties
with agreed Treaty limits and consistent with the commitments contained in the
CFE Final Act. We urge a swift resolution of outstanding issues relating to
Istanbul commitments, including on Georgia and Moldova. Recognizing the
contributions of the CFE Treaty to European security and stability, we recall that
the entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty would permit accession by nonCFE States. We welcome the entry into force of the Open Skies Treaty on 1
January 2002.
25. We express our deep appreciation to the Government of Iceland for hosting this
meeting.
•
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Final Communique
Issued at the Ministerial Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council

1. As we meet today, NATO is acting to preserve peace through its operations;
spreading stability through its partnerships; and reinforcing our community of
shared values through the most robust round of enlargement in our history. The
North Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of our collective defense and the
essential transatlantic forum for security. Today, we took stock of NATO's
ongoing transformation to meet 21st century threats and challenges to the security
of our populations, territory and forces, from wherever they may come, and gave
direction on work still to be done, as we look ahead to our Summit in Istanbul
next June.
2. We look forward to welcoming seven new members of the Alliance by the time of
the Istanbul Summit, which will strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic
area. We are pleased to be joined today by our colleagues from these countries,
who associate themselves with this Communique. The formal accession of the
new members into the Alliance will take place as soon as the ratification process
is complete. We welcome the significant contribution the Invitees are already
making to our security and the progress they have made in their reform efforts,
and we encourage them to continue on this path.
3. We categorically reject and condemn terrorism in all its forms. We express our
sympathy to all the victims of terrorism and unwavering solidarity to Allies that
-., have been targeted by it. NATO is determined to use all means at its disposal and
to cooperate fully with other international organizations and with its Partners to
fight this scourge. We welcome the progress on implementing the package of
measures approved at the Prague Summit to improve NATO's capacity to respond
to terrorism, and the recent establishment of the Permanent Terrorist Threat
Intelligence Unit. NATO's Operation Active Endeavour continues to make a
significant contribution in the Mediterranean to the fight against terrorism, in
cooperation with the International Maritime Organization; it has helped to
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4.

5.

6.

7.

maintain security through maritime anti-terrorism surveillance and boarding
operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the escort of designated Allied ships
through the Straits of Gibraltar.
In Afghanistan, the Alliance now leads the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) under its UN mandate. This operation demonstrates our readiness
to deploy forces wherever the Alliance decides, to ensure our common security.
Our aim is to assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, integrated
into the international community, including by assisting the Afghan Transitional
Authority in the maintenance of security and stability and in the electoral process
according to the Bonn Process. We decided on the progressive expansion of
ISAF beyond Kabul in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions,
including through temporary deployments for specific tasks and limited in size
and duration, provided all military conditions, and requirements for the Kabul
mission, are met. We will continue to address the scope of such specific tasks.
/We welcome the German deployment of a pilot Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT), under ISAF, in Kunduz. Expecting that the establishment of additional
PRTs will follow, we consider that ISAF could move to assume military
command of such PRTs where consistent with military requirements and
capabilities. Achievement of these objectives will be subject to consultations with
and contributions from PRT framework nations and the provision of the required
assets, including for Kabul International Airport. We will review NATO's
contribution to stabilization efforts in Afghanistan on a regular basis.; It is
necessary to ensure close co-ordination and cooperation between ISAF and
Operation Enduring Freedom, and also with the Afghan National Army. Our
forces will also have to work closely with the UN Assistance Mission to
Afghanistan and other international organizations on the ground, including the
European Union.
We task the Council in Permanent Session to develop for the Istanbul Summit a
comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, in close
consultation with other International Organizations and the Afghan Transitional
Authority. We welcome the appointment of Mr. Hikmet Cetin of Turkey to the
position of NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan.
The Alliance continues to support Poland in its leadership of a multi-national
division in Iraq. The North Atlantic Council will review NATO's contribution to
the stabilization efforts on a regular basis. We welcome the adoption of UN
Security Council Resolution 1511 on Iraq and are committed to its full
implementation in order to restore conditions of stability and security in the
country, and return governing responsibilities and authorities to the people of
Iraq. In that regard, we welcome the Agreement on Political Process signed in
Baghdad on 15 November 2003. Peace, stability and reconstruction in Iraq
remain a high priority.
The security environment in the strategically important region of the Balkans is
stable but remains fragile. We reaffirm our support for the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of all the countries in the Balkans. We want to see enduring stability
and peace in the region.
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8. Our missions in the Balkans continue to evolve. The improved security
environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina will allow for further reduction of SFOR
by next Spring. Over the coming months, Allies will assess options for the future
size and structure of SFOR, to include possible termination of SFOR by the end
of 2004, transition possibly to a new EU mission within the framework of the
Berlin+ arrangements and to a new NATO HQ Sarajevo. We task the Council in
Permanent Session and the NATO Military Authorities to consult with their EU
counterparts on Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with agreed texts and
procedures and within the framework of Berlin+. We will consult, as appropriate,
with all other parties concerned, including the authorities of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
.
9. In Kosovo, KFOR's presence remains essential. We welcome the proposal of the
Contact Group to establish a date for review of Kosovo's progress in meeting
internationally endorsed standards. Further advancement towards a process to
determine Kosovo's future status, in accordance with UN Security Council
Resolution 1244, will depend on the outcome of this comprehensive review. We
encourage all parties to work constructively to meet the agreed standards, and to
support the efforts of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Mr.
Harri Holkeri. Direct dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina on practical issues
of mutual concern remains a key benchmark and an indispensable element of the
international community's policy of Standards before Status; we encourage
Belgrade and Pristina to pursue their dialogue in good faith.
10. We are committed to help the countries of the Balkans integrate fully into EuroAtlantic structures. We encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan
countries. We expect them to assume ownership of, and implement, pressing
reforms. They must comply fully with their international obligations, including
full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), in particular bringing to justice all those who are indicted by
the Tribunal, notably Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, as well as Ante
Gotovina, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1503,
11. We call on the Government and all political actors in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia to continue to work toward full implementation of the
Ohrid Agreement. NATO's support to the European Union's Operation
Concordia successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of the Berlin+
arrangements. NATO has conducted its preliminary lessons learned process and
we will conduct a lessons learned process with the EU.
12. We encourage Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their candidacies for
NATO membership. We want them to succeed and will continue to support their
reform efforts through the MAP process. We reaffirm that the current round of
enlargement will not be the last and that NATO's door remains Open.
13. We recognize the progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and
Montenegro in their efforts to join Partnership for Peace (PfP), welcome
substantive progress on defense reform, and will continue to assist both countries
in meeting established NATO conditions for PfP membership. We look forward
to welcoming them into PfP once they have met the conditions set forth by the
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Alliance, including full cooperation with the ICTYj-in particular to detain and turn
over persons indicted for war crimes to the Tribunal. We urge both countries to
envisage the Istanbul Summit as a realistic target by which they could meet the
outstanding conditions. We will assess the two countries' progress on their
possible accession to PfP in advance of the Istanbul Summit.
14. We task the Council in Permanent Session to review and develop NATO's
Balkans strategy, encompassing political aspects as well as operations, in time for
the Istanbul Summit.
15. NATO and the European Union share common strategic interests, and we remain
strongly committed to enhancing our cooperation. Since our last meeting,
1
NATO-EU cooperation has made concrete progress and is developing in a
constructive manner. We agreed a concerted approach for the Western Balkans.
We look forward to further substantive cooperation with the EU, including
through the Berlin+ arrangements. A joint NATO-EU crisis management
exercise was successfully held in November. NATO-EU consultations and >
cooperation on questions of common interest relating to security, defense and
crisis management, such as the fight against terrorism, mutually reinforcing
capabilities, and civil-emergency planning, were stepped up and will continue to
be developed. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to consider how
to reinforce, by the time of the Istanbul Summit, the strategic partnership between
NATO and the EU as agreed between our two organizations, including through
effective consultations with the EU, respecting the autonomy of the two
organizations, and in a spirit of transparency. NATO and the EU could also cosponsor a seminar on terrorism.
16. NATO's Partnerships, which contribute greatly to security and stability across the
Euro-Atlantic area, are of increasing value and importance. During the ten years
of its existence, Partnership for Peace has been an increasingly effective
instrument for cooperation in such areas as peace support operations and the fight
against terrorism. The Istanbul Summit should build on progress made at Prague
to re-focus PfP to reflect its post-enlargement dimensions and the Alliance's focus
on new threats. We have therefore tasked the Council in Permanent Session to
develop proposals to further tailor Partnership to tackle key thematic issues and
individual Partners' needs and capabilities, to promote defense reform which
encourages military transformation and interoperability, and to enhance regional
cooperation and mutual support. In this context the Council will examine whether
and how selected Partnership activities might be opened, on a case by case basis,
to other countries which might express an interest in such involvement. These
new measures should allow for more focused and deeper practical cooperation.
We agree to promote a special focus on the strategically important regions of the
Caucasus and Central Asia.
17. Security in the Euro-Atlantic area is closely linked to security and stability in the
Mediterranean. We look for additional progress beyond that achieved since the
Prague Summit in upgrading the Mediterranean Dialogue. We direct the Council
in Permanent Session to consider ways to further enhance this relationship by
generating, in consultation with all Mediterranean Dialogue partners, by the time
of the Istanbul Summit, options to develop a more ambitious and expanded
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framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue. This initiative will genuinely
improve cooperation in a number of fields, including on defense reform and
interoperability, including through PfP-like instruments, and open more
Partnership activities to the Mediterranean Dialogue partners on a case by. case
basis. Our efforts will complement and mutually reinforce other Mediterranean
initiatives, including those of the European Union and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
18. The NATO-Russia Council, in which NATO member states and Russia work
together as equal partners in areas of common interest, continues to make
valuable contributions to security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Our political
dialogue has developed on key security issues, including Afghanistan and the
Balkans. Our practical cooperation has reached a new level, including in militaryto-military projects; and, through our focus on improving interoperability, we
have also laid the groundwork for future military cooperation , including
potentially in joint peacekeeping operations . We welcome progress made on
nuclear confidence building measures, and on the safe management of nuclear and
radiological material. We look forward to approval of an ambitious Work
Program for 2004. We are committed to building on this progress, and to further
enhancing the NATO-Russia relationship.
19. We remain committed to stronger NATO-Ukraine relations under the Charter on a
Distinctive Partnership and welcome progress made over the past year in the
implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and Ukraine's 2003 Annual
Target Plan. We look forward to concrete implementation of the Annual Target
Plan in 2004, including the conduct of free and fair Presidential elections,
improvements to media freedom, strengthening arms export controls, and
progress on and funding for the Defense Review. We encourage "Ukraine to
pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration, and we
will keep under active review all possible options to support Ukraine in these
efforts.
20. We are closely following the development of events in Georgia. We call on the
Georgian authorities to hold free and fair elections, planned for January next year.
We support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia.
The Alliance remains committed to developing Partnership with Georgia through
using the full range of Partnership instruments.
21. The Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the
Alliance's security objectives, including preventing the spread and use of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. We stress the
importance of abiding by, fully implementing and strengthening existing
international arms control and disarmament accords and multilateral nonproliferation and export control regimes. Early admission of all invitees into all
appropriate existing non-proliferation regimes could play a positive role in that
regard. In particular, we underline our commitment to reinforcing the NonProliferation Treaty, the pre-eminent non-proliferation and disarmament
mechanism, and ensuring the full compliance with it by all states party to the
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Treaty, We will also strengthen our common efforts to safeguard nuclear and
radiological material.
22. The Alliance supports the aims of the Proliferation Security Initiative to establish
a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and. stop
shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from
states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal
authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the United
Nations Security Council.
23. We remain committed to the protection of civilian populations. We welcome the
progress made in the implementation of the Civil Emergency Planning Action
Plan for the Improvement of Civil Preparedness against possible Terrorist Attacks
against Civilian Populations with Chemical, Biological and Radiological Agents.
We look forward to its full implementation in order to reinforce national
preparedness and reaction to civil emergencies.
24. As we have consistently stated, we remain committed to the CFE Treaty as a
cornerstone of European security, and reaffirm our attachment to the early entry
into force of the Adapted Treaty. We recall that fulfillment of the remaining
Istanbul commitments on Georgia and Moldova will create the conditions for
Allies and other States Parties to move forward on ratification of the Adapted
CFE Treaty. We welcome the approach of those non-CFE countries, which have
stated their intention to request accession to the Adapted CFE Treaty upon its
entry into force. Their accession would provide an important additional
contribution to European security and stability.
25. We urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia as
set out in their Istanbul Joint Statement of 17 November 1999 and, to this end,
call upon the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level. We
note the progress that was made on withdrawal of Russian military forces from
Moldova during the first half of 2003. We regret that this progress was not
sustained and that the 31 December 2003 extended deadline, agreed in the
framework of the OSCE, will not be met. It is essential that efforts be intensified
to complete the withdrawal in early 2004. We will continue, via the OSCE, to
assist in this process.
26. Based on the enduring principles enshrined in the Washington Treaty, NATO
today is demonstrating our commitment to multilateralism through effective
action and our shared commitment to: the transatlantic link; NATO's fundamental
security tasks including collective defense; our shared democratic values; and the
United Nations Charter. As we prepare for the Istanbul Summit, we invite the
Council in Permanent Session to intensify consultations on the challenges and
threats facing the Alliance, and how best to respond to them.
27. We continue to attach high priority to the implementation of measures to enhance
the efficiency and effectiveness of the NATO Headquarters organization,
including through modern management and financial systems, sound and
transparent management of the new Headquarters project, and improvements to
gender balance and diversity in the Alliance's International Staff.
28. We wish to thank Lord Robertson of Port Ellen warmly for his leadership role in
guiding NATO's transformation. We are confident that the new Secretary
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General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, will continue to carry forward NATO's
evolution, and build on the Alliance's record of success, and we pledge our full
support to him.
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APPENDIX I

DISCUSSION OF INFERENCES IN THE PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS

Speech Acts

Explicit Performative

Reflexive Intentions

Implicatures

The speech acts are categorized as the following:
• Assertions: express a belief and the intention that
' another/others also hold that belief;
• Commitment: express an intention to perform some
act in the future;
• Directive: express the intention that another/others act
in a particular way.
There propositions add 'hereby' to the speech act to stress the
fundamental point of speech act theory that language is
action.
The propositions specify implicitly conveyed intentions.
Reflexive intentions differ depending on the type of speech
act. The reflexive intentions in the pragmatic analysis follow
the following form:
• Assertion: P is the case.
o Reflective Intentions
• S believes that P.
• S wants H to believe that P.
• Directive: Do X.
o Reflective Intentions
• S believes that his utterance, in virtue
his authority over H, constitutes
sufficient reason for H to do X.
• S wants H to do X because of S's
command.
• Commitment: I will do Y.
o Reflective Intentions
• S believes his utterance obligates him
to do Y on condition that H indicates
he wants S to do Y.
• S wants Y on the condition that H
indicates he wants S to do Y.
• S wants H to believe (1) and (2).
These propositions come from Grice's cooperative principle,
which includes the following maxims of conversation:
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•

Presuppositions

The maxim of quality: Do not say what you believe to
be false, and do not say anything for which you lack
adequate evidence.
• The maxim of quantity: Make your contribution as
informative as is required for the current purposes of
the exchange.
• The maxim of relevance: Make your contributions
relevant.
• The maxim of manner: Avoid obscurity, avoid
ambiguity, be brief and be orderly.
Researchers and analyst infer implicature by assuming that
speakers follow these maxims.
The presuppositions are inferences that need to be true for a
statement to be meaningful or have a truth value. Most
suppositions have the characteristics of 'constancy under
negation.' The classic example is as follows:
• The King of France is bald.
• The King of France is not bald.
• The King of France exists.
The first two statements help to suppose the third, even
through the first two negate one another. This is consistent
under negation. Most presuppositions in the pragmatic
analysis have this property.
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APPENDIX J

DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 1

Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 1
•
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1996) 165 held at NATO HQ Brussels 10
Dec 1996
_
.
Speech Act: Assertion, Commitment, and Directive
a. The member nations herby assert to:
a. Preserve its political and military strength, ensuring its ability to carry out
the full range of its missions.
b. Help build a truly cooperative European security structure.
c. Open the Alliance and its ability to carry out all its new roles and mission;
d. Remains steadfast in its primary goal of providing stability and security in
the Euro-Atlantic area.
a. Strengthening cooperative relations with all our Partners including through
an enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the initiative to establish an
Atlantic Partnership Council.
b. A broad process of integration and cooperation is underway in Europe;
Russia is a part of it through its membership in the OSCE and the Council
of Europe and its relationship with NATO as well as the European Union
c
andtheWEU.
c. Reaffirm that the nuclear forces of the Allies continue to play a unique and
essential role in the Alliances strategy of war prevention.
d. Develop on the basis of transparency ever-closer and deeper cooperative
ties open to all Partner countries by making the Partnership more
operational; strengthening its political consultation element, taking full
account of the respective activities of the OSCE and the relevant European
institutions such as the WEU and the EU; and involving Partners more in
operations planning and Partnership decision-making.
e. Value the close and effective cooperation between Russia and NATO in
IFOR.
f. Continue to support Ukraine as it develops as a democratic nation and a
market economy.
g. Support the Middle East peace process, and urge all participants to remain
firmly committed to it.
h. The CFE Treaty is a fundamental cornerstone of security and stability for
all in the Euro-Atlantic area
i. Proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their
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delivery means continues to be a matter of serious concern to us.
j . Reaffirm our commitment to the Alliance's common-funded programs.
b. The member nations hereby direct to:
a. Urge all participants of the Middle East Peace process to remain firmly
i committed to it.
b. Urge the Russian Federation to follow the United States in ratifying the
START II Treaty.
c. Urge all States Parties who have not yet done so to approve this CFE
Flank Agreement before the end of the extended provisional application
period.
d. Urge the early ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies by those states
which have not already ratified.
e. Urge all other nations to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
c. The member nations hereby commit to:
a. Develop a new command structure;
b. Finalize all necessary arrangements for the European Security and
Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO;
,
c. Invite one or more of the countries which have expressed interest in
joining the Alliance to begin accession negotiations;
k. Work with Partners on the initiative to establish an Atlantic Partnership
Council (APC) as a single new cooperative mechanism;
1. Further develop an enhanced relationship with Russia and the Ukraine by
aiming at reaching an agreement at the earliest possible date on the
development of a strong, stable and enduring security partnership;
d. Enhancing the Mediterranean dialogue;
e. Further developing the ability to carry out new roles and missions relating
to conflict prevention and crisis management;
m. Further enhance our political and defense efforts against the proliferation
of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery means;
n. Ensuring that the NACC goals of enhancing transparency and confidence
in security matters among member states remain central to future
cooperation,
o. Enhance the political dimension of the Partnership through increasing
opportunities for political consultations,
p. Expand the agreed fields of military missions within the PfP to the full
range of the Alliance's new mission,
q. Broaden the NATO/PfP exercise program in accordance with the
expanded scope of the Partnership,
r. Enable Partner countries to participate in the planning and execution of
PfP activities.
s. Involve Partners more substantively and actively in PfP-related parts of
the regular peacetime work of NATO's Military Authorities,
t. Examine, together with Partners, the possible modalities for the
elaboration of a political-military framework for PfP operations,
u. Increase regional cooperation within the Partnership provided it remains
open to all Partners and remains an integral part of the overall PfP.
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v. Develop a charter between NATO and Russia, which would encompass
the shared principles that will form the basis of our relationship; a broad
set of areas of practical cooperation; mechanisms for regular and ad hoc
consultations; and mechanisms for military liaison and cooperation,
w. The development of a distinctive and effective NATO-Ukraine
relationship, which could be formalized, possibly by the time of the
Summit, building on the document on enhanced NATO-Ukraine relations
agreed in September 1995, and taking into account recent Ukrainian
proposals,
x. Keep under review the allocation of resources in order to ensure their
optimal us.
y. Identify the implications of adaptation for NATOs common-funded
budgets and to make appropriate recommendations for dealing with these.
z. Improve its capabilities to address the risks posed by proliferation and
strengthen the review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), scheduled for April 1997.
.
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, and Enforcement
'
Explicit Performative:
a. The member nations hereby assert the Alliance will uphold the security and
stability of its member countries while taking a new shape, reflecting the
fundamental changes in the security environment in Europe and the enduring
vitality of the transatlantic partnership which underpins our endeavors.
a. The member nations hereby encourage the members of the Alliance to ratify,
accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
b. The member nations hereby commits the Alliance to do the following:
a. Agree on a new command structure;
b. Finalize all necessary arrangements for the ESDI within NATO;
c. Invite one or more of the countries which have expressed interest in
joining the Alliance to begin accession negotiations;
d. Pledge that the Alliance will remain open to the accession of further
members and will remain ready to pursue consultations with nations
seeking NATO membership, as it has done in the past;
e. Strengthening cooperative relations with all our Partners including through
an enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the initiative to establish an
Atlantic Partnership Council;
f. Intensifying and consolidating relations with Russia beyond the
Partnership for Peace;
g. Further develop an enhanced relationship with Ukraine;
h. Enhancing our Mediterranean dialogue;
i. Further develop our ability to carry out new roles and missions relating to
conflict prevention and crisis management; and
j . Further enhancing our political and defense efforts against the
proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their
delivery means.
•
'.
Reflective Intentions:
c. Assertion:
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a. The member nations believe that its must maintain security and stability
while being able to maintain in the current global security environment.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to uphold its mission by carry out
cooperative means through political and military measures.
d. Directive
3. The member nations believe that its utterance, in virtue of its authority
over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for to the member nations
to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
4. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command.
e. Commitment:
a. The member nations believe that its utterance obligates the Alliance to
secure and stabilize the global security environment on the condition that
)
the member nations indicate they will agree to a new structure command;
make arrangements for the ESDI; keep the Alliance open for new
membership; strengthen cooperative relations with all Partners , especially
those with Russia and the Ukraine; enhance Mediterranean dialogue; and
further enhance political and defense efforts relating to conflict
prevention, crisis management, and WMDs.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the
condition that the member countries will be able to secure and stabilize the
Euro-Atlantic area and protect their citizens.
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).
Implicatures:
a. Assertion:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the
same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members
that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its members,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to the Alliance.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it
is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
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relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
, through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members it
is establishing political relationships,
hi. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations; assertion informs its members
conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force
if necessary,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members
will use force if necessary,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force
is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries,
a. Directive:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a
part of the same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member
countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its members and other countries in the global security
environment.
,
/
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive
to its members and other countries in the global security
environment.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral
248

alliance commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries
and other countries
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment.
c. NATO ' member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
countries and other countries it is establishing political
relationships.
}
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries
and other countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment,
b. Commitment:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries
along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a
part of the same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the
member countries that they are fellow citizens.
„• . '
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment.
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
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member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance
commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its'
commitment to its member countries.
. c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries it is establishing political relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment
to its member countries.
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will
use force if necessary,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries will use force if necessary,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is
relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries!
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative.
.'
Presuppositions:
a. If the member nations preserve its political and military strength, ensuring its
ability to carry out the full range of its missions, then the Alliance will be able to
stabilize and secure in the whole Euro-Atlantic area and the global security
environment.
b. If member nations do not preserve its political and military strength, ensuring its
v
ability to carry out the full range of its missions, then the Alliance will not be able
to stabilize arid secure in the whole Euro-Atlantic area and the global security
environment.
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APPENDIX K

DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 2

Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 2
•
__
___
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1997) 155 held at NATO HQ Brussels 16
Dec 1997
.
Speech Act: Assertion, Commitment, and Directive
a. The member nations assert to:
a. Have taken historical steps to transform the Alliance.
b. Have endorsed politico-military guidance for the development of options
for a future NATO-led military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina
following the end of SFOR's mandate.
c. Have completed the initial estimates of the resource implications for
accession of the three invitees, and have confirmed that the costs will be
manageable.
d. Have made significant progress has been made on developing the
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance.
e. NATO enlargement is part of a comprehensive process.
f. Welcome the confirmation by the invited countries of their willingness to
assume the rights and obligations of NATO membership and to meet the
associated political commitments.
g. Admitting new members will entail resource implications for the Alliance,
h. The Partnership for Peace continues to be the focal point of our efforts to
build with Partners new patterns of practical cooperation across a wide
range of security issues.
i. The Partnership for Peace has shown its value in contributing to stability
in Europe through the special assistance the Alliance is continuing to
provide to Albania, in the context of PfP and drawing on the experience of
the Italian-led Multinational Protection Force, in the rebuilding of its
national armed forces following the crisis in that country in early 1997.
j . The signature in Paris last May of the NATO-Russia Founding Act
marked the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between
NATO and Russia.
k. That the Ukraine has a key role to play in European security; and that
Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, democratic
development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapon
state are key factors for security and stability in Central and Eastern
Europe and on the continent as a whole.
,
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1. Believes the security of the Mediterranean region and the whole of Europe
are closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean,
m. Implementation of the CJTF concept will enhance the Alliance's ability to
plan and conduct quickly and effectively a wide range of military
operations employing multinational and multi-service forces capable of
being generated and deployed at short notice,
n. The Alliance Strategic Concept adopted by our Heads of State and
Government in Rome in 1991, sets out the principal aims and objectives of
the Alliance,
o. To succeed, the Peace Agreement must continue to be implemented in an
environment of general security,
p. A broad security dialogue would represent a significant element in
establishing regional stability,
q. NATO's interest in stability extends beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina to
the surrounding region,
r. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and
their means of delivery pose risks to the Alliance.
s. We strongly condemn all acts of terrorism.
b. The member nations direct to:
a. Urge all states that have not yet signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention to do so, and call upon those that have ratified to carry out
fully their obligations under the Convention.
b. Urge the Russian Federation to ratify the START II Treaty as soon as
possible, so that negotiations on START III can begin.
c. Urge Russia to honor its commitments as stated by President Yeltsin in
1992 to substantially reduce its tactical nuclear weapons stockpile.
d. Urge the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine to take the necessary
steps to permit its entry into force.
c. The member nations commit to:
a. Cooperate closely with the three invited countries through the coming
months, building on the successful accession talks this year; and we will
work for the timely ratification of the Protocols of Accession
b. Realize the full potential of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC).
c. Pursue vigorously our consultations and cooperation with Russia under the
auspices of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.
d. Carry forward our program of consultations and cooperation with Ukraine
under the new NATO-Ukraine Charter.
e. Carry out through our Mediterranean Cooperation Group a new round of
individual dialogues; with our six, Mediterranean Dialogue Partners, and
established a work program for cooperation.
f. Reinforce peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on Allied
solidarity and cohesion, as reflected in our common commitment to the
core function of collective defense, and in the maintenance of a strong
transatlantic link, a new cooperative partnership with other Euro-Atlantic
nations, building a ESDI within NATO, and the Alliance's effectiveness
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g.

h.
i.
j.

k.

1.
m.

n.

o.

p.

q.

r.

s.
t.
u.
v.

for the full range of its missions,
Continue our intensified dialogues with those nations that aspire to NATO
membership or otherwise wish to pursue a dialogue on membership
questions/
Endorse the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre and a
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit,
Increase further the effectiveness of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
and the enhanced Partnership for Peace, in cooperation with Partners,
Enhancing NATO's information efforts in Russia, and we expect to open a
NATO Documentation Centre in Moscow and encourage Russia to play an
active role in the EAPC and"the enhanced PfP.
Launching a rich and varied program of consultation and practical
cooperation with Ukraine and work with the Ukraine to develop a more
focused Individual Partnership Program.
Attach great importance to an early and successful completion of the
process of the Alliance's internal adaptation,
Develop the arrangements and procedures necessary for the planning,
preparation, conduct and exercise of WEU-led operations using NATO
assets and capabilities,
Endorse the terms of reference agreed by the Council in Permanent
Session for the examination, and updating as necessary, of the Alliance
Strategic Concept, as mandated by our Heads of State and Government in
Madrid,
Strengthening the OSCE as a primary instrument for early warning,
conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation as
well as for enhancing cooperative security and advancing democracy and
human rights,
To the full and unconditional implementation of the Peace Agreement in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the establishment of that country as a
single, democratic and multi-ethnic state,
Endorsed politico-military guidance to the NATO Military Authorities for
the development of options for a NATO-led military presence in Bosnia
and Herzegovina following the end of SFOR's mandate,
Organizing courses for military and civilian defense officials of Bosnia
and Herzegovina at the NATO School to promote reconciliation among
the formerly warring factions.
Launch an initial set of security cooperation activities with Bosnia and
Herzegovina to include both Entities and all three ethnic groups,
Endorse efforts to negotiate an effective verification regime to strengthen
the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,
Early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and an early
start to negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty,
Continue to support all efforts to combat terrorism, including using
arrangements in the Alliance for consultation on threats of a wider nature
that affect Alliance security interests. In accordance with our national
legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible
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to prevent and suppress this scourge.
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement
•.
Explicit Performative:
• The member nations hereby assert the Alliance will uphold its mission through
the reinforcement of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, based upon on
Allied solidarity and cohesion, as reflected in our common commitment to the
core function of collective defense, and in the maintenance of a strong
transatlantic link, a new cooperative partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations,
building a ESDI within NATO, and the Alliance's effectiveness for the full range
of its missions.
b. The member nations hereby encourage its members to ratify, accede and fully
implement NATO treaties and policies.
• The member nations hereby commit the Alliance to do the following:
a.r Continue with the comprehensive process of enlarging NATO;
b. Continue to remain open through the admission of new members into the
Alliance;
c. Provide broad cooperation with Partners in the EAPC and the enhanced
PfP;
d. Create' a strong, stable and enduring partnership with Russia and a
distinctive Partnership with Ukraine;
e. Continue to enhanced Mediterranean dialogue;
f. Strengthening the OSCE as a primary instrument for early warning,
conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation as
well as for enhancing cooperative security and advancing democracy and
human rights;
w. Continue efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina by endorsing politico-military
guidance to the NATO Military Authorities for the development of options
for a NATO-led military presence; launch an initial set of security
cooperation activities to include both Entities and all three ethnic groups;
g. Endorse and continue with measures for the proliferation of WMD; and
h. Continue to support all efforts to combat terrorism.
Reflective Intentions:
a. Assertion:
a. The member nations believe that it must uphold its mission through the
reinforcement of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area while being
able to< evolve and maintain the Alliance in the global security
environment.
b. The member nations want the Alliance upholds its mission by carry out
cooperative means through political and military measures.
b. Directive
5. The member nations believe that its utterance, in virtue of its authority
over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for to the member nations
to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
6. The member nations want is members to ratify, accede and fully
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command.
c. Commitment:
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a. The member nation believes that its utterance obligates the Alliance to
promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and the global
security environment on the condition that the member countries, as
reflected in our common commitment to the core function of collective
defense, and in the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link, a new
cooperative partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations, building a ESDI
within NATO, and the Alliance's effectiveness for the full range of its
missions.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directive on the
condition that the member countries will be able to promote peace and
security amongst themselves.
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).
___
Implicatures:
c. Assertion:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the
same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs the members
that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its members,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to the Alliance.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it
is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members it
is establishing political relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
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peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members
conflicts^can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries,
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force
if necessary,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members
will use force if necessary,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force,
is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries,
b. Directive:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
. i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a
part of the same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member
countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its members and other countries in the global security
environment,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive
to its members and other countries in the global security
environment.
\
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral
alliance commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries
and other countries
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships.
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ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
countries and other countries it is establishing political
relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries
and other countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment,
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment,
d. Commitment:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries
along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a
part of the same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the
member countries that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance
commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
r
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships.
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
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member countries it is establishing political relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment
to its member countries.
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will
use force if necessary,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries will use force if necessary,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is
relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative.
Presuppositions:
a. If the member nations are able to maintain an Allied solidarity and cohesion, as
reflected in our common commitment to the core function of collective defense,
and in the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link, a new cooperative
partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations, building a ESDI within NATO, and
the Alliance's effectiveness for the full range of its missions, then the Alliance
will be able to promote peace and stability in the whole Euro-Atlantic area and
throughout the global security environment.
b. If the member nations are not able to maintain an Allied solidarity and cohesion,
as reflected in our common commitment to the core function of collective
defense, and in the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link, a new cooperative
partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations, building a ESDI within NATO, and
the Alliance's effectiveness for the full range of its missions, then the Alliance
will not be able to promote peace and stability in the whole Euro-Atlantic area
and throughout the global security environment.
r
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APPENDIX L

DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 3

Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 3
•, •
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1998) 140 held at NATO HQ Brussels 8 Dec
1998
-^___
Speech Act: Assertion, Commitment and Directive
a. The member nations hereby assert to:
a. Celebrate the historic achievements of NATO as a strong, united and
successful Alliance.
b. We are pleased with the successful completion by all Allies of the
ratification process for the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland to the Washington Treaty.
c. The membership of these countries will contribute to an overall
strengthening of the Alliance and to enhancing security and stability in
Europe.
d. Reaffirm that the door remains open to NATO membership under Article
10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and in accordance with Paragraph 8 of the
Madrid Summit Declaration.
e. We are pleased that the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and an
enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) are resulting in a stronger
consultative forum and a more operational Partnership.
f. The Partnership for Peace continues to be the focal point of our efforts to
build with Partners new patterns of practical military and defense-related
cooperation across a wide range of issues.
g. Political-military framework will be a key element in future cooperation
and will provide for an increased role of Partners in one of the Alliance's
major new tasks.
h. Partnership for Peace programs can also play an important role in
contributing to Alliance efforts in reinforcing regional stability, such as in
the Balkans.
i. Encouraged by the developing process of consultation and practical
cooperation with Russia under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council
(PJC) and remain committed to working together with Russia to achieve a
strong, stable and enduring partnership, on the basis of the principles of
common interest, reciprocity and transparency, as called for in the NATORussia Founding Act.
j . The crisis in Kosovo has confirmed the value of the PJC as a consultative
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forum,
k. The Ukraine has a key role to play in European security.
1. Security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the
Mediterranean,
m. We therefore give great attention to our Mediterranean Dialogue which is
part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security, contributes to
building confidence with participating countries and mutually reinforces
other international efforts towards this end.
n. The establishment of the Kosovo Verification Missions has opened a new
stage in cooperation between NATO and the OSCE.
o. CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security,
p. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and
their means of delivery continue to be a matter of serious concern for the
Alliance,
q. We recognize that proliferation can pose a direct threat to the Alliance,
r. We underline the risk to international and regional stability posed by the
spread of NBC weapons.
s. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability which
can threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our
condemnation of terrorism.
b. The member nations hereby direct to:
a. Call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay.
b. Call upon all countries to accede to and implement the START II Treaty
indue course.
,
c. We urge all countries to accede to and fully implement the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.
d. We call on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to ratify the Open Skies Treaty
without delay.
c. The member nations hereby commit to:
a. Recommend to our Heads of State and Government that at the Washington
Summit they set out their shared vision of the Alliance in the years ahead an Alliance adapted, renewed and ready to meet the security challenges of
the 21st century.
b. Develop for the Washington Summit a comprehensive package that will
continue the enlargement process, operationalize our commitment to the
open door policy and underscore our willingness to assist aspiring
countries in meeting NATO standards.
c. Continue with internal adaption to be able to maintain the Alliance's
military effectiveness for the full range of its missions building on its
essential collective defense capabilities and its ability to react to a wide
range of contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and to develop
the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance.
d. Make recommendations on how best to further enhance the effectiveness
of ESDI within the Alliance, including the contribution made by all
European Allies, beyond the Washington Summit.
e. Ensure that the Strategic Concept is fully consistent with the Alliance's
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new security environment.
f. Reaffirm our commitment to collective defense and the transatlantic linktake account of the challenges the Alliance now faces; and present an
Alliance ready and with a full range of capabilities to enhance security and
stability for countries in the Euro-Atlantic area in the 21st century,
including through dialogue, cooperation and partnership and, where
appropriate, non-Article 5 crisis response operations, such as that in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the possible participation of partners. We
instructed the Council in Permanent Session to pursue this work
vigorously so that the new text is available by the time of the Washington
Summit.
g. Enhance future cooperation by establishing a basis for Partner
involvement in political consultations and decision-making, command
arrangements and operational planning for NATO-led non-Article 5
operations
h. Increased attention given to multinational formations as a means to
enhance military cooperation between Allies and Partners, as in
IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
i. Establish the NATO-Russia Scientific and Technological Cooperation
Committee,
j . Continue to work closely with Russia to develop an updated and
substantial Individual Partnership Program (IPP) to include a wide range
of practical defense-related and military-to-military cooperative activities^
k. Utilize as fully as possible the potential offered by Ukraine's active
participation in enhanced PfP and the agreed NATO-Ukraine Work Plan
for 1999.
1. Support an active information effort in Ukraine through the NATO
Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv.
m. Further improve the political, civil and military aspects of our Dialogue,
n. Support the efforts of the OSCE to develop a Document-Charter on
European Security,
o. A successful adaption of the CFE Treaty,
p. Prevent proliferation and to reversing it, should it occur, through
diplomatic means,
q. Prepare to expand NATO's efforts to address the evolving proliferation
threat,
r. Achieve progress on a legally binding / protocol including effective
verification measures to enhance compliance and promote transparency
that strengthens the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention.
s. Combat terrorism in accordance with our international commitments and
national legislation.
• :
.
'
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, and Enforcement
Explicit Performative:
a. The member nations hereby assert the Alliance is able to adapt, renew and is
ready to meet the security challenges of the 21 st century through security and
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stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.
b. The member nations hereby encourage its members to ratify, accede and fully
implement NATO treaties and policies.
c. The member nations hereby commit the Alliance to do the following:
a. Develop a comprehensive package that will continue the enlargement
process, pperationalize our commitment to the open door policy and
underscore our willingness to assist aspiring countries in meeting NATO
standards;
b. Continue with internal adaption;
c. Improve the political, civil and military aspects of the Alliance;
d. Prepare to expand NATO's efforts to address the evolving proliferation
threat; and
e. Combat terrorism in accordance with our international commitments and
national legislation.
.
Reflective Intentions:
a. Assertion
a. The member nations believes that its must be able to adapt, renew and is
ready to meet the security challenges of the 21 st century while maintaining
security and stability for its members nations and throughout the global
security environment.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to believe that it has the ability to
adapt, renew, and has the ability to be ready to meet the security
challenges in the global security environment while upholding security
and stability.
b. Directive
a. The member nations believe that its utterance, in virtue of its authority
over the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for to the member nations
to ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
b. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's command.
c. Commitment
a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the Alliance to
maintaining security and stability on the condition that it can develop a
comprehensive package that will continue the enlargement process;
operationalize our commitment to the open door policy and underscore our
willingness to assist aspiring countries in meeting NATO standards;
continue with internal adaption; improve the political, civil and military
aspects of the Alliance; prepare to expand NATO's efforts to address the
evolving proliferation threat; and combat terrorism in accordance with our
international commitments and national legislation.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the
condition that the member countries will be able to adapt, renew, and has
the ability to be ready to meet the security challenges in the global security
environment while upholding security and stability.
c. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).
Implicatures:
'
___
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e. Assertion:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the
same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members
that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its members,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to the Alliance.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it
is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it
is establishing political relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members
conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force
if necessary,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members
will use force if necessary.
_____
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use offeree
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is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries,
c. Directive:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a
part of the same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO directive informs the member countries and other
countries that they are fellow citizens,
iji. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its members and other countries in the global security
environment,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive
to its members and other countries in the global security
environment.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral
alliance commitment.
Hi. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries
and other countries
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
countries and other countries it is establishing political
relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries
and other countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully.
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
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f.

countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment,
Commitment:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries
along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a
part of the same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the
member countries that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance
commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries it is establishing political relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries conflicts cdn be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully.
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment
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to its member countries.
(
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will
use force if necessary,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries will use force if necessary,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is
relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative.
_______
Presuppositions:
a. If the member nations are able to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the security
challenges of the 21 st century, then the Alliance will be able to maintaining
security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security
environment.
b. If the member nations are not able to adapt, renew and is ready to meet the
security challenges of the 21 st century, then the Alliance will not be able to
maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the
global security environment.
_
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DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 4

Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 4
-..
. ' '
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (1999) 166 held at NATO HQ Brussels 15
Dec 1999
Speech Act: Assertion, Commitment, and Directive
a. The member nations hereby assert:
a. We set forth NATO's vision for the 21st century and approved an
updated Strategic Concept at the Washington Summit, where we also
celebrated the Alliance's 50th Anniversary.
b. We admitted as new members the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
c. We contributed decisively, in particular through the conduct of our air
campaign and the subsequent deployment of KFOR, to the international
community's objective of creating the basis for long-term peace and
stability in Kosovo.
d. The Kosovo air campaign, which demonstrated the cohesion and unity of
the Alliance and its determination to act, reinforced the diplomatic efforts
of the international community and achieved the key objectives of the
NATO Allies and their Partners.
e. We are determined to play our part in meeting in full the aims of the
international community as set out in UN Security Council Resolution
1244.
f. Close civil-military relations are essential for the success of our common
goals and of our peace-building efforts in the region.
g. The achievement of the de-militarization and the dissolution of the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) under the supervision of KFOR was an
important step in establishing an environment for post-conflict,
reconciliation.
h. Our individual bilateral efforts, the substantial role of the EU and that of
other international bodies, are making a decisive contribution to the
economic reconstruction of Kosovo.
i. We express our deep appreciation for the robust practical and political
support provided by Partner countries of the region throughout the air
campaign and thereafter. This support was and remains critical to
success.
j . The Alliance remains committed to supporting a peaceful future for
•• . •
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single democratic state composed of two
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multi-ethnic Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Republika Srpska.
SFOR has helped to secure a more stable and secure environment in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The important challenges remain, such as:
i. the return of displaced persons to minority areas;
ii. further reduction of both Entities'armed forces;
iii. further progress in humanitarian de-mining;
iv. improving the effectiveness of all common institutions, notably
the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and cooperation
between Entities;
v. transferring to the ICTY persons indicted for war crimes;
vi. the fight against corruption, organized crime and illegal secret
services;
vii. judicial and police reform; and
viii. the establishment of a state border service,
We remain concerned about continued tensions between Belgrade and
the democratically elected government of Montenegro,
The forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Croatia will
be crucial for its future,
Our experience in Kosovo has confirmed that NATO must continue to
adapt and improve its defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of
future multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions,
The DCI is essential to strengthening European defense capabilities and
the European pillar of NATO, so that European Allies will be able to
make a stronger and more coherent contribution to NATO,
The development of an effective ESDI will strengthen the Alliance,
through which we remain ready to pursue common security objectives
wherever possible,
Our readiness to define and adopt, in accordance with our decisions taken
in Washington, the necessary arrangements for European Union ready
access to separable but not separate NATO collective assets and
capabilities, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not
engaged militarily as an Alliance, respecting the requirements of NATO
operations and the coherence of its command structure.
The importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies, for the
necessary involvement of non-EU European Allies in these structures,
Participation of non-EU European Allies will enhance the effectiveness
of EU-led military operations and will contribute directly to the
effectiveness and vitality of the European pillar of NATO,
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council remains the key forum for regular
consultation on security and defense related issues between the Alliance
and its Partners,
Our aim remains to establish a strong, stable and enduring partnership
within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
We are deeply concerned about the conflict in Chechnya, continuing
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reports of civilian casualties there and the plight of displaced persons.
We condemn, in particular, Russian threats against unarmed civilians,
such as those in Grozny,
x. Acknowledging the right of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity and
to protect its citizens against terrorism and lawlessness,
y. We condemn terrorism in all its manifestations but believe that Russia's
pursuit of a purely military solution to the conflict is undermining its
legitimate objectives.
z. The Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance's
cooperative approach to security since security in the whole of Europe is
closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean,
aa. We reaffirm that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will
continue to play an important role in the achievement of NATO's
security objectives.
t
bb. The Adapted CFE Treaty will enhance security throughout Europe, not
least as it introduces a more constraining structure of National and
Territorial Ceilings, while permitting sufficient deployment flexibility for
routine training purposes and effective crisis management, thereby
ensuring NATO's ability to fulfill its responsibilities,
cc. NATO countries are concerned about continued Russian non-compliance
with the Treaty's Article V («flank») limits,
dd. The Alliance attaches importance to preserving strategic stability,
ee. The prevention of the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery
remains our primary aim.
ff. Recognize that proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC)
weapons and their means of delivery, which pose a potential threat to the
Allies' populations, territory and forces, can continue to occur despite our
preventive efforts and can pose a direct military threat to those
populations, territories and forces,
gg. In order to enhance the effectiveness of Civil-Military Cooperation,
confirmed in the Strategic Concept as essential to the Alliance's
operational capability, a fundamental review of civil emergency planning
in NATO is nearing completion,
hh. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability that
can threaten the territorial integrity of States,
ii. The terrorist threat against deployed NATO forces and NATO
installations requires the consideration and development of appropriate
measures for their continued protection taking full account of host nation
responsibilities,
b. The member nations hereby direct to:
a. Urge all community leaders in Kosovo, irrespective of their ethnic
background, to work together and with the international community in
the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic
society founded on the rule of law, tolerance and respect for human
rights.
b. Urge all parties to demonstrate fully their commitment to the Dayton
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process and their cooperation with the High Representative, as the basis
for further progress in transferring administrative responsibility to local
authorities.
c. Call upon the Presidency to implement in full the commitments made in
the New York Declaration of 15 November, and to support the work of
the Standing Committee on Military Matters.
d. Demand that all parties fully co-operate with the ICTY, in particular by
surrendering inductees within their territory.
e. Call on Belgrade and the government of Montegro to resolve their
differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any
destabilizing measures.
f. We encourage all aspirants to set themselves realistic, prioritized goals
and timelines and to allocate the necessary resources to them.
g. We encourage Russia to resume cooperation on the broad range of issues
foreseen in the Founding Act and to engage actively in the EAPC and the
Partnership for Peace.
h. Urge Russia to exercise the fullest restraint, to refrain from the use of
force against civilians and protect their human rights, to facilitate the
provision of humanitarian aid to those in need, and to co-operate fully
with international relief agencies and to ensure security for their
operations.
i. We urge Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict.
j . We encourage Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and
economic reforms, and reaffirm NATO's support for Ukraine's efforts to
this end.
k. Call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay.
1. Call upon all countries to accede to and implement the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty as soon as possible,
c. The member nations hereby commit to:
a. Take steps to further adapt the Alliance to the new security environment.
b. Further its fundamental security tasks, as set out in the Strategic Concept,
and the importance of our individual and collective efforts to achieve our
guiding objective of enhancing the security and stability of the EuroAtlantic area.
c. Review the status of NATO's comprehensive approach and continuing
commitment to the promotion of security, stability, peace and democracy,
and the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region, including through
the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, and
the implementation of NATO's South-East Europe Initiative.
d. Monitor closely the situation in South-East Europe.
e. Helping to establish a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo
where all peoples can live in peace and security and enjoy universal
human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through
participation in democratic institutions.
f. Continue to do our utmost to provide a secure environment and we will
give appropriate support for the conduct of free and fair elections under
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g.
h.
i.

j.
k.

1.

m.
n.
o.
p.
q.

r.
s.

t.
u.
v.
w.

x.

y.

the auspices of the OSCE.
Our goal of integrating all the countries of South-East Europe into the
Euro-Atlantic Community.
Building on the Alliance's already extensive cooperation in the region as
evidenced by NATO's leadership of the SFOR and KFOR operations.
Continue to contribute to the success of the Stability Pact by making
available its wealth of experience and expertise in practical military and
defense-related cooperation and by ensuring that our efforts complement
and contribute to the goals of the Pact.
Contribute to effective conflict prevention.
Continue to consider means to ensure an effective and coherent Alliance
contribution to the efforts of the international community to prevent and
defuse conflicts, and to make recommendations where and if appropriate.
Ensure that NATO's forces can meet the challenges of mobility,
deployability, sustainability, effective engagement, survivability and
interoperable and effective command, control and communications
systems.
Reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar.
Take into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU.
Reaffirms its commitment to remain open to new members.
Further enhance Partnership for Peace and make it more operational.
Endorse the Operational Capabilities Concept which will reinforce PfP's
operational capabilities and improve the capability and interoperability of
Parmer forces, as well as enhance the Alliance's overall ability to put
together tailored force packages to mount and sustain future NATO-led
PfP operations along the lines of SFOR and KFOR.
Continue to attach importance to consultations and practical cooperation
with Russia.
Support the efforts of the Joint Working Group on Defense Reform and
remain prepared to provide advice, as appropriate, to assist Ukraine with
the transformation of its defense establishment. In the economic area, we
welcome the initiation of a program for the retraining of retired military
officers.
Efforts aimed at reducing nuclear weapons.
An early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Remain committed to preventing proliferation and reversing it where it
has occurred through diplomatic means.
Support deepening consultations with Russia in these areas within the
Permanent Joint Council, as well as with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine
Commission and with other Partners in the EAPC, as well as with the
Mediterranean Dialogue countries.
Consider options for confidence and security building measures,
verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament, in the
light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of
nuclear weapons.
Condemnation of terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in
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'
accordance with our international commitments and national legislationRules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force
Explicit Performative:
d. The member nations hereby assert the Alliance has been able to adapt, renew and
is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21 st century by maintaining
stability and security; ensuring the effectiveness of bilateral and multinational
operations across the full range of Alliance missions; maintaining civil-military
relations; implementing robust practical and political support provided by
Partner countries; having the ability to define, adopt, and evolve policies; and
establishing a strong, stable and enduring partnerships within the framework of
the Alliance.
e. The member nations hereby direct the following:
a. Member countries to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties
and policies;
b. Leaders in Kosovo to work together and with the international
community in the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a
democratic society;
c. Belgrade and the government of Montegro to resolve their differences in
a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any destabilizing
measures;
d. Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict; and
e. Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic reforms.
f. The member nations hereby commit to the following:
a. Further adapt the Alliance to the new security environment while still
maintaining security and stability;
b: Continue to consider means to ensure an effective and coherent Alliance
contribution to the efforts of the international community to prevent and
defuse conflicts, and to make recommendations where and if appropriate
c. Monitor closely the situation in South-East Europe;
d. Continue efforts in Kosovo and other areas of involvement of the
Alliance;
e. Help to establish a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo;
f. Contribute to effective conflict prevention;
g. Reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar;
h. To remain open to new members.
i. Continue to attach importance to consultations and practical cooperation
with Russia and the Ukraine;
j . Efforts aimed at reducing nuclear weapons; and
k. Reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our
international commitments and national legislation.
Reflective Intentions:
d. Assertion:
a. The member nations believe the Alliance has been able to adapt, renew
and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21 st century.
b. The member nations want its members to believe it has adapted,
renewed, arid is ready in the global security environment based upon the
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Alliance's ability to maintain stability and security; ensuring the
effectiveness of bilateral and multinational operations across the full
range of Alliance missions; maintaining civil-military relations;
implementing robust practical and political support provided by Partner
countries; having the ability to define, adopt, and evolve policies; and
establishing a strong, stable and enduring partnerships within the
framework of the Alliance.
e. Directive:
a. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for to the member nations to
ratify, accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
i. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's
command.
b. The member nation believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for leaders to work together
and with the international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo
and the establishment of a democratic society.
i. The member nations want the leaders of Kosovo to work together
and with the international community in the reconstruction of
Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic society because of
NATO's command.
c. The member nations believe in its utterance, virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for both parties to resolve their
differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any
destabilizing measures.
i. The member nations want the parties of Belgrade and Montegro
to resolve their differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and
refrain from any destabilizing measures because of NATO's
command.
d. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for Russia to open all avenues
for a political solution to the conflict.
i. The member nations want Russia to open all avenues for a
political solution to the conflict because of NATO's command.
1. The member nations believe in its utterance, virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the Ukraine to move
forward with its democratic and economic reforms.
i. The member nations want the Ukraine to move forward with its
democratic and economic reforms because of NATO's command.
f. Commitment:
a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the Alliance to adapt,
renew and is ready to meet the security challenges of the 21 st century on
the condition that the member countries want to maintain stability and
security; ensure the effectiveness of bilateral and
multinational
operations across the full range of Alliance missions; maintain civil273

military relations; implement robust practical and political support
provided by Partner countries; have the ability to define, adopt, and
evolve policies; and establish a strong, stable and enduring partnerships
within the framework of the Alliance.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the
condition that the member nations would be able to maintain the ability
to adapt, renew, and have the ability to be ready to meet the security
challenges in the global security environment while upholding security
and stability
c. NATO wants the member nations to believe (a) and (b).
Implicatures:
g. Assertion:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of
the same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs the members
that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is
relevant to its members,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
assertion to the Alliance.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members
it is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
assertion to its member countries.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members
it is establishing political relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
assertion to its member countries.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully.
•.
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members
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conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
assertion to its member countries,
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use
force if necessary,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members
will use force if necessary,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of
force is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
assertion to its member countries,
d. Directive:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a
part of the same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member
countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is
relevant to its members and other countries in the global security
environment.
\
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
directive to its members and other countries in the global security
environment.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral
alliance commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries
and other countries
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global
security environment.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
countries and other countries it is establishing political
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relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries
and other countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global
security environment,
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
'
peacefully.
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully.
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
assertion to its member countries and other countries in the global
security environment,
h. Commitment:
<
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries
along with other countries around the world and their citizens are
a part of the same race-human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the
member countries that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is
relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance
commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries it is establishing political relationships.
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
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through political relationships is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries,
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
," e, NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will
use force if necessary,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries will use force if necessary,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is
relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative.
.
.
Presuppositions:
c. If the member nations have the ability to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the
security challenges of the 21 st century, then the Alliance will be able to maintain
security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security
environment,
a. If the member nations do not possess the ability to able to adapt, renew, and be
ready to meet the security challenges of the 21 st century, then the Alliance will
not be able to maintaining security and stability for its member nations and
throughout the global security environment.
-.
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APPENDIX N

DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 5

Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 5
"
•' ."
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2000) 124 held at NATO HQ Brussels 15
Dec 2000
.
.
: .'
Speech Act:
a. The member nations hereby assert:
a. Reaffirm NATO's strong commitment to the achievement of security,
stability, peace, democracy and respect for human rights in South-East
Europe and will continue to pursue this objective vigorously, primarily
through the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and in Kosovo.
b. Reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all
countries in the region.
c. Welcoming the democratic changes that have taken place in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) after September's parliamentary and
presidential elections.
d. The democratic changes in the FRY will pave the way for increased
stability across the region and offer new opportunities for regional
cooperation.
e. Recent acts of violence by insurgent elements in the Presevo Valley and
the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) adjacent to the internal boundary between
Kosovo and Serbia, are of concern to NATO and KFOR.
f. Condemn the violence caused by extremists and call on the perpetrators to
cease their illegal activity forthwith. Any extremist activity and the
possibility of an escalation of violence present a continuing threat to
stability in the region, especially for neighboring countries.
g. Reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of UNSCR 1244.
h. The municipal elections in late October were a milestone for democratic
development in Kosovo,
i. The protection and security of all the people of Kosovo remain a priority,
j . Violence from any quarter, whether ethnically, politically or criminally
motivated, is unacceptable,
k. Concerned about the high level of organized crime which is a continuing
threat to the people of Kosovo and neighboring countries.
1. Greater and more rapid progress needs to be made in Bosnia and
Herzegovina towards a self-sustaining, multi-ethnic democracy.
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m. Those important challenges remain. In particular, further progress must be
achieved in market reform, economic re-construction and the creation of a
self-sustaining economy and a single economic space; the adjudication of
property claims enabling the return of refugees and displaced persons
especially to areas in which their ethnic groups are in the minority;
improving the effectiveness of all state level institutions and cooperation
between Entities; transferring to the ICTY persons indicted for war
crimes; the fight against corruption, organized crime and illegal secret
services; judicial and police reform; and the full functioning of the State
Border Service. We support the High Representative in his, use of the
authority accorded to him to advance this agenda.
n. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs armed forces with a unified command and
control capable of joint deployment and joint action under international
and regional security organizations.
o. NATO's efforts are aimed at enabling the countries of the region to work
together to ensure their own security and thus support and complement the
objectives of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe.
p. DCI will provide the forces and capabilities the Alliance urgently requires
to meet the security challenges of the 21st century by ensuring the
effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of
Alliance missions.
q. The implementation of DCI will depend on the adequacy of national
defense budgets.
r. The DCI will also promote greater interoperability among Alliance forces
and, where applicable, between Allied and Partner forces.
s. Reaffirmed our determination to reinforce NATO's European pillar and
remain committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership.
t. Alliance will remain the foundation for the collective defense of its
members and continue actively to play its important role in crisis
management as set out in the Strategic Concept.
u. The European Allies are committed to further strengthening their military
capabilities and to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar. This will
enhance their ability to contribute both to the Alliance's missions and to
EU-led operations for Petersberg tasks where the Alliance as a whole is
not engaged.
v. The Alliance agrees that these proposals constitute the basis for the
permanent NATO/EU agreement.
w. Reaffirm the Alliance's commitment to remain open to new members.
x. We believe that Partnership is pivotal to the role of the Alliance in
promoting security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and
contributes to the enhancement of the Alliance's capabilities in crisis
management.
y. We value highly the continuing progress in making the Partnership for
Peace more operational and look forward to reviewing progress on these
initiatives at our next meeting.
z. We value our ongoing consultations and cooperation with Russia in the
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framework of the PJC on such issues as strategy, defense policy and
military doctrines, infrastructure development programs, nuclear weapons,
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery, theatre missile defense, air defense, and other disarmament and
arms control issues, including CFE and Open Skies, scientific and
environmental issues, civil emergency preparedness, and the retraining of
discharged military personnel.
aa. Great importance to the further development of military-to-military
cooperation and are pursuing our negotiations with Russia with a view to
opening a NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow in the near future,
as called for in the Founding Act.
bb. Reaffirm that a mutually satisfactory, just and durable solution to the
conflict in Chechnya is urgent and essential and that the parties must take
steps to begin a dialogue that can lead to a settlement.
cc. Acknowledging the right of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity and
its right and responsibility to protect all its citizens against criminality and
terrorism which we condemn in all its forms.
dd. We deplore the continued loss of life and material damage inflicted upon
the civilian population; this calls for prompt and independent investigation
of violations of human rights and breaches of international law.
ee. We recall the importance we attach to the efforts of humanitarian
assistance organizations to relieve the suffering of the displaced and call
on Russia to support them fully.
ff. We value our relationship with an independent, democratic and stable
Ukraine and Ukraine's contribution to ensuring stability in Central and
Eastern Europe and the continent as a whole.
gg. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is an essential part of the Alliance's
cooperative approach to security, since security in the whole of Europe is
closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean.
hh. Reaffirm the progressive nature of the Dialogue.
ii. Early entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty will ensure CFE's
continuing viability as a cornerstone of European security and stability.
jj. Believe ratification by our governments can only be envisaged in the
context of compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty's agreed levels
of armaments and equipment and consistent with the commitments
contained in the CFE Final Act.
kk. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and
their means of delivery continue to be a matter of serious concern for the
Alliance as it poses risks to international and regional security and can
pose a direct military threat to Allies' populations, territory and forces.
11. We continue to place great importance on non-proliferation regimes,
international arms control and disarmament, and export control regimes as
means to prevent proliferation.
mm.
We reaffirm that the Alliance's defense posture must have the
capability to address appropriately and effectively the risks associated
with the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery.
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nn. We continue to emphasize the importance of universal accession and
adherence to, as well as full compliance with, the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
00. We deplore the recent terrorist attacks against nationals of several NATO
countries and deeply regret the tragic loss of life.
pp. Terrorism constitutes a threat to internal and international security, to
peaceful relations between States and to their territorial integrity, to the
development and functioning of democratic institutions throughout the
world and to the enjoyment of human rights and civil liberties,
qq. We strongly condemn this scourge in all its manifestations, and reiterate
our strong determination to combat it in{ full compliance with all our
international commitments and national legislation,
b. The member nations hereby direct to:
a. Call upon the new representatives on the Kosovo municipal councils to
carry out their duties responsibly, in close cooperation with the
international community.
b. Call upon all Rosovo inhabitants to support the significant efforts being
made by KFOR and UNMIK to strengthen the rule of law.
c. Call upon all communities in Kosovo to work towards this goal in
cooperation with KFOR and UNMIK.
d. Call on the newly elected leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to commit
themselves to the full implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords,
taking on greater responsibility for and ownership of the process. In
particular, we encourage them to redouble their efforts to improve the
functioning of state level institutions.
e. Urge the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the objectives
of Annex I B of the Dayton Peace Agreement concerning confidencebuilding and security measures.
f. Urge Russia to respect its international obligations as a member of the
UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, as well as the relevant principles
enshrined in the Founding Act.
g. Call on the Chechen side to co-operate in good faith in seeking a solution
to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take action against it.
h. We urge the Russian government to expedite the OSCE Assistance
Group's return to Chechnya under its existing mandate.
i. Encourage Ukraine to pursue these efforts, and in that regard we welcome
the approval of Ukraine's state program for the reform of the armed
forces, and the recent Presidential Decree on its implementation.
j . Although the Alliance is not involved in the Middle East Peace Process,
we strongly support it and urge all participants to remain firmly committed
to it.
k. We call upon the States participating in the negotiations on regional
stability under the Accords to make use of the fresh impetus generated by
the participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the OSCE, with
the aim of concluding their work by the agreed deadline.
1. Call on Russia and Belarus to ratify the Open Skies Treaty to allow it to
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enter into force as soon as possible,
m. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of
nuclear disarmament,
n. We welcomed Russian ratification of the START II Treaty.
0. We will encourage countries that are not part of the MTCR to subscribe to
and adopt its principles, commitments, confidence-building measures and
incentives.
c. The member nations hereby commit to:
a. Promote long-term stability based on regional reconciliation, good
neighborliness, confidence-building measures, regional cooperation, a
lasting resolution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY).
•b." Continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and
democratic Kosovo where its entire people, irrespective of ethnic origin or
religion, can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights
and freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in
democratic institutions.
c. Support the efforts of the SRSp to establish local democratic, selfgoverning institutions in Kosovo.
d. Support the efforts of the international community to establish a
functioning judicial system in Kosovo, but acknowledge that much work
remains to be done in this respect.
e. The full implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
f. Continue to work closely, in particular through SFOR, with the High
Representative and with other organizations, such as the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Police Task
Force (IPTF) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY).
g. Endorse SFOR's continuing close working relationship with the civilian
agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
h. Assist in drawing up a similar program for Albania.
i. Contributing to the Stability Pact effort to develop a South-East Europe
regional civil-military emergency response capability through its Disaster
Prevention and Preparedness Initiative.
j . Providing sufficient resources to ensure its implementation.
k. Making the most effective use of resources and to finding innovative
approaches to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of
national contributions and possible cooperative and collective
arrangements and mechanisms, including multinational, joint and common
funding.
1. To provide, subject to the necessary decisions, further expert advice upon
request by the EU.
m. To work for permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency,
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consultation and cooperation between NATO and the EU.
n. Develop cooperation and consultations between NATO and the EU on
questions of common interest relating to security, defense and crisis
management, so that crises can be met with the most appropriate military
response and effective crisis management ensured.
o. Intensify consultation in times of crisis, which will also enable non-EU
European Allies to raise their concerns when they consider their security
interests might be involved.
p^ Continue to work on the ESDI within the Alliance as directed at the
Washington Summit and agreed at subsequent Ministerial meetings.
q. To put in place arrangements for: assured EU access to NATO planning
capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;
the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO
capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations; the
identification of a range of European command options for EU-led
operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to
assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities; and the further
adaptation of the Alliance's defense planning system, taking account of
relevant activities in and proposals from the European Union. Allies will
be consulted on the EU's proposed use of assets and capabilities, prior to
the decision to release these assets and capabilities, and kept informed
during the operation.
r. Continue to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring
countries on their preparations for possible future membership.
s. Continue to place high priority on the strengthening of our partnership
with all members of the Euro-Atlantic community through the EAPC and
the Partnership for Peace.
t. Continue to develop the EAPC as a key forum for political consultation
and practical cooperation on Euro-Atlantic security issues.
u. Continue efforts in the EAPC/PfP framework to support broader efforts
underway to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and
in support of global humanitarian mine action and the promotion of
International Humanitarian Law, among other EAPC priority areas.
v. Further develop cooperation on information and outreach opportunities
and welcome Partners' continuing interest in cooperation in civil
emergency preparedness.
w. To the full implementation of the Political-Military Framework for
NATO-led PfP operations.
x. Building a strong, stable and enduring partnership with the Russian
Federation in accordance with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, on the
basis of the principles of transparency and reciprocity.
y. Continue dialogue and cooperation in the framework of the PJC on issues
relating to the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, building on the valuable
"experience of practical cooperation with Russian forces in both SFOR and
KFOR.
z. Implementing the program of cooperation between NATO and Russia on
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search and rescue at sea agreed by PJC Defense Ministers on 5 December
2000 and to the early signature of a Memorandum of Understanding with
Russia on environmental protection,
aa. Support the implementation of Ukraine's defense reform and welcome the
enhanced role and new initiatives of the Joint Working Group on Defense
Reform,
bb. Consider ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of our
cooperative relations with all the Mediterranean partners in accordance
with the Washington Summit decisions, in areas where NATO can bring
an added value and where partners have expressed interest,
cc. Support the implementation of such an agreement within the framework of
the Stability Pact for South-East Europe,
dd. Pursue vigorously implementation of the recommendations contained in
the CFE Treaty, including with Russia through the PJC.
ee. Continued work in NATO inter alia on Theatre Missile Defense for point
and area defense, in particular on the feasibility study on a possible system
for the defense of deployed NATO forces,
ff. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as an important
element in our efforts to counter the proliferation of means for delivering
Weapons of mass destruction.
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force
Explicit Performative:
b. The member nations hereby assert to uphold and maintain stability and security
for the Alliance, its members nations and their citizens by remaining strongly
committed to the achievement of security, stability, peace, democracy and respect
for human rights for its member countries and in out -of-area mission, including
South-East Europe; remain steadfast and adhere to policies and treaties; continue
to pursue this objective vigorously, primarily through the NATO-led
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo; condemn all
acts of violence and terrorism; enable the countries of the region to work together
to ensure their own security; further strengthening their military capabilities and
to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar; continue cooperative efforts to work
with Russia and any situations which arise concerning the nation; and finally
continue to condemn all acts of terrorism and violence.
c. The member nations hereby direct the following:
a. Member countries to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties
and policies;
b. Encourage non-member countries to subscribe to and adopt its principles,
commitments, confidence-building measures and incentives.
c. Representatives and leaders in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina to carry
out their duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation
with the international community and adhere to all treaties and policies;
d. Urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to
the conflict; and
e. Encourage Ukraine to move forward on its current path of political and
economic reform. ;
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d. The member nations hereby commit to the following:
d. Promote long-term stability based on regional reconciliation, good
neighborliness, confidence-building measures, regional cooperation, a
lasting resolution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and
cooperation;
e. Continue working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and
democratic for all member nations and in out-of-mission areas where all
its people, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and
security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis,
including through participation in democratic institutions;
f. Providing sufficient resources to ensure its implementation to efficiently
carry out policies, treaties, and out-of-area mission;
g. Effectively use resources and find innovative approaches to overcoming
shortfalls in capabilities, taking advantage of national contributions and
possible cooperative and collective arrangements and mechanisms,
including multinational, joint and common funding.
h. To work for permanent arrangements to ensure full transparency,
consultation and cooperation between member nations, especially in
regards to NATO and the EU;
i. Intensify consultation in times of crisis;
j . Continue to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the aspiring
countries on their preparations for possible future membership; and
k. Consider ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of our
cooperative relations with all partners.
. • • - • '
Reflective Intentions:
b. Assertion:
a. The member nations believe the Alliance has been able to maintain and
uphold its original mission; as such the Alliance needs to adapt, renew,
and be ready to meet the challenges of the global security environment.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to be able to maintain and uphold
its original mission while being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet
the challenges of the global security environment based upon the
Alliance's ability to remain strongly committed to the achievement of
security, stability, peace, democracy and respect for human rights for its
member countries and in out -of-area mission, including South-East
Europe; remain steadfast and adhere to policies and treaties; continue to
pursue this objective vigorously, primarily through the NATO-led
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo;
condemn all acts of violence and terrorism; enable the countries of the
region to work together to ensure their own security; further strengthening
their military capabilities and to reinforcing the Alliance's European
pillar; continue cooperative efforts to work with Russia and any situations
which arise concerning the nation; and finally continue to condemn all
acts of terrorism and violence.
c. Directive:
. 7 '
a. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
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the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the member nations to ratify,
accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies,
i. The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's
command.
b. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage non-member
countries to subscribe to and adopt its principles, commitments,
confidence-building measures and incentives.
i.
The member nations want to encourage non-member countries to
subscribe to and adopt its principles, commitments, confidencebuilding measures and incentives because of NATO's command.
c. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the representatives and
leaders in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina to carry out their duties
responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with the
international community and adhere to all treaties and policies.
i.
The member nations want the representatives and leaders in
Kosovo, Bosnia, and Herzegovina to carry out their duties
responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with the
international community and adhere to all treaties and policies
because of NATO's command.
d. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to urge Russia and Chechnya to
cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict.
i.
The member nations want to urge Russia and Chechnya to
cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict because of
NATO's command,
f. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Ukraine to move
forward on its current path of political and economic reform,
i. The member nations want the Ukraine to move forward on its
current path of political and economic reform because of NATO's
command,
d. Commitment:
1. The member nations believes its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able
to maintain and uphold its original mission while being able to adapt,
renew, and be ready to meet the challenges of the global security
environment on the condition that its member countries want to promote
long-term stability based on regional reconciliation, good neighborliness,
confidence-building measures, regional cooperation, a lasting resolution to
the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and cooperation; continue
working towards a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and democratic
for all member nations and in out-of-mission areas where all its people,
irrespective of ethnic origin or religion, can live in peace and security and
enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including
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through participation in democratic institutions; provide sufficient
resources to ensure its implementation to efficiently carry out policies,
treaties, and out-of-area mission; effectively use resources and find
innovative approaches to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, taking
,
advantage of national contributions and possible cooperative and
collective arrangements and mechanisms, including multinational, joint
and common funding; work for permanent arrangements to ensure full
transparency, consultation and cooperation between member nations,
especially in regards to NATO and the EU; intensify consultation in times
of crisis; continue to provide advice, feedback and assistance to the
aspiring countries on their preparations for possible future membership;
and consider ways to strengthen the political and practical dimensions of
our cooperative relations with all partners,
m. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the
condition that the member nations will be able to maintain and uphold its
original mission while being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet
the challenges of the global security environment.
n. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).
Implicatures:
i. Assertion:
•,'."•'
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the
same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members
that they are fellow citizens,
hi. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its members,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to the Alliance.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members it
is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment.
Hi. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it
is establishing political relationships.
,
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iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
r
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members
conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
hi. Relevance: NATO member nations'are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force
if necessary,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members
will use force if necessary,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force
is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries,
e. Directive:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a
part of the same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member
countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its members and other countries in the global security
environment,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive
to its members and other countries in the global security
environment.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral
alliance commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries
and other countries
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
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to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
countries and other countries it is establishing political
relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries
and other countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries andpther countries in the global security
environment,
Commitment:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries
along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a
part of the same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the
member countries that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance
commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries.
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
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commitment to its member countries.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries it is establishing political relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations' are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment
to its member countries.
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will
use force if necessary,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries will use force if necessary,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is
relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative.
Presuppositions:
a., If the member nations are able to maintain and uphold its original mission while
being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the challenges of the global
security environment, then the Alliance will be able to maintaining security and
stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment,
b. If the member nations are not able to maintain and uphold its original mission
while being able to adapt, renew, and be ready to meet the challenges of the
global security environment, then the Alliance will not be able to maintaining
security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security
environment.
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APPENDIX O

DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 6

Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 6
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2001) 158 held at NATO HQ Brussels 6 Dec
2001
'. . Speech Act: Assertion, Commitment, and Directive
a. The member nations hereby assert:
a. The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 resulted in
the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in
the history of the Alliance.
b. We deplore the loss of life which affected so many NATO members and
partner countries.
c. To reaffirm that a confident and cooperative partnership between the
Allies and Russia, based on shared democratic values and the shared
commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, as enshrined in
the NATO-Russia Founding Act, is essential for stability and security in
the Euro-Atlantic area.
d. We support Russia's right to protect her territorial integrity, and recognize
her right to protect all citizens against terrorism and criminality.
e. The Alliance has played a particularly active role in promoting stability
and security in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in close
cooperation with the European Union (EU) and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
f. We reaffirm Our condemnation of the use of violence for political ends.
g. We recognize the crucial contribution NATO's Partner countries are
making to the Alliance's efforts to foster peace and stability in the EuroAtlantic region.
h. The events of 11 September have underlined the importance of enhanced
cooperation between the two organizations on questions of common
interest relating to security, defense, and crisis management, so that crises
would be met with the most appropriate military response and effective
crisis management ensured. Important work remains to be done on the
arrangements for NATO support to EU-led operations, in accordance with
the decisions taken at the 1999 NATO~ Washington Summit and
subsequent Ministerial meetings,
i. Events on and since 11 September show that our security is challenged in
a variety of different, sometimes unpredictable, ways.
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j.

We reaffirm that the Alliance must have the capability to defend
appropriately and effectively against the threats that the proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery can pose.
k. The Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the
Alliance's security objectives.
1. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament along with deterrence
and defense play an essential role in enhancing security against these new
threats and challenges. In this context, the role that missile defense could
play is being actively considered as we continue our consultations with the
United States on this issue,
b. The member nations hereby direct to:
a. Urge Russia to build on the steps towards establishing a political dialogue
with Chechnya and find a prompt and lasting political and peaceful
resolution to the conflict and to respect and protect the human and legal
rights of the population.
b. Gall on the Chechen side to cooperate in good faith in seeking a political
solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take actions against it.
c. Urge all parties involved in promoting stability and security in close
cooperation EU and OSCE to implement the Framework Agreement in
full, and to continue to cooperate with the international community.
d. We encourage the newly elected leaders of Kosovo to exercise their new
functions in strict compliance with United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1244 and the constitutional framework for provisional selfgovernment and in full cooperation with UNMIK and KFOR. We also
call on them to establish effective cooperation with the authorities of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
e. Encourage all our Partners to seek a more active relationship with the
Alliance.
f. Encourage Ukraine to continue to take concrete steps to take its reform
process forward and stand ready to assist it in this regard.
c. The member nations hereby commit to:
a. Upholding it's allegiance to its member states and its policies regarding
the attacks of 11 September 2001.
b. Taken stock of NATO's broad agenda, and given further guidance on its
implementation.
c. Forge a new relationship with Russia, enhancing our ability to work
together in areas of common interest.
d. Explore and develop, in the coming months, building on the Founding
Act, new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint
decision, and coordinated/joint action.
e. Intensifying our cooperation in the common goals of a strong, stable and
enduring partnerships and other areas, including non-proliferation, export
control and arms control matters, arms transparency and confidence
building measures, missile defense, search and rescue at sea, and militaryto-military cooperation,, which represents a major step towards a
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f.

g.

h.
i.

j.

k.
1.

m.

n.

o.
p.

q.
r.

s.
t.

qualitatively new relationship.
Continuing the enlargement process of the Alliance and will encourage the
nine aspirant countries to continue focused efforts to prepare for possible
future membership, making full use of the opportunities offered through
our Membership Action Plan (MAP).
A peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe, and our
determination to oppose all violence, whether ethnically, politically or
criminally motivated.
Support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in
South-East Europe.
Promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, good neighborliness,
stable and secure borders, protection of rights of members of all ethnic
groups and minorities, confidence-building measures, a lasting solution to
the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and full cooperation with
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
NATO's operations in the Balkans and possibilities for rationalization and
an enhanced regional approach, recognizing the need for continued close
consultation with other international organizations involved.
The territorial integrity of the Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia.
Stand ready to continue to contribute to security by providing support for
the EU and OSCE monitors for a further three-month period, as part of its
contribution to peace and stability in the country.
The full implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and call on all political leaders in this country
to continue to renounce separatism and violence, to support democratic
institutions and to take on greater responsibility for and ownership of the
process of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement.
Strongly endorse the respective efforts of SFOR and the ICTY to detain
and bring to trial persons indicted for war crimes. In this context, we
reiterate that the Entities carry primary responsibility for bringing to
justice persons indicted for war crimes, and urge them to cooperate more
effectively with SFOR to this end.
Further broaden and strengthen cooperation in the framework of the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP).
Broaden and strengthen cooperation with our Mediterranean partners, and
invite them to intensify their dialogue with us on security matters of
common concern.
Achieving a close, transparent and coherent NATO-EU relationship.
Make progress on all the various aspects of our relationship, noting the
need to find solutions satisfactory to all Allies on the issue of participation
by non-EU European Allies.
Ensure that Alliance forces have the best possible capabilities to meet
these challenges and are able to work together seamlessly.
Continue to work together to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy
to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and
defense efforts.
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u. Contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 NonProliferation Treaty Review Conference and will work towards a
successful outcome of the upcoming review,
v. Support ongoing efforts to achieve an International Code of Conduct
against Ballistic Missile Proliferation before the end of 2002.
w. Swift resolution of remaining issues between Russia and Georgia.
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force
Explicit Performative:
c. The member nations hereby assert in order to uphold and maintain stability and
security in a post 9-11 environment for the Alliance, its members nations and their
citizens it is essential that confident and cooperative partnerships, based on shared
democratic values and the shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided
Euro-Atlantics are upheld; continuing to uphold current policies and treaties;
condemning all use of violence and terrorism for either military or political
means; continue to engage in current and future out-of-area mission; and
reaffirming the necessity of having the capability to defend appropriately and
effectively against threats.
d. The member nations hereby direct the following:
a. Member countries to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties
and /• policies and to continue to cooperate with the international
community;
b. Urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to
the conflict
c. Encourage the elected leaders of Kosovo to exercise their new functions in
strict compliance and carry out their duties responsibly and work together
and in close cooperation with the international community and adhere to
all treaties and policies;
d. Encourage all our Partners to seek a more active relationship with the
Alliance; and
e. Encourage Ukraine to continue to take concrete steps to take its reform
process forward.
e. The member nations hereby commit to the following: h. Upholding it's allegiance to its member states and its policies regarding
the attacks of 11 September 2001;
i. Continue to uphold existing relationships and forge new relationships
Russia;
j . Explore and develop, in the coming months, new, effective mechanisms
for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action;
k. Continuing the enlargement process;
1. To develop a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the
Balkans;
m. Promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, good neighborliness,
stable and secure borders, protection of rights of members of all ethnic
groups and minorities, confidence-building measures, and lasting solution
to the problem of refugees and displaced persons;
n. NATO's operations in the Balkans and possibilities for rationalization and
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an enhanced regional approach, recognizing the need for continued close
consultation with other international organizations involved.
o. Continue to denounce terrorism and all acts of violence;
p. Further broaden and strengthen cooperation in the framework of the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP);
q. Ensure that Alliance forces have the best possible capabilities to meet
these challenges and are able to work together seamlessly;
r. Continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these
challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts;
and
s. Find a swift resolution of remaining issues between Russia and Georgia.
Reflective Intentions:
c. Assertion:
a. The member nations believe that the Alliance needs to be able to uphold
and maintain stability and security in the post 9-11 in order to meet the
challenges of the global security environment.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to be able to uphold and maintain
stability and security in the post 9-11 environment by being confident and
cooperative partnerships, based on shared democratic values and the
shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Euro-Atlantics are
upheld; continuing to uphold current policies and treaties; condemning all
use of violence and terrorism for either military or political means;
continue to engage in current and future out-of-area mission; and
reaffirming the necessity of having the capability to defend appropriately
and effectively against threats.
d. Directive:
a. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the member nations to ratify,
accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
i.
The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's
command.
b. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority oyer
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to urge Russia and Chechnya to
cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict.
i.
The member nations want to urge Russia and Chechnya to
cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict because of
NATO's command.
c. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the elected leaders of
Kosovo to exercise their new functions in strict compliance and carry out
their duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with
the international community and adhere to all treaties and policies.
i.
The member nations want the elected leaders of Kosovo to
exercise their new functions in strict compliance and carry out their
duties responsibly and work together and in close cooperation with
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the international community and adhere to all treaties and policies
because of NATO's command.
f. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for all Partners to seek a more
active relationship with the Alliance.
i. NATO wants all Partners to seek a more active relationship with
the Alliance because of NATO's command.
g. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance; constitutes sufficient reason for the Ukraine to continue to
take concrete steps to take its reform process forward.
i. The member nations want the Ukraine to continue to take concrete
steps to take its reform process forward because of NATO's
command,
e. Commitment:
s
a. The member nations believe its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able
to be able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the post 9-11 in
order to meet the challenges of the global security environment on
condition that the member nations indicate they would uphold its
allegiance to its member states and its policies regarding the attacks of 11
September 2001; continue to uphold existing relationships and forge new
relationships Russia; explore and develop, in the coming months, new,
effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and
coordinated/joint action; continuing the enlargement process; develop a
peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans;
promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, good neighborliness,
stable and secure borders, protection of rights of members of all ethnic
groups and minorities, confidence-building measures, and lasting solution
to the problem of refugees and displaced persons; continue to denounce
terrorism and all acts of violence; further broaden and strengthen
cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP); ensure that Alliance forces
have the best possible capabilities to meet these challenges and are able to
work together seamlessly; continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive
strategy to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political
and defense efforts; and find a swift resolution of remaining issues
between Russia and Georgia.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the
condition that the member nations will be able to uphold and maintain
stability and security in the post 9-11 in order to meet the challenges of the
global security environment.
c. The member nations wants the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).
Implicatures:
k. Assertion:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the
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same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members
that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its members,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to the Alliance.
~
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members it
is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
c
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it
is establishing political relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members
conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force
if necessary,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members
will use force if necessary,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force
is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries,
Directive:
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a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a
part of the same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member
countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its members and other countries in the global security
environment,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive
to its members and other countries in the global security
environment.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral
alliance commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries
and other countries
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
countries and other countries it is establishing political
relationships.
,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries
and other countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully.
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
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to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment.
1. Commitment:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries
along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a
part of the same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the
member countries that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance
commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
v
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries it is establishing political relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment
to its member countries.
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will
use force if necessary.
'
-.
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ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries will use force if necessary,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is
[
relevant to its member countries.
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative.
_____
Presuppositions:
a. If the member nations are able to uphold and maintain stability and security in the
post 9-11, then the Alliance will be able to maintaining security and stability for
its member nations and throughout the global security environment.
b. If the member nations are not able to uphold and maintain stability and security in
the post 9-11, then the Alliance will not be able to maintaining security and
stability for its member nations and throughout the global security environment.
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APPENDIX P

DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 7

Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 7
- • ,
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2002) 59 held at NATO HQ Brussels 14 May
2002
Speech Act: Assertive, Commitment, and Directive
a. The member nations hereby assert:
a. Re-affirmed NATO's commitment to a peaceful, stable and democratic
South-East Europe, and to the development of close and effective relations
between NATO and the European Union.
b. Reiterate our determination to combat the threat of terrorism for as long as
necessary.
c. Meeting this challenge is fundamental to our security.
d. Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation make an essential
contribution to preventing the use of WMD, along with deterrence and
defense.
e. To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field
forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain
operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.
f. The accession process will take into account work conducted under the
MAP, and the MAP will be used to help the integration of invitees into
Alliance structures.
g. We commend Croatia on the progress it has made in its reform efforts,
making full use of the options offered by Partnership for Peace (PfP), the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Intensified Dialogue.
h. We welcome the decisive and substantial deepening of the NATO-Russia
relationship, which marks an historic step towards the Alliance's longstanding goal of building a secure, cooperative and democratic EuroAtlantic area.
i. We note Ukraine's strong determination to pursue full Euro-Atlantic
integration.
j . Since 11 September, the important contribution made by NATO's
Partnerships to Euro-Atlantic security has been confirmed and reinforced.
k. Our joint efforts in the Balkans have furthered the achievement of peace
and stability in that region and shown that close cooperation brings
considerable benefits.
1. The events of 11 September have underlined the importance of enhanced
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cooperation between the two organizations on questions of common
interest relating to security, defense, and crisis management, so that crises
would be met with the most appropriate military response and effective
crisis management ensured,
m. The continued presence of NATO-led forces demonstrates and embodies
our determination to oppose all violence whether ethnically, politically or
criminally motivated, and to strengthen peace, tolerance, the rule of law
and democratic institutions in the region,
n. We reiterate that the Entities carry primary responsibility for bringing to
justice persons indicted for war crimes, and urge them to cooperate more
effectively with SFOR to this end.
o. Reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1244, and welcome the establishment of
provisional institutions of self-government which include representatives
of all communities,
p. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, along with deterrence
and defense play an essential role in enhancing security against these new
threats and challenges,
q. The Alliance stresses the importance of abiding by and strengthening
existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes and
international arms control and disarmament accords,
r. Recognizing the contributions of the CFE Treaty to European security and
stability, we recall that the entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty
would permit accession by non-CFE States.
b. The member nations hereby direct:
a. Croatia to continue to contribute to stability in the Balkans.
b. Urge Russia to find a prompt and lasting political and peaceful resolution
to the conflict in Chechnya, and to respect and protect the human and legal
rights of the population.
c. Call on the Chechen side to cooperate in good faith in seeking a political
solution to the conflict, to condemn terrorism and to take action against it.
d. Encourage Ukraine to implement the reforms required to achieve this
objective and stand ready to continue to assist it in this regard.
e. Call on the local authorities in the country to take on greater responsibility
for and ownership of the process of implementing the Dayton Peace
Agreement.
f. Call on the provisional institutions and community leaders to assume their
responsibilities and fully cooperate with UNMIK, KFOR and the'
international community to promote a peaceful, multi-ethnic, multicultural and democratic Kosovo.
g. Encourage Russia to enhance its cooperation with NATO to facilitate our
efforts to verify this claim as soon as possible.
(
c. The member nations hereby commit to:
a. Act on its core commitments to deter and defend against any threat of
aggression against any NATO member state, as provided for in Articles 5
and 6 of the Washington Treaty.
'•
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b. To the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan.
c. The Alliance and its members are playing their full part in the current
campaign against terror, confirming NATO's key role in ensuring EuroAtlantic security, including in the face of new threats.
d. Adapt to be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks and to
strengthen security right across the Euro-Atlantic area.
e. Strengthen our national and collective capacities to protect our
populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist
attack, directed from abroad.
f. Working together with member nations and Partners to deal with the threat
posed by possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including
their possible use by terrorists, and the means of their delivery.
g. Enhance our ability, through working on all possible options, to provide
support, when requested, to national authorities for the protection of
civilian populations against the effects of any terrorist attack, and are
cooperating with our Partners in this field, taking into account the various
proposals and initiatives put forward.
h. Develop new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance, including
strategic lift and modern strike capabilities, so that NATO can more
effectively respond collectively to any threat of aggression against a
member state.
i. Launch the next round of NATO enlargement.
j . Remain open to new members, and enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic
area.
k. Collective defense and the Alliance's full range of missions, a firm
commitment to contribute to stability and security, especially in regions of
crisis and conflict, and to be willing and able to assume the responsibilities
of membership.
1. Continuing to work with the aspirants to help them make sufficient
progress to be invited to begin accession negotiations at Prague.
m. Support Russia's right to protect her territorial integrity, and recognize her
responsibility to protect all her citizens against terrorism and criminality.
n. Develop new mechanisms and modalities that build on the Charter on a
Distinctive Partnership and bring our relationship to a qualitatively new
level. We expect to deepen and expand our relationship, including
through intensified consultations and cooperation on political, economic
and defense issues.
o. A new, more substantive relationship with Partners, which intensifies our
cooperation in responding to new security- challenges, including terrorism.
p. In light of the changing security environment, the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are adapting to remain
valuable and effective.
q. Upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean
Dialogue, including by consulting with Mediterranean partners on security
matters ,of common concern, including terrorism-related issues, as
appropriate.
''
•,
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r. Achieving a close, transparent and coherent NATO-EU relationship.
s. To make progress on all the various aspects of our relationship, noting the
need to find solutions satisfactory to all Allies on the issue of participation
by non-EU European Allies,
t. A peaceful, stable, and democratic South-East Europe, and reaffirm our
support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in
the region,
u. Working together with our Partners in SFOR and KFOR and with other
international institutions, we will continue to promote regional
reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights of members of all
ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures and a lasting
solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons,
v. We remain actively engaged in the field of border security and smuggling
interdiction operations and reaffirm the importance of a wider regional
approach to these issues,
w. Further support efforts towards security and stability in the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
x. Security by providing support for the EU and OSCE monitors through the
presence of Task Force Fox.
y. A self-sustaining peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in full accordance
with the principles of the General Framework Agreement,
z. Endorse the respective efforts of SFOR and the ICTY to detain and bring
to trial persons indicted for war crimes,
aa. Further developing the Alliance's relations with the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY), and expect swift implementation of the agreement that
has been reached between Serbia and Montenegro in redefining their
relationship,
bb. Full and continued cooperation with ICTY, democratic reform and control
of the military, as well as full and transparent implementation of the
Dayton Peace Agreement, are essential to a deeper relationship with the
Alliance,
cc. Support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue
to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security
objectives,
dd. Adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet the threats posed by
the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, adopting an
appropriate mix of political and defense efforts,
ee. Actively contribute to the development of agreements and measures in
arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, and pursue further arms
reductions, transparency and confidence and security building measures,
ff. Contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and welcome the full
discussion of issues at the Preparatory Conference for the 2005 Review
Conference in April 2002.
gg. Support ongoing efforts to achieve an International Code of Conduct
against Ballistic Missile Proliferation before the end of 2002.
^__^
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hh. Work at NATO on theatre missile defense.
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force
Explicit Performative:
b. The member nations hereby assert in order to maintain stability and security for
the Alliance, its member nations, and their citizens, the Alliance must commit to
promote peaceful, stable, and democratic nations, including those countries in
South-East Europe; continue to combat the threat of terrorism; continue to prevent
the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense; to carry out the full range of
its missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed,
sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives; continue
to develop the relationships with Russia and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation
between
the member nations and the EU; ensuring crisis are met with the most
s
appropriate military response and effective crisis management is implemented;
continue to maintenance out-of-area missions; and uphold current policies and
treaties.
c. The member nations hereby direct the following:
a. Member countries to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties
and policies and to continue to cooperate with the international
community;
b. Encourage Russia to enhance its cooperation with NATO to facilitate our
efforts to verify this claim as soon as possible.
c. Urge Russia and Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to
the conflict;
d. Encourage Croatia to continue to contribute to stability in the Balkans.
e. Encourage Ukraine to implement the reforms required to achieve this
objective and stand ready to continue to assist it in this regard; and
f. Call on the local authorities in all out-of-area missions to take on greater
responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing policies
and treatments.
d. The member nations hereby commit to the following:
a. Act on its core commitments to deter and defend against any threat of
aggression against any NATO member state;
b. Adapt to be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks and to
strengthen security right across the Euro-Atlantic area;
c. Strengthen national and collective capacities to protect our populations,
territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack,
directed from abroad;
d. Work with member nations and Partners to deal with the threat posed by
possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including their
possible use by terrorists, and the means of their delivery;
e. Develop new and balanced capabilities within the Alliance;
f. Launch the next round of NATO enlargement;
g. Remain open to new members, and enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic
area;
h. Build a new, more substantive relationship with Partners;
i. Upgrade the political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean
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Dialogue;
j . Promote regional reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights of
members of all ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building
measures and a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced
persons;
k. Adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet the threats posed by
the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, adopting an
appropriate mix of political and defense efforts;
1. To develop a peaceful, stable and democratic South-East Europe and the
Balkans; and
m. Continue to adapt the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these
challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts.
Reflective Intentions:
a. Assertion:
a. The member nations believe that the Alliance needs to be able to maintain
security and stability for its member nations and in out-of area-mission in
order to meet the challenges of the global security environment.
b. The member nations wants the Alliance to maintain stability and security
for its member nations and in out-of-area missions by commit to promote
peaceful, stable, and democratic nations, including those countries in
South-East Europe; continue to combat the threat of terrorism; continue to
prevent the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense;, to carry out
the full range of its missions and field forces that can move quickly to
wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and
achieve their objectives; continue to develop the relationships with Russia
and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation between the member nations and
the EU; ensuring crisis are met with the most appropriate military
response and effective crisis management is implemented; continue to
maintenance out-of-area missions; and uphold current policies and
treaties.
'
• ./'
b. Directive:
a. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the member nations to ratify,
accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies.
i.
The member nations want its members to ratify, accede and fully
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's
command.
b. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Russia to enhance
its cooperation with NATO.
i.
The member nations want its members to encourage Russia to
enhance its cooperation with NATO because of NATO's
command.
c. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to urge Russia and Chechnya to
cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the conflict.
'
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i. The member nations want its members to urge Russia and
Chechnya to cooperate in good faith to find a solution to the
conflict because of NATO's command.
d. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Croatia to continue
to contribute to stability in the Balkans.
i.
The member nations want its members to encourage Croatia to
continue to contribute to stability in the Balkans because of
NATO's command.
e. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Ukraine to
implement the reforms1 required to achieve this objective and stand ready
to continue to assist it in this regard.
i.
The member nations want its members encourage Ukraine to
implement the reforms required to achieve this objective and stand
ready to continue to assist it in this regard because of NATO's
command.
f. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes Sufficient reason to call on the local authorities in
all out-of-area missions to take on greater responsibility for and ownership
of the process of implementing policies and treatments.
i.
The member nations want its members to call on the local
authorities in all out-of-area missions to take on greater
responsibility for and ownership of the process of implementing
policies and treatments because of NATO's command,
c. Commitment:
a. The member nations believes its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able
to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of
area-mission in order to meet the challenges of the global security
environment on the condition that the member nations to act on its core
commitments to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against
any NATO member state; Adapt to be better able to perform its
fundamental security tasks and to strengthen security right across the
Euro-Atlantic area; strengthen national and collective capacities to protect
our populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including
terrorist attack, directed from abroad; work with member nations and
Partners to deal with the threat posed by possible use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), including their possible use by terrorists, and the
means of their delivery; develop new and balanced capabilities within the
Alliance; launch the next round of NATO enlargement; remain open to
new members, and enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic area; build a
new, more substantive relationship with Partners; upgrade the political and
practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue; promote regional
reconciliation and cooperation, protection of rights of members of all
ethnic groups and minorities, confidence-building measures and a lasting
solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons; adapt the
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Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet the threats posed by the
proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, adopting an
appropriate mix of political and defense efforts; develop a peaceful, stable
and democratic South-East Europe and the Balkans; and continue to adapt
the Alliance's comprehensive strategy to meet these challenges, adopting
an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts,
b. The member nations want the Alliance nations to carry out the directives
on the condition that the member nations will be able to maintain security
and stability for its member nations and in out-of area-mission in order to
meet the challenges of the global security environment
b. NATO wants its member nations to believe (a) and (b).
__
Implicatures:
m. Assertion:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: The membernations believe that its members along with
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the
same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members
that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its members,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to the Alliance.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it
is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members it
is establishing political relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully.
,
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ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members
conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries,
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force
if necessary,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members
will use force if necessary,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force
is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries,
g. Directive:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a
part of the same race-human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member
countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its members and other countries in the global security
environment,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive
to its members and other countries in the global security
environment.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral
alliance commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries
and other countries
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships.
.
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
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countries and other countries it is establishing political
relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries
and other countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment,
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment,
n. Commitment:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries
along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a
part of the same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the
member countries that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance
commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
•
member countries it is establishing political relationships.
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iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries.
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment
to its member countries.
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will
use force if necessary,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries will use force if necessary,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is
^ relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.
(Implicature): The intentions' of the member nations are normative.
Presuppositions:
a. If the member nations are able to maintain security and stability for its member
nations and in out-of area-mission, then the Alliance will be able to maintaining
security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security
environment.
b. If the member nations are not able to maintain security and stability for its
member nations and in out-of area-mission, then the Alliance will not be able to
maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the
global security environment.
'
.
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APPENDIX Q

DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS FOR SPEECH ACT 8

Dialogical Analysis for Speech Act 8
'
.
Statement: Press Communique M-NAC-2 (2003) 152 held at NATO HQ Brussels 4 Dec
2003
.
Speech Act: Assertive, Commitment, and Directive
b. The member nations hereby assert:
a. The North Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of our collective defense
and the essential transatlantic forum for security. Today, we took stock of
NATO's ongoing transformation to meet 21st century threats and
challenges to the security of our populations, territory and forces, from
wherever they may come, and gave direction on work still to be done.
b. We look forward to welcoming seven new members of the Alliance by the
time of the Istanbul Summit, which will strengthen security for all in the
Euro-Atlantic area.
c. In Afghanistan, the Alliance now leads the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) under its UN mandate.
d. Peace, stability and reconstruction in Iraq remain a high priority.
e. The security environment in the strategically important region of the
Balkans is stable but remains fragile.
f. We want to see enduring stability and peace in the Balkans.
g. Our missions in the Balkans continue to evolve.
h. The improved security environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina will allow
for further reduction of SFOR by next Spring,
i. In Kosovo, KFOR's presence remains essential,
j . Direct dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina on practical issues of
mutual concern remains a key benchmark and an indispensable element of
;
the international community's policy of Standards before Status.
k. We recognize the progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia
and Montenegro in their efforts to join Partnership for Peace (PfP),
welcome substantive progress on defense reform.
1. NATO and the European Union share common strategic interests,
m. NATO-EU cooperation has made concrete progress and is developing in a
' •- . ' constructive manner.
n. NATO's Partnerships, which contribute greatly to security and stability
across the Euro-Atlantic area, are of increasing value and importance.
.
o. Partnership for Peace has been an increasingly effective instrument for
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cooperation in such areas as peace support operations and the fight against
terrorism.
p. Security in the Euro-Atlantic area is closely linked to security and stability
in the Mediterranean.
q. This initiative will genuinely improve cooperation in a number of fields,
including on defense reform and interoperability, including through PfPlike instruments, and open more Partnership activities to the
Mediterranean Dialogue partners on a case by case basis.
r. The NATO-Russia Council, in which NATO member states and Russia
work together as equal partners in areas of common interest, continues to
make valuable contributions to security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.
Our political dialogue has developed on key security issues, including
Afghanistan and the Balkans. Our practical cooperation has reached a
new level, including in military-to-military projects; and, through our
focus on improving interoperability, we have also laid the groundwork for
future military cooperation, including potentially in joint peacekeeping
operations.
s. We stress the importance of abiding by, fully implementing and
strengthening existing international arms control and disarmament accords
and multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes.
t. It is essential that efforts be intensified to complete the withdrawal in early
2004.
c. The member nations hereby direct to:
a. We encourage all parties in Kosovo to work constructively to meet the
agreed standards, and to support the efforts of the Special Representative
of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Harri Holkeri.
b. We encourage Belgrade and Pristina to pursue their dialogue in good faith.
c. We encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan countries.
d. We expect them to assume ownership of, and implement, pressing reforms
and they must comply fully with their international obligations.
e. We call on the Government and all political actors in the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia to continue to work toward full implementation of
the Ohrid Agreement.
f. We encourage Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their
candidacies for NATO membership.
g. We encourage Ukraine to pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full
Euro-Atlantic integration, and we will keep under active review all
possible options to support Ukraine in these efforts.
h. We call on the Georgian authorities to hold free and fair elections, planned
for January next year. '. •
i. We urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and
Russia and call upon the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately
senior level.
d. The member nations hereby commit to:
a. Preserve peace through its operations; spreading stability through its
313

b.
c.
d.
e.

f.

g.
h.

i.
j.

k.
1.
m.
n.
o.
p.
q.

r.

s.
t.
u.

partnerships; and reinforcing our community of shared values through the
most robust round of enlargement in our history.
Categorically reject and condemn terrorism in all its forms.
Use all means at its disposal and to cooperate fully with other international
organizations and with its Partners to fight terrorism.
This operation demonstrates our readiness to deploy forces wherever the
Alliance decides, to ensure our common security.
Our aim is to assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country,
integrated into the international community, including by assisting the
Afghan Transitional Authority in the maintenance of security and stability
and in the electoral process according to the Bonn Process.
Develop a comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in
Afghanistan, in close consultation with other International Organizations
and the Afghan Transitional Authority.
Support Poland in its leadership of a multi-national division in Iraq.
Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1511 on Iraq and are
committed to its full implementation in order to restore conditions of
stability and security in the country, and return governing responsibilities
and authorities to the people of Iraq,
Support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in
theBalkans.
Consult with their EU counterparts on Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
accordance with agreed texts and procedures and within the framework of
Berlin,
Further advancement towards a process to determine Kosovo's future
status, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
Committed to help the countries of the Balkans integrate fully into EuroAtlantic structures.
,
The current round of enlargement will not be the last and that NATO's
door remains open,
Continue to assist both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in meeting
established NATO conditions for PfP membership,
Review and develop NATO's Balkans strategy, encompassing political
aspects as well as operations,
Enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU.
Examine whether and how selected Partnership activities might be opened,
on a case by case basis, to other countries which might express an interest
in such involvement,
Consider ways to further enhance this relationship by generating, in
consultation with all Mediterranean Dialogue partners options to develop a
more ambitious and expanded framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue.
Build on the progress between NATO and Russia, and to further
enhancing the NATO-Russia relationship,
Create stronger NATO-Ukraine relations under the Charter on a
Distinctive Partnership.
Closely following the development of events in Georgia.
•
:
314

v. Support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia,
w. Develop Partnership with Georgia through using the full range of
Partnership instruments,
x. Support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue
to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security
objectives, including preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery.
y. Reinforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the"pre-eminent non-proliferation
and disarmament mechanism, and ensuring the full compliance with it by
all states party to the Treaty,
z. Strengthen our common efforts to safeguard nuclear and radiological
material,
aa. Support the aims of the Proliferation Security Initiative to establish a more
coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop
shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to
and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent
with national legal authorities and relevant international law and
frameworks, including the United Nations Security Council,
bb. The protection of civilian populations,
cc. The CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security, and reaffirm our
attachment to the early entry into force of the Adapted Treaty,
dd. Multilateralism through effective action and our shared commitment to:
the transatlantic link; NATO's fundamental security tasks including
collective defense; our shared democratic values; and the United Nations
Charter. ,
ee. Implementation of measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of
the NATO Headquarters organization, including through modern
management and financial systems, sound and transparent management of
the new Headquarters project, and improvements to gender balance and
diversity in the Alliance's International Staff.
Rules Invoked: Identity, Security, Deterrence, Enforcement, and Use of Force
Explicit Performative:
b. The North Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of our collective defense and the
essential transatlantic forum for security. Today, we took stock of NATO's
ongoing transformation to meet. 21st century threats and challenges to the security
of our populations, territory and forces, from wherever they may come, and gave
direction on work still to be done thus the member nations needs to continue
expand the Alliance and encourage new members to join; continue to combat
terrorism; ensure peace, stability and reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan, the
Balkans; continue to help to improve the security environment in Bosnia and
Herzegovina; continue to prevent the use of WMD, along with deterrence and
defense; to carry out the full range of its missions and field forces that can move
quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations oyer distance and time,
and achieve their objectives; continue to develop the relationships with Russia
and the Ukraine; enhance cooperation between the member nations and the EU;
ensuring crisis are met with the most appropriate military response and effective
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crisis management is implemented; continue to maintenance out-of-area missions;
and uphold current policies and treaties.
e. The member nations hereby direct the following:
n. Member countries to ratify, accede, and fully implement NATO treaties
and policies and to continue to cooperate with the international
community;
0. Encourage all parties in Kosovo to work constructively to meet theagreed
standards;
a. Encourage regional cooperation among the Balkan countries;
b. Encourage Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their
candidacies for NATO membership.
c. Encourage Ukraine to pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full EuroAtlantic integration; and
d. Urge swift resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and
Russia and call upon the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately
senior level.
f. The member nations hereby commit to the following:
a. Preserve peace through its operations; spread stability through its
partnerships; and reinforce our community of shared values through the
most robust round of enlargement in our history.
b. Use all means at its disposal and to cooperate fully with other international
organizations and with its Partners to fight terrorism;
c. Assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country, integrated into the
international community;
d. Develop a comprehensive strategy for NATO's engagement in
Afghanistan, in close consultation with other International Organizations
and the Afghan Transitional Authority;
e. Support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in
the Balkans and help those countries to integrate fully into Euro-Atlantic
structures;
f. Continue with the enlargement of NATO;
g. Enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU;
h. Consider ways to further enhance relationships by generating a more
ambitious and expanded framework;
i. Build on the progress between NATO and Russia, and NATO and the
Ukraine;
j . Closely follow the development of events in Georgia and support the
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia;
k. Support farms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to
play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives,
including preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) and their means of delivery;
1. Multilateralism through effective, action and our shared commitment to:
the transatlantic link; and
m. Implementation of measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of
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the organization.
'
,'
Reflective Intentions:
d. Assertion:
a. The member nations believe the Alliance is the basis of collective defense
and the essential transatlantic forum for security and as such it needs to
maintain security and stability for its member nations and Partners in order
to meet the challenges of the global security environment.
b. The member nations want the Alliance to maintain security and stability
!
for it member nations and Partners by taking stock of NATO's ongoing
transformation to meet 21st century threats and challenges to the security
of our populations, territory and forces, from wherever they may come,
and gave direction on work still to be done thus the member nations needs
to continue expand the Alliance and encourage new members to join;
continue to combat terrorism; ensure peace, stability and reconstruction in
Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans; continue to help to improve the security
environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina; continue to prevent the use of
WMD, along with deterrence and defense; to carry out the full range of its
missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are
needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their
objectives; continue to develop the relationships with Russia and the
Ukraine; enhance cooperation between the member nations and the EU;
ensuring crisis are met with the most appropriate military response and
effective crisis management is implemented; continue to maintenance outof-area missions; and uphold current policies and treaties.
e. Directive:
g. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason for the member nations to ratify,
accede and fully implement NATO treaties and policies,
i.
The member nations wants its member to ratify, accede and fully
implement NATO treaties and policies because of NATO's
command,
h. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage all parties in
Kosovo to work constructively to meet the agreed standards;
i. The member nations want its members to encourage all parties in
Kosovo to work constructively to meet the agreed standards
j because of NATO's command.
i. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage regional
cooperation among the Balkan countries;
ii. The member nations want its members to encourage regional
cooperation among the Balkan countries because of NATO's
command.
j . The member nations believes in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage Albania, Croatia
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue pursuing the
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reforms necessary to advance their candidacies for NATO membership,
iii. The member nations want its members to encourage Albania,
Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to
continue pursuing the reforms necessary to advance their
candidacies for NATO membership because of NATO's command,
k. The member nations believe in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance, constitutes sufficient reason to encourage the Ukraine to.
pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic integration,
iv. The member nations wants its members to encourage the Ukraine
to pursue all reforms necessary to its goal of full Euro-Atlantic
-v
integration.
1. The member nations believes in its utterance, in virtue of its authority over
the Alliance constitutes sufficient reason to urge swift resolution of the
outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia and call upon the parties
to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level.
i. The member nations wants its members to urge swift resolution of
the outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia and call upon
the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level,
f. Commitment:
d. The member nations believes its utterance obligates the Alliance to be able
to maintain security and stability for its member nations and in out-of
area-mission in order to meet the challenges of the global security
environment on the condition that the member nations strive to preserve
peace through its operations; spread stability through its partnerships; and
reinforce our community of shared values through the most robust round
of enlargement in our history; use all means at its disposal and to
cooperate fully with other international organizations and with its Partners
to fight terrorism; assist in the emergence of a united, sovereign country,
integrated into the international community; develop a comprehensive
strategy for NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, in close consultation
with other International Organizations and the Afghan Transitional
Authority; support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the
countries in the Balkans and help those countries to integrate fully into
Euro-Atlantic structures; continue with the enlargement of NATO;
enhancing cooperation between NATO and the EU; consider ways to
further enhance relationships by generating a more ambitious and
expanded framework; build on the progress between NATO and Russia,
and NATO and the Ukraine; closely follow the development of events in
Georgia and support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Georgia; support farms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will
continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security
objectives, including preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery; multilateralism through
effective action and our shared commitment to: the transatlantic link; and
implementation of measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of
.
the organization.
.

e. The member nations want the Alliance to carry out the directives on the
condition that the member nations will be able to maintain security and
stability for its member nations and in out-of area-mission in order to meet
the challenges of the global security environment
f. The member nations want the Alliance to believe (a) and (b).
,
Implicatures:
o. Assertion:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: The member nations believe that its members along with
other countries around the world and their citizens are a part of the
same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs the members
that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its members,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to the Alliance.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members it
is establishing a multilateral alliance commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members it
is establishing political relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations'assertion informs its members
conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries.
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e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its members will use force
if necessary,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its members
will use force if necessary,
in. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing its use of force
is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries,
h. Directive:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its members along
with other countries in the global security and their citizens are a
part of the same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs the member
countries and other countries that they are fellow citizens.
•
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its members and other countries in the global security
environment,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its directive
to its members and other countries in the global security
environment.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' directive informs its member
countries and other countries it is establishing a multilateral
alliance commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries
and other countries
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
countries and other countries it is establishing political
relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries
and other countries.
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
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to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment,
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' assertion informs its member
countries and other countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
v. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its assertion
to its member countries and other countries in the global security
environment,
p. Commitment:
a. NATO member countries believe we are fellow citizens.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that its member countries
}
along with other countries around the world and their citizens are a
part of the same race - human,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs the
member countries that they are fellow citizens,
iii. Relevance: NATO member countries are fellow citizens is relevant
to its member countries.
/
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
b. NATO member countries believe security is based on multilateral
commitment to use.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe that it is establishing
security through multilateral alliance commitment,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries it is establishing a multilateral alliance
commitment,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through a multilateral alliance is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
c. NATO member countries believe security is based on political
relationships.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe it is establishing security
through political relationships,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries it is establishing political relationships,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing security
through political relationships is relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
d. NATO member countries will resolve conflicts peacefully.
:
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe conflicts can be resolved
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peacefully,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries conflicts can be resolved peacefully,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing conflicts can
be resolved peacefully,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations clearly conveying its commitment
to its member countries,
e. NATO member countries will use force if necessary.
i. Quality: NATO member nations believe its member countries will
use force if necessary,
ii. Quantity: NATO member nations' commitment informs its
member countries will use force if necessary,
iii. Relevance: NATO member nations are establishing it will force is
relevant to its member countries,
iv. Manner: NATO member nations are clearly conveying its
commitment to its member countries.
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are sincere.
(Implicature): The intentions of the member nations are normative..
'
Presuppositions:
c. If the member nations are able to maintain security and stability for its member
nations and in out-of area-missions, then the Alliance will be able to maintaining
security and stability for its member nations and throughout the global security
environment,
a. If the member nations are not able to maintain security and stability for its
member nations and in 6ut-of area-missions, then the Alliance will not be able to
maintaining security and stability for its member nations and throughout the
global security environment.
/ .
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